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The	  research	  set	  out	  to	  examine	  the	  investment	  &	  economic	  suitability	  of	  Renewable	  Energy	  (“RE”)	  
assets	  for	  South	  African	  institutional	  investors.	  Data	  was	  collected	  through	  a	  series	  of	  structured	  and	  
semi	  structured	  interviews	  and	  further	  triangulated	  and	  cross-­‐checked	  through	  a	  thorough	  literature	  
review	   of	   available	   policy	   documentation	   and	   academic	   literature.	   The	   limitations	   concerning	   this	  
study	  have	  much	  to	  do	  with	  the	  nascent	  nature	  of	  the	  renewable	  energy	  program	  and	  therefore	  the	  
lack	  of	  availability	  of	  hard	  economic	  and	  financial	  historical	  data.	  Further	  there	  is	  very	  little	  academic	  
literature	  on	  renewable	  energy	  investing	  pertaining	  to	  a	  South	  African	  context.	  To	  mitigate	  some	  of	  
the	   risks	   presented	   by	   the	   aforementioned	   limitations,	   interviewees	   were	   mainly	   subject-­‐matter	  
experts	   on	   the	   issue	   of	   RE	   investing	   and	   therefore	   provided	   key	   insights	   through	   a	   series	   of	  
structured	  and	  semi-­‐structured	  interviews.	  Within	  a	  South	  Africa	  specific	  context,	  there	  is	  very	  little	  
academic	  material	  dealing	  with	  RE	  or	  infrastructure	  finance	  and	  investment.	  The	  implications	  of	  this	  
study	  are	  therefore	  crucial	  in	  helping	  set	  the	  basis	  for	  the	  development	  of	  future	  theories	  around	  this	  
and	   related	   topics.	   Interview	  discussions	  and	   review	  of	  other	  material	   revealed	  key	   themes,	  which	  
allowed	  the	  researcher	  to	  discern	  some	  key	  findings:	  
Firstly,	   there’s	   a	   cautious	   but	   emerging	   consensus	   that	   the	   economic	   and	   financial	   features	   of	   RE	  
assets	  make	  them	  suitable	  (and	  even	  attractive)	  for	  consideration	  in	  asset	  class	  allocation	  decisions.	  
Further	  and	  related:	  the	  merging	  view	  was	  that	  RE	  assets	  could	  offer	  the	  benefit	  of	  both	  reducing	  risk	  
and	   increasing	  expected	   returns	  within	  a	  given	  portfolio.	  A	  key	   related	  sub-­‐theme	  and	   finding	  was	  
the	   need	   to	   establish	   a	   common	   set	   of	   nomenclature,	   which	   would	   describe	   and	   ultimately	   help	  
benchmark	  the	  economic	  and	  financial	  features	  of	  RE	  assets	  –	  the	  ability	  to	  benchmark	  financial	  and	  
economic	   data	   being	   a	   key	   aspect	   of	   the	   asset	   allocation	   framework.	   Secondly	   data	   collected	  
indicated	   that	   there	   is	   strong	   institutional	   support	   for	   government’s	   energy	   policy	   and	   how	   it	   has	  
been	   implemented	   to	   date.	   	   Thirdly,	   in	   working	   out	   the	   suitability	   of	   RE	   assets	   investors	   tend	   to	  
default	  to	  comparable	  proxies	  such	  as	  bonds,	  equities,	  REITS.	  The	  emerging	  theme	  coming	  out	  of	  the	  
data	   is	   that	   RE	   assets	   are	   likely	   to	   resemble	   fixed	   income	   assets	   in	   their	   financial	   and	   economic	  
characteristics.	   	   Lastly,	   for	   all	   the	   emerging	   consensus	   in	   support	   of	   the	   government’s	   RE	   policy,	  
many	   investors	   seem	  to	  hedge	   their	  optimism	  and	   remain	  generally	  unsure	  and	   in	   some	   instances	  
sceptical	   of	   the	   overall	   sustainability	   of	   the	   program,	   citing	   the	   fact	   that	   there	   are	   still	   too	  many	  
unknowns	  regarding	  RE	  assets	  and	  their	  respective	  futures.	  This	  research	  therefore	  has	  some	  useful	  
practical	  applications	  for	  institutional	  investors,	  hopefully	  further	  demystifying	  a	  sector	  that	  could	  be	  
a	  lynchpin	  of	  the	  South	  African	  economy	  for	  some	  time	  to	  come.	  
Key	  words:	  infrastructure	  investment,	  asset	  allocation,	  renewable	  energy,	  and	  institutional	  investors	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1.1 Research	  Area	  
1.1.1 REIPPP	  
As	   little	   as	   under	   20	   years	   ago	   (1998),	   South	   Africa	   experienced	   an	   oversupply	   electricity	  
generation,	  so	  much	  so	  that	  Eskom,	  under	  policy	  directives	   from	  DOE,	  was	  mothballing	   its	  
available	  generation	  capacity	  (DOE,	  2015).	  By	  the	  start	  of	  2008	  however,	  this	  situation	  had	  
reversed	  itself.	  With	  a	  growing	  economy	  and	  increased	  demand	  for	  electricity,	  South	  Africa	  
began	   experiencing	   structural	   supply	   problems:	   struggling	   to	   meet	   growing	   electricity	  
demand	   whilst	   at	   the	   same	   time	   supply	   itself	   had	   dwindled	   (Baker,	   2015).	   As	   Marquard	  
(2007)	  indicates,	  before	  1990	  just	  over	  a	  quarter	  of	  the	  population	  had	  access	  to	  electricity,	  
whereas	  a	  decade	  later	  that	  number	  had	  more	  than	  doubled,	  with	  an	  electricity	  penetration	  
rate	   just	  over	  60%.	  This	   trend	  continued,	  with	  penetration	  rates	  of	  circa	  85%	  having	  being	  
achieved	  by	  2011	  (DOE,	  2015).	  
These	   structural	   shifts	   in	   demand	   and	   supply	   planted	   the	   seeds	   for	   private	   investment	  
opportunities	  within	  the	  South	  African	  energy	  sector,	  with	  renewable	  energy	  identified	  as	  an	  
early	  potential	  investment	  target	  (Winkler,	  2005).	  As	  far	  back	  as	  2003	  DOE	  published	  a	  white	  
paper,	  which	  included	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  the	  country’s	  energy	  mix,	  an	  intention	  to	  develop	  
renewable	  energy	   (“RE”)	   technologies	   in	  order	   to	  diversify	   Eskom’s	   reliance	  on	   coal	   (DOE,	  
2015),	  (Eskom	  Annual	  Reports,	  2008-­‐2014).	  
In	  August	   2011,	   the	  DOE	   issued	  Request	   For	  Proposals	   (“RFPs”),	   inviting	  private	   investors,	  
developers	  and	  other	  interested	  parties	  to	  bid	  and	  table	  their	  respective	  plans	  to	  provide	  RE	  
into	  the	  grid	  as	  Independent	  Power	  Producers	  (“IPPs”)	  (DOE,	  2011;	  Msimanga	  and	  Sebitosi	  
(2014).	   Thus	   the	  Renewable	  Energy	   Independent	  Power	  Producer	  Procurement	   (“REIPPP”)	  
program	  was	  born,	  with	  REIPPP	   located	   firmly	  within	   the	  DOE’s	   long-­‐term	  energy	  plans	   to	  
introduce	   private	   energy	   producers	   to	   augment	   Eskom’s	   generation	   capacity	   (Baker	   and	  
Wlokas,	  2014).	  	  From	  the	  onset	  therefore,	  government	  identified	  the	  crucial	  role	  that	  private	  
sector	  capital	  would	  play	  in	  helping	  DOE	  develop	  a	  long	  term,	  sustainable	  energy-­‐mix	  plan.	  
This	  paper	  looks	  at	  how	  the	  role	  of	  particularly	  institutional	  investors	  could	  prove	  critical	  in	  
helping	  DOE	  roll	  out	  its	  renewable	  energy	  platform	  –	  a	  key	  aspect	  of	  DOE’s	  overall,	  long	  term	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energy	  plan	   (IRP,	  2013).	  More	  particularly,	   the	  paper	  examines	  how	   institutional	   investors	  
currently	  perceive	  RE	  assets	  and	  whether	  investment	  into	  RE	  assets	  will	  help	  them	  fulfil	  their	  
current	  investment	  aims	  and	  objectives.	  
The	  REIPPP	  program	  involves	  a	  series	  of	  bidding	  rounds	  occurring	  approximately	  once	  year.	  
To	  date	  there	  have	  been	  four	  bidding	  rounds	  under	  the	  REIPPP	  program	  with	  a	  fifth	  round1	  
expected	  close	  was	  in	  November	  2015.	  In	  the	  first	  round	  of	  bidding,	  in	  November	  2011,	  53	  
bids	   were	   received	   by	   DOE,	   with	   twenty	   eight	   being	   adjudged	   successful,	   representing	  
1416MW	  of	  wattage	  and	  total	  investment	  size	  of	  nearly	  sixty-­‐billion	  Rands	  (Eberhard,	  Kolker,	  
Leigland,	   2014).	   The	   first	   of	   the	   IPPs	   plugged	   into	   the	   national	   grid	   in	   December	   2012	  
(Creamer,	  2012,	  November	  16).	  	  
In	   the	   second	   round	   of	   bidding	   in	   March	   2012,	   seventy-­‐nine	   bids	   were	   received	   with	  
nineteen	   being	   awarded.	   The	   third	   round	   of	   bidding	   occurred	   in	  May	   2013	   with	   93	   bids	  
submitted	   with	   only	   seventeen	   bids	   successful.	   A	   fourth	   round	   of	   bidding	   is	   currently	  
underway	  as	  of	  time	  of	  writing	  (Creamer,	  supra).	  
The	  REIPPP	  program	  has	  been	  considered	  an	  extra-­‐ordinary	  success	  even	  though	  it	  is	  still	  in	  
its	  infancy	  stages.	  With	  64	  new	  IPPs	  (to	  date)	  expecting	  to	  yield	  additional	  3922	  MW	  into	  the	  
national	   grid,	   the	   program	   is	   amongst	   the	  most	   successful	   RE	   programs	   in	   the	   world.	   As	  
Eberhard	   et	   al,	   (2014)	   puts	   it:	   “Since	   2012,	   South	   Africa	   has	   ranked	   among	   the	   top	   ten	  
countries	   globally	  in	   terms	   of	   renewable	   energy	   IPP	   investments.	   In	   less	   than	   three	   years,	  
South	  Africa	  has	   signed	  up	  more	   investment	   for	  more	   independent	  power	  generation	   than	  
has	  been	  achieved	  across	  the	  entire	  African	  continent	  over	  the	  past	  20	  years.”	  
Figure	  1	  Selected	  projects	  in	  Rounds	  1	  -­‐	  3	  of	  REIPPP	  (Source:	  Baker	  and	  Wlokas,	  2015)	  
1 Colloquially	  referred	  to	  as	  Round	  4,5	  (Business	  Day,	  21	  September,	  p3)
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Per	  the	  bid	  program,	  an	  IPP	  entity	  builds,	  owns	  and	  operates	  a	  RE	  power	  plant	  off	  the	  back	  
of,	   inter	  alia,	   a	  20	  year	  Power	  Purchasing	  Agreement	   (DOE,	  2012;	  Msimanga	  and	  Sebitosi,	  
2014).	  The	  winning	  bidders	  develop,	  build,	  own	  and	  operate	  the	  IPP	  utility	  for	  the	  duration	  
of	  the	  PPA	  (Eberhard	  et	  al,	  2014).	  
The	   REIPPP	   program	   has	   attracted	   an	   array	   of	   stakeholders	   –	   financiers,	   developers,	  
technology	  manufacturers,	  suppliers	  and	  international	  utility	  companies.	  At	  time	  of	  writing	  
there	   were	   sixty-­‐four	   successfully	   bid	   projects	   across	   different	   RE	   technology	   platforms	  
(solar,	  wind,	  biomass,	  hydro).	  
Per	  the	  REIPPP	  program,	  an	  IPP	  bids	  to	  build,	  own	  and	  operate	  a	  project	  utility	  off	  the	  back	  
of	   a	   twenty	   year	   Power	   Purchase	   Agreement	   (“PPA”)	   from	   Eskom.	   National	   Treasury	  
(“Treasury”)	   in	   turn	   underwrites	   Eskom’s	   obligations	   under	   the	   PPA.	   All	   REIPPP	   PPAs	   are	  
structured	   on	   a	   ‘take	   or	   pay	   basis’	   for	   the	   full	   20	   year	   duration.	   Furthermore,	   typical	   to	  
infrastructure	  projects	  of	  this	  nature,	  the	  projects	  are	  financed	  with	  a	  combination	  of	  debt	  
and	  equity	  (DOE,	  2012;	  Baker,	  2015).	  
The	   sustainability	   of	   the	   REIPPP	   will	   be	   dependant	   on	   the	   long-­‐term	   participation	   of	  
investors	  into	  the	  sector.	  Kaminker	  and	  Stewart	  (2012)	  write	  that	  institutional	  investors	  play	  
a	   key	   role	   in	   determining	   the	   sustainability	   of	   utility	   assets	   and	   are	   key	   partners	   to	  
policymakers	   in	   developing	   clean-­‐energy	   policy.	   It	   therefore	   follows	   that	   policymakers,	  
practioners	   should	   concern	   themselves	   with	   the	   views	   of	   institutional	   investors	   on	   the	  
REIPPP	  program	  and	  what	  role	  they	  can	  play	  over	  the	  long	  term.	  
The	  South	  African	  institutional	  market	  however,	  does	  not	  have	  an	  established	  track	  record	  
as	   investors	   into	   utility	   assets,	   generally,	   let	   alone	   RE	   assets	   specifically.	   Within	   a	   South	  
African	   context	   we	   have	   yet	   to	   develop	   what	   Blanc-­‐Brude	   et	   al	   (2014)	   refers	   to	   as	   the	  
relevant	  infrastructure	  benchmarks.	  Benchmarks	  that	  would	  allow	  us	  to	  accurately	  measure	  
the	  financial	  viability	  and	  success	  of	  REIPPP.	  Given	  the	  newness	  of	  the	  REIPPP	  we	  simply	  do	  
not	  have	  enough	  hard	  data.	  	  Gratwick	  and	  Eberhard	  (2008)	  explain	  that	  some	  of	  the	  reasons	  
for	  lack	  of	  private	  investment	  into	  the	  utility	  space	  is	  a	  consequence	  of	  what	  they	  refer	  to	  as	  
the	  absolute	  dominance	  of	  Eskom	  as	  the	  sole	  end-­‐to-­‐end	  provider	  of	  electricity	  and	  that	  the	  
prevailing	   technology	   of	   choice	   has	   been	   coal-­‐powered	   utilities	   (this	   particular	   point	   has	  
formed	   the	   bedrock	   of	   South	   Africa’s	   energy	   policy	   for	   decades).	   Since	   its	   inception	  
therefore,	   the	   REIPPP	   program	   has	   ushered	   in	   a	   hive	   of	   not	   only	   policy	   activity	   but	   also	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investment	   activity.	   RE	   assets	   require	   large	   capital	   outlay,	   outlay	   that	   Eskom	   itself	   cannot	  
spare.	   REIPPP	   thus	   presents	   some	   potential	   investment	   opportunities,	   particularly	   for	  
institutional	   investors	   looking	  to	  diversify	  their	  current	  asset	  allocation	  outlook.	  (Baker	  and	  
Wlokas,	  2015)	  
1.1.2 Funding	  the	  REIPPP	  
RE	  assets	  are	  typically	  funded	  via	  a	  combination	  of	  debt	  and	  equity	  funding	  via	  a	  ring-­‐fenced	  
special	  purpose	  vehicle	  (“SPV”)	  (Yescome	  2013).	  Debt	  and	  equity	  providers	  capitalize	  a	  ring	  
fenced	  SPV,	  which	  in	  turn	  develops,	  constructs	  and	  ultimately	  operates	  the	  REIPPP	  asset	  on	  
a	  specified	  contractual	  basis.	  Therefore,	  like	  other	  large-­‐scale	  utility	  infrastructure	  projects,	  




Equity	   financiers	  are	  often	   involved	   in	   the	  project	  development	  phase,	   typically	  seeking	   to	  
exit	   upon	   conclusion	   of	   project	   construction	   (Baker	  Wlokas,	   2015).	   Debt	   providers	   on	   the	  
other	   hand,	   time	   their	   involvement	   to	   coincide	   with	   what	   is	   known	   as	   financial	   close2	  
(Gecelter,	  2013).	  	  
The	  REIPPP	  marked	  a	  significant	  departure	  in	  policy	  by	  the	  South	  African	  government,	  in	  that	  
for	  the	  first	  time	  and	  on	  a	  systematic	  basis,	  private	  capital	  participated	  in	  the	  development,	  
construction	  and	  ownership	  of	  large-­‐scale	  utility	  assets	  (Barker,	  2011).	  Once	  again	  this	  paper	  
looks	  at	   the	  potentially	   critical	   role	   institutional	   investors	   (as	  providers	  of	  both	  equity	  and	  
debt	  capital)	  could	  play	  as	  both	  funders	  and	  investors	  into	  the	  REIPPP.	  
1.2 Problem	  Statement	  
The	  aim	  of	  this	  research	  is	  to	  determine	  the	  suitability	  and	  viability	  of	  RE	  assets	  within	  the	  
asset	   allocation	   frameworks	   of	   institutional	   investors,	   that	   is,	   will	   institutional	   investors	  
consider	   investment	   into	   RE	   assets	   attractive	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   their	   current	   investment	  
2	  Financial	  Close	  is	  the	  point	  in	  the	  project	  life	  where	  all	  fund	  arrangements	  have	  been	  fully	  
contracted.	  Usually	  the	  point	  at	  which	  the	  project	  is	  ‘construction	  ready’	  (Eberhard	  et	  al,	  2014)	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considerations.	   A	   key	   determinant	   of	   both	   suitability	   and	   viability	   lies	   in	   determining	  
whether	  the	  key	  economic	  and	  financial	  features	  of	  RE	  assets	  benefit	  the	  overall	  investment	  
aims	  and	  objectives	  of	  institutional	  investors.	  In	  other	  words,	  whether	  RE	  assets	  –	  viewed,	  as	  
a	   separate,	   distinct	   class	   of	   assets	   –	   would	   satisfy	   the	   asset	   allocation	   mandates	   of	  
institutional	  investors.	   In	  an	  ideal	  research	  context	  the	  researcher	  would	  have	  preferred	  to	  
analyse	   reams	  of	   financial	  data	  generated	   from	  RE	  assets	  under	   the	  REIPPP	  and	   from	  that	  
data	  glean	  what	  the	  actual	  financial	  and	  economic	  data	  says	  about	  potential	  asset	  allocation	  
decisions.	  But	  given	  how	  nascent	  the	  REIPPP	   is,	   this	  approach	  simply	  was	  not	  possible	  and	  
instead	  the	  research	  relies	  on	  collating	  the	  views	  of	  subject	  matter	  experts	  within	  the	  REIPPP	  
and	   asset	   management	   world,	   gauging	   the	   fundamental	   question	   of	   whether	   investment	  
into	  the	  REIPPP	  will	  prove	  to	  be	  ultimately	  good	  for	  business.	  	  
It’s	  newness	  notwithstanding,	  the	  success	  of	  the	  REIPPP	  program	  thus	  far	  has	  put	  RE	  assets	  
firmly	  on	  the	   investment	  radar	  of	   local	  and	   international	   investors	   (Wlok	  2014).	  RE	  assets,	  
like	   other	   infrastructure	   assets,	   typically	   have	   long	   dated	   cash	   flows,	   which	   escalate	   in	  
accordance	   with	   inflation.	   The	   twenty-­‐year	   PPA	   contract	   is	   underwritten	   by	   Treasury,	  
therefore	  making	  RE	  cash	  flows	  akin	  to	  SA	  Treasury	  bonds	  in	  overall	  risk	  profile	  (Eberhard	  et	  
al,	  2014).	  	  
This	  research	  therefore	  examines	  the	  suitability	  of	  RE	  assets	  as	  a	  potential	  investment	  class	  
for	  local	  investors;	  examining	  what	  the	  overall	  investment	  considerations	  in	  determining	  the	  
viability	   of	   RE	   asset	   investing.	   Kritzman	   (2007)	   makes	   the	   point	   that	   for	   an	   asset	   to	   be	  
considered	  within	   an	   asset	   allocation	   framework	   it	   needs	   to	   either	   improve	   the	   expected	  
return	  of	  an	  overall	  portfolio	  and/or	  reduce	  the	  risk	  of	  the	  overall	  portfolio.	  A	  key	  part	  of	  this	  
research	   therefore,	   was	   to	   determine	   the	   suitability	   of	   RE	   assets	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   institutional	  
investors’	  broader	  aims	  and	  objectives.	  	  	  
A	  core	  part	  of	  this	  research	  focused	  on	  how	  the	  economic	  and	  financial	  characteristics	  of	  RE	  
assets	   influenced	   their	   viability	   suitability	   or	   lack	   thereof	   of	   for	   institutional	   investors	  
(Meeder,	   2000).	   The	   research	   particularly	   emphasised	   the	   views	   of	   financial	   participants	  
from	  the	  various	  financial	  institutions	  in	  South	  Africa;	  what	  perception	  they	  held	  of	  RE	  assets	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Arguably,	   investors	   now	   have	   an	   additional	   choice	   to	   consider	   in	   their	   asset	   allocation	  
decisions,	   but	   as	  mentioned	  above,	   the	  REIPPP	   is	   still	   very	  much	   in	   its	   nascent	  phase	   and	  
knowledge	  of	   the	  mechanics	  and	  detail	  of	  RE	  assets	  remains	   limited	  for	  many	   institutional	  
investors.	  Critically	  though,	  the	  long	  term	  success	  and	  sustainability	  of	  the	  REIPPP	  program	  
will	  be	  highly	  dependant	  on	  the	   long-­‐term	  availability	  of	  private	   institutional	  sector	  capital	  
(Dodd	   2014)	   and	   RE	   assets	   have	   certain	   characteristics	   that	  may	  make	   them	   suitable	   for	  
institutional	  investors.	  	  
In	   a	   study	   conducted	   for	   the	   South	   African	   Reserve	   Bank	   “(Sarb”)	   Nhlapo	   and	   Gumata	  
(2011)3	   looked	   at	   the	   investment	   patterns	   of	   non-­‐bank	   institutional	   investors	   from	   the	  
period	   1990	   to	   2010.	   In	   their	   study	   Nhlapo	   and	  Gumata	   (2011),	   showed	   that	   during	   that	  
period	  the	  non-­‐bank	  institutional	  investor	  market	  grew	  from	  nearly	  R200	  billion	  to	  over	  R4	  
trillion	  –	  outstripping	  growth	  in	  traditional	  bank	  assets	  during	  the	  same	  period.	  Nhlapo	  and	  
Gumata	  (2011)	  also	  find	  that	  non-­‐bank	  institutional	  investors	  account	  for	  over	  140%	  of	  GDP	  
(versus	  120%	  for	  banks).	  	  
Non-­‐bank	  institutional	   investors	  are	  composed	  of	  pension	  and	  provident	  funds,	  unit	  trusts,	  
insurers	   –	   all	   of	   whom	   with	   significant	   local	   South	   African	   presence.	   Within	   this	   group	  
insurers	  are	  the	  largest	  group	  (Nhlapo	  and	  Gumata,	  2011).	  	  What	  was	  interesting	  about	  this	  
particular	  study,	  was	  how	  it	  showcased	  both	  how	  active	  institutional	  investors	  are	  in	  South	  
Africa	   and	   also	  what	   their	   respective	   asset	   allocation	   outlooks	   are.	   The	   research	   question	  
herein	  relates	  to	  how	  such	  investors	  view	  RE	  assets	  from	  an	  investment	  perspective.	  	  
Leape	  and	  Thomas	  (2011)	  in	  a	  paper	  they	  wrote	  for	  CREFSA,	  LSE4	  highlight	  how	  changes	  in	  
regulations	   (Regulation	   28	   –	   which	   is	   discussed	   in	   more	   detail	   below)	   impacted	   asset	  
allocation	   frameworks	   for	   institutional	   investors.	   In	   this	   same	  study,	   it	   is	   shown	  that	  asset	  
allocation	   outlooks	   for	   institutional	   investors	   have	   increased	   in	   both	  mandate	   and	   scope,	  
with	  investors	  continuously	  seeking	  new	  avenues	  of	  investment	  for	  their	  funds.	  According	  to	  
3 In	   this	  particular	   study	   the	   term	   ‘non-­‐bank	   institutional	   investor’	   typically	   refers	   to	  pension,	  provident,	  annuity	  houses	  
and	  all	  other	  non-­‐banking	  financial	  institutions.	  The	  authors	  also	  use	  the	  words	  ‘institutional	  investors’	  as	  opposed	  to	  ‘non-­‐
bank	   institutional	   investor’.	   For	   the	   purposes	   of	   simplicity,	   this	   research	   paper	   adopts	   the	   use	   of	   the	   term	   ‘institutional	  
investor’	  to	  refer	  to	  non-­‐bank	  institutional	  investors	  who	  seek	  to	  invest	  over	  the	  long	  term.	  	   
4 Centre for Research into Economics and Finance in Southern Africa (CREFSA), London School of Economics 
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Leape	  and	  Thomas	  (2011),	  alternative	  assets	  such	  as	  unlisted	  equity	  will	  continue	  to	  receive	  
greater	  consideration	  in	  asset	  allocation	  frameworks.	  This	  is	  a	  critical	  development	  because	  
an	   increase	   in	  mandate	  scope	  allows	  for	   institutional	   investors	  to	  theoretically	  consider	  RE	  
assets	  within	  their	  asset	  allocation	  frameworks.	  
Much	  of	  the	  starting	  point	  of	  the	  research,	  was	  to	  examine	  the	  body	  of	  literature	  that	  deals	  
with	  the	  theoretical	  nomenclature	  of	  the	  terms	  “asset	  class”,	  “infrastructure”	  and	  whether	  
RE	  Assets	  correspond	  adequately	  enough	  to	  the	  current	  theoretical	  and	  practical	  consensus	  
as	   to	  what	   constitutes	   an	   “infrastructure	   asset	   class”	   (Bitsch,	   Buchner,	   and	  Kaserer,2010).	  
This	  paper	  sought	  to	  find	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  developing	  theories	  and	  consensus	  benefit	  the	  
local	   context	   and	   given	   the	   dearth	   of	   information	   available	   locally,	   an	   examination	   of	  
international	  text	  and	  data	  was	  not	  only	  useful	  but	  also	  necessary.	  	  
Internationally,	  there	  is	  a	  wide	  body	  of	  developing	  literature,	  which	  deals	  with	  the	  economic	  
and	   financial	   features	   of	   infrastructure	   assets,	   particularly	   within	   developing	   market	  
economies	   contexts	   (Henckel,	   and	   McKibbin,	   2010).	   Fedderke,	   Perkins	   and	   Luiz	   (2006)	  
comprehensively	   underscore	   the	   role	   successful	   infrastructure	   investment	   will	   have	   on	   a	  
country’s	   long-­‐term	   growth	   prospects.	   They	   also	   indicate	   that	   South	   Africa	   has	   an	  
infrastructure	  investment-­‐funding	  gap,	  which	  should	  be	  funded	  with	  the	  involvement	  of	  the	  
private	  sector.	  The	  REIPPP	  program	  is	  in	  some	  parts	  a	  policy	  response	  to	  this	  infrastructure-­‐
funding	  gap	  described	  by	  Fedderke	  et	  al	  (2006)	  &	  (Baker,	  2015).	  
With	  nearly	  R140bn	   in	  direct	   investments,	  REIPPP	  has	  been	  described	  as	   the	  single	   largest	  
cause	  of	  foreign	  direct	  investment	  into	  Africa	  (Eberhard	  et	  al,	  2014).	  Within	  a	  South	  African	  
context	   it	   certainly	   is	   one	   of	   most	   active,	   rapid	   and	   largest	   infrastructure	   programs	  
implemented	  by	  the	  South	  African	  government	  since	  1994	  (Baker	  2015).	  The	  program	  is	  still	  
however	   in	   its	   nascent	   stages,	   with	   only	   c35%	   of	   the	   targeted	   10	   000	   MW	   being	   fully	  
implemented	   (DOE,	   2012).	   In	   other	  words	   a	   greater	   investment	   and	   funding	   commitment	  
will	  be	  required	  in	  the	  short	  to	  medium	  term.	  This	  paper	  effectively	  examines	  what	  that	  level	  
of	  commitment	  could	  be	  from	  institutional	  investors.	  This	  is	  a	  critical	  research	  problem	  given	  
how	   long	   term	   sustainability	   of	   the	   REIPPP	   will	   invariably	   rely	   on	   long	   term	   investors	   of	  
which	  institutional	  investors	  such	  as	  pension	  funds	  are	  best	  placed	  to	  provide	  (Kaminker	  and	  
Stewart,	  2012).	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Although	  local	  investors	  are	  regarded	  as	  being	  highly	  robust	  and	  sophisticated	  (OCED,	  2013),	  
compared	  to	  their	  counterparts	  in	  Australia	  and	  Canada,	  South	  African	  institutional	  investors	  
are	   relatively	   inexperienced	   investors	   into	   the	  energy	   infrastructure	   space	   (Inderst,	   2009).	  
Up	   until	   the	   REIPPP	   program,	   Eskom	  was	   the	   single	   largest	   investor	   in	   the	   South	   African	  
utility	  space	  (Waller,	  2010).	  Private	  investment	  was	  crowded	  out	  up	  until	  the	  introduction	  of	  
the	  REIPPP	  program.	  
This	  research	  therefore	  seeks	  to	  fill	  that	  theoretical	  and	  practical	  gap	  with	  research	  findings	  
that	   would	   guide	   investor	   and	   policymaker	   outlook	   regarding	   RE	   assets.	   Success	   of	   the	  
REIPPP	  is	  predicated	  on	  the	  continued	  involvement	  of	  private	  sector	  capital	  investment	  into	  
the	  various	  project	  companies	  and	  bid	  rounds.	  There	  are	  some	  practical	  applications	  of	  this	  
research	  for	  portfolio	  managers,	  analysts	  and	  trustees	  of	  large	  institutional	  funds.	  	  
1.3 Purpose	  and	  Significance	  of	  the	  Research	  
Sustained	   private	   investment	   into	   electricity	   generation	   will	   have	   the	   twin	   effect	   of	  
alleviating	  the	  state’s	  funding	  burden	  and	  would	  support	  overall	  economic	  growth	  (Fedderke	  
et	   al,	   2006).	   Private	   sector	   capital,	   in	   the	   form	   large	   scale	   institutional	   funding	   and	  
investment	   could	   play	   a	   critical	   role	   in	   ensuring	   the	   success	   and	   sustainability	   of	  
government’s	  policy	  imperatives	  and	  supporting	  much	  needed	  economic	  growth.	  
The	  purpose	  of	  this	  study	  is	  to	  determine	  whether	  the	  REIPPP	  program	  represents	  a	  viable	  
investment	   opportunity	   for	   local	   institutional	   investors.	   It	   is	   hoped	   that	   the	   research	   will	  
benefit	   investment	   practitioners	   and	   other	   relevant	   stakeholders,	   helping	   them	   increase	  
their	  own	  understanding	  of	  RE	  assets	  as	  a	  possible	  investment	  choice.	  	  
1.4 Research	  Questions	  and	  Scope	  
The	  primary	  research	  question	  of	  this	  study	  is:	  
“Do	   Renewable	   Energy	   assets	   represent	   a	   viable	   investment	   choice	   for	   South	   African	  
institutional	  investors?”	  	  
Sub	  Question	  1:	  
Are	   RE	   assets	   considered	   an	   asset	   class	   and	   is	   investment	   in	   RE	   assets	   likely	   to	   benefit	  
investor	  asset	  allocation	  outlooks?	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Sub	  Question	  2:	  
What	  factors	  determine	  investor	  outlook	  of	  the	  REIPPP	  program?	  
1.5 Research	  Assumptions	  and	  Ethics	  
a. Research	  assumptions
This	   research	   partly	   relied	   on	   first-­‐hand	   accounts	   of	   interviewees	  who	   are	   subject	  matter	  
experts	  on	   the	   research	   subject	   at	   hand.	   The	   researcher	   compiled	   the	   list	   of	   interviewees	  
based	  on	  their	  proximity	  to	  REIPPP	  program.	  	  
The	  underlying	  assumption	  is	  that	  the	  interviewees	  have	  participated	  in	  good	  faith	  and	  have	  
proffered	  information	  to	  the	  researcher	  in	  good	  faith	  -­‐	  untainted	  with	  undeclared	  agendas.	  
Research	   data	   was	   also	   collected	   by	   a	   careful	   study	   of	   government	   policy	   regarding	  
renewable	  energy.	  Material	  pertaining	  to	  policy	  outlook	  and	  other	  sources	  of	  literature	  and	  
reading	  material	  was	  also	  relied	  on,	  mainly	  to	  triangulate	  interviewee-­‐generated	  data.	  
This	   research	   assumes	   the	   DOE’s	   Renewable	   Energy	   programs	   will	   be	   implemented	   as	  
stipulated	  in	  the	  IRP	  and	  other	  related	  policy	  documentation	  –	  with	  no	  significant	  deviations	  
from	  the	  set	  targets	  for	  RE	  generation	  capacity.	  
In	  this	  paper	  the	  researcher	  uses	  the	  term	  ‘infrastructure	  assets’	  or	  simply	  ‘infrastructure’	  in	  
the	  normative	  sense,	  as	  it	  applies	  to	  economic	  theory	  and	  literature	  (Hulten,	  1996).	  For	  the	  
purposes	  of	   this	   study	  however,	  uses	  of	   the	   term	   is	  meant	   to	   reflect	   the	  narrow	  meaning	  
ascribed	  to	  the	  term	  ‘economic	  infrastructure’	  as	  articulated	  by	  Inderst	  (2010).	  	  
The	   researcher	  also	  defines	   ‘institutional	   investor’	   as	  a	  South	  African	  based,	   typically	  non-­‐
bank	  investor	  (Nhlapo	  and	  Gumata,	  2011)	  (the	  researcher	  concedes	  that	  in a relatively small
financial services market such as South Africa’s, the distinction between banking and non-
banking institutional investor is often more artificial than real).	  Therefore	  mainly	  pension	  and	  
endowment	   funds,	   insurers,	   annuity	   houses	   and	   their	   various	   representatives	   and	   similar.	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This	  restriction	  on	  the	  definition	  above	  is	  useful	  because	  it	  helps	   in	  the	  overall	  mapping	  of	  
the	  direction	  of	  the	  research.	  
Lastly,	   given	   the	   dearth	   of	   listed	   instruments	   (debt	   and	   equity)	   in	   RE	   assets	   under	   the	  
REIPPP,	   this	   study	   was	   primarily	   focused	   on	   the	   suitability	   of	   unlisted	   instruments	   for	  
institutional	   investors.	   Although	   for	   completeness’	   sake,	   examples	   of	   non-­‐local	   studies	  
conducted	  on	  listed	  instruments	  are	  referred	  to	  in	  this	  work	  as	  well.	  
b. Research	  Ethics
As	   will	   be	   discussed	   further	   below,	   data	   forming	   the	   basis	   of	   this	   research	  was	   primarily	  
collected	  through	  a	  series	  of	  interviews.	  Interviewees	  were	  made	  fully	  aware	  of	  the	  research	  
objectives	   and	   were	   made	   aware	   of	   the	   voluntary	   nature	   of	   their	   participation.	   Where	  
requested,	  interviewee	  details	  were	  kept	  anonymous.	  	  
2 LITERATURE	  REVIEW	  
2.1 Overview	  
Institutional	  investors	  in	  South	  African	  invest	  across	  a	  wide	  spectrum	  of	  asset	  classes	  (Leape	  
and	  Thomas,	  2011,	  Nhalpo	  and	  Gumata,	  2011).	  Furthermore,	  as	  Petrella	   (2005)	  highlights,	  
investors	   typically	   make	   investment	   decisions	   based	   on	   pre-­‐existing	   asset	   allocation	  
frameworks.	  Writing	  on	  behalf	  of	   the	  OECD,	   Inderst	   (2009)	  makes	  the	  point	   that	  since	  the	  
2008	   financial	   crisis	   institutional	   investors	   have	   sought	   investments	   that	   both	   provide	  
greater	   diversification	   and	   consistent	   long-­‐term	   income	   returns.	   The	   concept	   of	   expected	  
return	   and	   diversification	   (lowering	   the	   variance	   of	   a	   portfolio)	   has	   been	   the	   focus	   of	  
extensive	  academic	  research	  ever	  since	  Markowitz	  (1952)	  published	  his	  now	  seminal	  paper	  
on	  modern	  portfolio	  theory.	  	  
The	  concepts	  of	  expected	  return	  and	  diversification	  benefits	  serve	  as	  a	  useful	  starting	  point	  
in	  helping	  determine	  whether	  RE	  assets’	  financial	  and	  economic	  features	  are	  observable	  as	  
distinct	   and	   unique	   traits,	   particular	   to	   RE	   assets	   alone.	   The	   study	   therefore	   examines	   in	  
some	  details	  what	  constitutes	  a	  separate	  asset	  class.	  More	  particularly,	  whether	  RE	  assets	  
form	  what	  Idzorek	  and	  Armstrong,	  (2009)	  refer	  to	  as	  a	  ‘mutually	  exclusive,	  non-­‐overlapping	  
opportunity	  set’	  within	  the	  asset	  allocation	  universe	  of	  institutional	  investors.	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Definitions	   and	   nomenclature	   therefore	  matter	   a	   great	   deal	   in	   determining	   where	   in	   the	  
investment	  universe	  RE	  assets	  may	  fit	  in.	  
The	  literature	  review	  focuses	  on	  five	  main	  areas	  (in	  list	  form	  below),	  each	  of	  which	  helps	  the	  
researcher	  build	   the	   theoretical	  basis	  upon	  which	   to	  answer	   the	  research	  questions	  posed	  
above.	   As	   will	   be	   detailed	   in	   chapter	   three	   below,	   literature	   review	   in	   this	   paper	   plays	   a	  
critical	  role	  in	  helping	  triangulate	  data	  collected	  from	  interviewees,	  allowing	  the	  researcher	  
to	  interrogate	  information	  received	  via	  interviewees	  from	  different	  perspectives.	  	  	  
There	  isn’t	  much	  South	  African	  literature	  or	  text	  focusing	  on	  South	  Africa’s	  REIPPP	  program.	  
There	   is	  a	  small	  but	  dedicated	  group	  of	   local	  writers	   like	  Eberhard,	  Wlok,	  Barker	  et	  al	  who	  
continue	  increasing	  the	  scope	  of	  available	  literature.	  Therefore	  a	  lot	  of	  the	  literature	  under	  
discussion	   herein	   describes	   theoretical	   frameworks	   that	   are	   applicable	   to	   a	   non-­‐South	  
African	   context.5	   The	   researcher	   nonetheless	   found	   many	   useful	   academic	   texts,	   whose	  
theoretical	  prescripts	  are	  both	  relevant	  and	  applicable	  within	  a	  local	  context.	  
In	  assessing	  the	  available	   literature	  the	  study	  looked	  at	   literature	  that	  seeks	  to	  answer	  the	  
stipulated	  research	  questions.	  	  
2.2 Nomenclature:	  ‘asset	  class’,	  ‘infrastructure	  assets’-­‐	  reaching	  consensus	  
As	   institutional	   investors	  seek	  to	  diversify	  their	  asset	  allocation	  choices,	   infrastructure	  as	  a	  
potential	   asset	   class	   has	   begun	   receiving	   serious	   consideration	   in	   both	   practice	   and	  
academic	   literature	   (Blundell,	   2006).	   From	   both	   a	   practical	   and	   theoretical	   perspective	  
therefore,	   the	   taxonomy	  of	   terms	   such	   as	   ‘asset	   class’,	   ‘infrastructure’	   and	   ‘infrastructure	  
asset’	   begin	   to	  matter	   because	   as	   Blanc-­‐Brude	   (2014)	   explains;	   there	   is	   value	   in	   creating	  
normative	  descriptions	   in	   trying	   to	  develop	  new	  tools	  of	  understanding	   infrastructure	  as	  a	  
potential	  investment.	  
Idzorek	   and	   Armstrong	   (2009)	   adopt	   a	   narrow	   of	   definition	   of	   ‘infrastructure	   assets’	   they	  
refer	  to	  ‘unique	  infrastructure’.	  Per	  Idzorek	  and	  Armstrong:	  “Unique	  infrastructure	  refers	  to	  
5 This	  limitation	  is	  itself	  not	  debilitating	  and	  in	  fact	  underscores	  the	  researchers	  motivation	  for	  undertaking	  this	  particular	  
research
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the	  direct	  infrastructure	  assets	  that	  are	  not	  already	  considered	  part	  of	  the	  other	  established	  
asset	  classes,	  most	  notably	  public	  equity,	  private	  equity,	  or	  commercial	  real	  estate.”	  	  
In	  similar	  fashion	  to	  Idzorek	  and	  Armstrong	  (2009),	  Inderst	  (2009)	  makes	  the	  argument	  for	  a	  
narrow,	   succinct	   definition	   of	   ‘infrastructure	   asset’	   within	   an	   asset	   allocation	   context.	  
Inderst	  mentions	   the	   term	   ‘economic	   infrastructure’	   in	   reference	   to	   assets	   such	   as	   ports,	  
utilities,	  roads,	  tunnels	  -­‐	  concluding	  that	   infrastructure	  assets	  under	  this	  category	  display	  a	  
key	   set	   of	   discernable	   financial	   and	   economic	   characteristics:	   long-­‐dated	   cash	   flows,	   low	  
correlation	  to	  other	  assets,	  natural	  inflation	  hedge.	  	  	  
Newell	   and	   Peng	   (2008)	   also	   identify	   the	   characteristics	   Idzorek	   and	   Armstrong	   (2008)	  
described	   above	   in	   their	   study.	   What	   is	   also	   clear	   in	   their	   paper,	   is	   that	   there	   is	   broad	  
academic	   consensus	   that	   utility	   assets	   such	   RE	   assets	   are	   regarded	   as	   an	   established	   and	  
acceptable	   sub-­‐set	   of	   the	   broader	   ‘infrastructure	   asset’.	   There	   is	   broad	   consensus	   on	   this	  
latter	  point	  (cf	  Bitsch	  et	  al,	  2010)).	  	  In	  other	  words,	  there	  is	  some	  strong	  academic	  backing	  of	  
the	  view	  that	  RE	  assets	  would	  qualify	  as	  a	   type	  of	   ‘infrastructure	  assets’,	  a	   type	  of	  asset	  –	  
given	  its	  economic	  and	  financial	  features	  –	  would	  be	  worthy	  of	  investment	  consideration	  by	  
institutional	  investors.	  
Newell	  and	  Peng	  (2008)	  (mainly	  describing	  the	  Canadian	  and	  Australian	  context)	  write	  that	  
there	  are	  some	  ‘clearly	  identifiable’	  economic	  and	  financial	  features	  of	  RE	  assets.	  Namely:	  
• Monopoly	  characteristics,
• Predictable	  earnings	  and	  cash	  flows
• Low	  volatility	  of	  cash	  flows
• Low	  correlation	  of	  returns	  vs.	  other	  asset	  classes
An	   interesting	   study	   by	   Blanc-­‐Brude	   (2013)	   regards	   the	   physical	   make-­‐up	   of	   assets,	   in	   of	  
themselves	   (i.e.	   “what	   kind	   of	   infrastructure	   asset	   is	   it?”),	   as	   not	   particularly	   helpful	   in	  
determining	   relevant	   benchmarks	   for	   institutional	   investors.	   Blanc-­‐Brude	   argues	   that	  
infrastructure	  assets	  primarily	  derive	  their	  characteristics	  from	  their	  underlying	  contractual	  
undertakings	   ‘which	  better	  embody	  the	   financial	  economics	  of	   infrastructure’.	  Faull	   (2012)	  
argues	   that	   infrastructure	   assets	   fully	   embody	   the	   characteristics	   of	   ‘long-­‐term	   finance’,	  
which	   he	   describes	   as	   multi-­‐decade,	   long	   dated	   investments.	   At	   this	   point	   it	   is	   worth	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reiterating	   that	   the	  PPA	  under	   the	  REIPPP	   is	   twenty	   years	   long.	  Haldane	   (2011)	  makes	   an	  
interesting	  point	  concerning	  such	  long	  dated	  investments,	  namely	  that	  investors	  are	  likely	  to	  
over-­‐discount	  the	  value	  of	  such	  investments	  given	  the	  ‘short	  term	  focus	  of	  investors’.	  	  
Finkenzeller,	   Dechant,	   Schäfer,	   (2010)	   provide	   granularity	   to	   the	   definition	   of	   ‘asset	   class’	  
and	  more	  particularly,	  whether	   infrastructure	  assets	   satisfy	   the	  necessary	   requirements	  of	  
this	   definition.	   They	   examine	   in	   some	   detail,	   the	   economic	   and	   financial	   features	   of	   real	  
estate	  assets,	  examining	  whether	  such	  assets	  are	  legitimate	   infrastructure	  assets	  –	  suitable	  
to	  institutional	  investors	  looking	  for	  long	  dated	  cash	  flows	  with	  relatively	  low	  volatility.	  	  They	  
conclude	  that	  although	  property	  and	  infrastructure	  assets	  have	  some	  common	  themes,	  the	  
two	   assets	   are	   in	   actual	   fact	   distinct	   assets	   –	   given	   variant	   risk,	   return	   profiles.	   In	   other	  
words	   they	   conclude	   that	   infrastructure	   assets	   are	   their	   own,	   distinct	   separate	   asset	   class	  
category.	  A	  key	  aspect	  of	  their	  research	  findings	  is	  that	  real	  estate	  assets	  can	  serve	  as	  useful	  
proxy	   in	   understanding	   the	   economic	   and	   financial	   features	   of	   infrastructure	   assets.	   This	  
latter	   finding	   is	  particularly	  useful	  within	  a	  South	  African	  context	  given	   the	   relatively	   large	  
and	   sustained	   participation	   of	   institutional	   investors	   within	   the	   South	   African	   real	   estate	  
market.	  As	  knowledge	  of	  RE	  assets	  improves	  it	  will	  be	  interesting	  to	  see	  if	  property	  investors	  
find	  a	  natural	  home	  in	  RE	  assets.	  
There	   is	  however	  some	  debate	  as	  to	  whether	   infrastructure	  assets	  are	   indeed	  a	  sub-­‐set	  of	  
the	   real-­‐estate	  asset	  class	  as	  opposed	   to	   their	  own	  distinct	  grouping.	   (Mansour	  and	  Nadji,	  
2007,	  Newell	  and	  Peng,	  2008	  and	  Beeferman,	  2008).	  	  
Idzorek	  and	  Armstrong	  (2009),	  in	  making	  their	  own	  argument	  as	  to	  why	  infrastructure	  assets	  
are	   a	   distinct	   asset	   class	   -­‐	   describe	   ‘asset	   classes’	   as	   “having	   inherent	   non-­‐skilled	   based	  
return.”	   further	   describing	   asset	   classes	   as	   “logical	   groupings”	   of	   assets	   displaying	   similar	  
characteristics.	  	  In	  this	  instance	  Idzorek	  and	  Armstrong	  (2009)	  identify	  specific	  economic	  and	  
financial	   features	   of	   infrastructure	   assets	   in	   justifying	   their	   conclusions	   that	   infrastructure	  
assets	   are	   themselves	   a	   separate	   and	   distinct	   asset	   class.	   	   As	   indicated	   above,	   properly	  
framing	   the	   relevant	  nomenclature	   regarding	  RE	  assets	  will	   allow	   institutional	   investors	   to	  
begin	   categorising	   the	   various	   economic	   and	   financial	   features	   of	   RE	   assets.	   Ultimately	  
allowing	  them	  to	  construct	  relevant	  benchmarking	  for	  instance,	  which	  (benchmarking)	  plays	  
a	  key	  role	  in	  the	  asset	  allocation	  framework	  (Blanc-­‐Brude	  et	  al,	  2014).	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A	  key	  consideration	  for	  investors	  looking	  to	  invest	  in	  RE	  assets	  will	  be	  whether	  there	  is	  some	  
modicum	   of	   uniformity	   across	   various	   RE	   assets.	   On	   the	   face	   of	   it	   there	   are	   some	   key	  
common	  features:	   twenty	  year	  PPAs,	   typically	  project	   financed	  structures	  with	  ring-­‐fenced	  
SPVs,	  inflation	  hedge	  (contained	  in	  the	  PPA),	  Treasury	  backed	  cash	  flows.	  There	  are	  however	  
some	   non-­‐extraneous	   differences	   amongst	   RE	   assets,	   even	   within	   the	   same	   category	   of	  
technology	  (eg:	  Solar),	  which	  could	  make	  it	  difficulty	  to	  standardise	  investors’	  understanding	  
of	  RE	  assets’	  risk	  and	  return	  profiles	  across	  different	  assets.	  	  
Weber	   and	   Alfen	   (2010)	   make	   the	   point	   that	   within	   an	   investment	   context,	   the	   term	  
‘infrastructure	   asset’	   is	   ‘heterogonous’.	   They	   indicate	   that	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	   generalise	  
observations	   of	   existing	   data	   on	   the	   risk-­‐return	   profile	   of	   infrastructure	   assets	   without	  
defining	   the	   parameters	   of	   observation	   properly.	   They	   further	   highlight	   that	   there	   are	  
aspects	   of	   such	   technology,	   which	   impact	   the	   return	   and	   risk	   profile	   of	   an	   infrastructure	  
asset	   (to	   further	   underscore	   this	   point	   within	   the	   REIPPP,	   different	   solar	   projects	   apply	  
differing	  solar	  panel	   technologies	  with	  differing	   technology	   risks	  and	  ultimately	  potentially	  
varying	  return	  profiles).	  They	  further	  highlight	  that	  the	  difficulty	  in	  extrapolating	  findings	  is	  
compounded	   by	   the	   fact	   there	   is	   a	   lack	   of	   historical	   data,	   which	   would	   allow	   us	   to	  
appropriately	  benchmark	  infrastructure	  returns	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  other	  assets.	  	  
Peng	  and	  Newell	  (2007)	  in	  their	  important	  work	  on	  pension	  fund	  interest	  into	  infrastructure	  
assets,	   manage	   to	   successfully	   analyse	   both	   listed	   and	   unlisted	   infrastructure	   assets	   in	  
Australia.	  Australia	   is	  arguably	  the	  most	  mature	  and	  experienced	  market	   for	   infrastructure	  
assets	  (Peng	  and	  Newell,	  2007).	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Figure	  2	  Infrastructure	  risk-­‐adjusted	  performance	  analysis:	  Q3	  1995	  -­‐	  Q2	  2006	  
They	   look	   at	   19	  unlisted	   infrastructure	   funds	   (with	   a	   144	   infrastructure	   assets)	   comparing	  
their	  respective	  risk-­‐adjusted	  returns.	  Unlisted	  infrastructure	  was	  found	  to	  deliver	  returns	  of	  
14,1%	   at	   relatively	   low	   risk	   of	   5,83%.	   Listed	   infrastructure	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   produced	  
higher	   returns	   at	   24,9%	   but	   with	   significantly	   higher	   volatility	   23,24%.	   This,	   the	   authors	  
conclude,	  may	   be	   due	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   listed	   infrastructure	   is	  more	   correlated	  with	   listed	  
equity.	   Their	   findings	   indicate	   that	   infrastructure	   assets	   satisfy	   what	   Blanc-­‐Brude,	   (2013)	  
refers	   to	   as	   the	   infrastructure	   narrative	   -­‐	   namely,	   that	   infrastructure	   assets	   have	   some	  
distinguishable	   economic	  &	   financial	   features	   (long	  dated	   income-­‐assets,	   display	   relatively	  
low	  volatility	  and	  show	  low	  correlation	  to	  other	  assets	  such	  as	  bonds	  and	  equity).	  However,	  
they	   also	   conclude	   that	   even	   assets	   that	   satisfy	   the	   so-­‐called	   infrastructure	  narrative	  may	  
struggle	  to	  find	  a	  home	  within	  investors'	  asset	  allocation	  framework.	  The	  reason	  being	  that	  
infrastructure	   assets	   don’t	   always	   satisfy	   the	   asset	   allocation	   requirement	   of	   offering	   risk	  
diversification.	  Particularly	  if	  they	  are	  listed	  (More	  work	  needs	  to	  be	  done	  on	  the	  differences	  
between	  listed	  and	  unlisted	  infrastructure	  assets).	  As	  mentioned	  above	  however,	  RE	  assets	  
are	  primarily	  unlisted	  SPVs	  but	  if	  it	  is	  found	  that	  listed	  RE	  assets	  will	  correlate	  listed	  equities’	  
risk	  (as	  opposed	  to	  being	  counter-­‐cyclical)	  then	  their	  suitability	  as	  an	  alternative	  asset	  class	  
may	   be	   harmed	   in	   the	   long	   term.	   As	   commented	   upon	   above,	   Nhlapo	   &	   Gumata	   (2008)	  
highlighted	   the	   impact	   of	   Regulation	   28	   on	   influencing	   institutional	   investment	   into	   the	  
unlisted	   sector.	   It’s	  easy	   to	  conclude	   that	   the	   long	   term	   interests	  of	   institutional	   investors	  
interested	   in	   the	   REIPPP	  will	   focus	   on	   ensuring	   that	   RE	   assets	   are	   listed,	  which	   given	   the	  
findings	   of	   Peng	   and	  Newell	   (2007)	   and	   their	   potential	   replicability	   in	   SA,	  may	   lead	   to	   an	  
unsustainable	  paradox	  for	  the	  REIPPP.	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The	  jury	  is	  still	  out	  on	  this	  latter	  point.	  Building	  off	  their	  2007	  (Peng	  and	  Newell,	  2007)	  study,	  
Peng	   and	   Newell	   (2011)	   reaffirm	   their	   initial	   findings	   that	   including	   infrastructure	   assets	  
within	   a	   portfolio	   produces	   optimal	   portfolio	   outcomes	   over	   the	   long	   run.	   This	   study	   is	  
critical	  in	  that	  it	  analyses	  performance	  over	  a	  longer	  period	  than	  previous	  studies	  and	  it	  has	  
a	   particular	   focus	   on	   unlisted	   infrastructure.	   This	   fact	  makes	   it	   easier	   to	   extrapolate	   the	  
findings	  to	  some	  local	  contexts.	  
There	  is	  obviously	  very	  little	  data	  available	  of	  a	  similar	  magnitude	  and	  depth	  describing	  the	  
South	   African	   landscape,	   particularly	   data	   pertaining	   to	   REIPPP	   program.	   As	   reiterated	  
elsewhere	  in	  this	  paper,	  there	  simply	  isn’t	  enough	  data	  to	  perform	  the	  type	  of	  analysis	  Peng	  
and	   Newell	   (2007	   &	   2011)	   performed	   for	   the	   Australian	   context	   (although	   their	   study	   is	  
Australia-­‐specific	   it	   also	  extensively	   references	  other	  major	   infrastructure	  markets	   such	  as	  
Canada,	  China	  and	  Europe).	  	  
The	  developing	  consensus	  for	  European	  and	  North	  American	  institutional	  investors	  has	  been	  
that	   infrastructure,	  although	   similar	   to	  other	  asset	   classes	   such	  as	  property,	   infrastructure	  
can	  legitimately	  claim	  its	  rightful	  place	  as	  a	  stand	  alone	  asset	  class	  (Peng	  and	  Newell,	  2008;	  
Preqin	  Survey	  2008,	  2009,	  2010,	  2011,	  2012,	  2013).	   	  Furthermore,	   recent	   research	  reveals	  
that	   not	   only	   is	   infrastructure	   its	   own	   asset	   class,	   it	   is	   also	   an	   appropriate	   asset	   class	   for	  
institutional	   investors	   because	   it	   provides	   stable,	   long-­‐term	   return	   with	   little	   volatility	  
(Mansour	  and	  Nadji,	  2007b;	  Newell	  and	  Peng,	  2008).	  
Research	  pertaining	  to	   the	   local	   investment	  market	   is	  minimal	  –	   the	  RE	  sector	   is	  still	   in	   its	  
infancy,	  with	  only	  some	  of	  the	  first	  of	  the	  Round	  1	  projects	  having	  reached	  full	  operational	  
status	  (Creamer,	  August	  2014)	  	  
At	  this	  stage	  some	  common	  themes	  begin	  to	  emerge	  in	  the	  literature	  regarding	  the	  question	  
of	   whether	   infrastructure	   assets	   are	   a	   legitimate	   asset	   class.	   The	   long	   dated	   nature	   of	  
infrastructure	  cash	  flows,	  the	  regulated	  monopoly	  under	  which	  they	  operate	  and	  relatively	  
low	   volatility	   of	   these	   assets	   -­‐	   describe	   the	   economic	   and	   financial	   features	   that	   asset	  
allocators	  would	  need	  to	  discern	  in	  making	  the	  appropriate	  asset	  allocation	  decisions.	  	  It	  still	  
remains	   to	   be	   seen	   however	   whether	   this	   developing	   consensus	   can	   be	   applied	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interchangeably	  for	  both	  listed	  and	  unlisted	  infrastructure	  assets.	  The	  readings	  differ	  on	  this.	  
Given	  the	  data	  available	  on	  infrastructure	  assets,	  Australian	  institutional	  investors	  can	  more	  
ably	  make	  asset	  allocation	  decisions	   than	  their	  South	  African	  counterparts.	  The	  researcher	  
does	   however	   hope	   that	   such	   foreign	   examples	  may	   prove	   to	   be	   useful	   to	   South	   African	  
institutional	  investors.	  	  
2.3 Asset	  allocation	  and	  Investor	  Profile	  
Kritzman	   (2007)	   describes	   a	   series	   of	   steps	   that	   institutional	   investors	   need	   to	   traverse	   in	  
reaching	  asset	  allocation	  decisions.	  Using	  Kritzman	  (supra)	  as	  a	  guideline,	  local	  institutional	  
investors	  considering	  investing	  in	  RE	  assets,	  the	  determination	  would	  be:	  firstly,	  identify	  the	  
asset	  class,	  secondly	  estimate	  expected	  return	  and	  downside	  risk,	  thirdly	   identify	  the	  most	  
optimal	   trade-­‐off	   between	   risk	   and	   return	   within	   a	   portfolio,	   lastly	   identify	   the	   optimal	  
portfolio	   were	   RE	   assets	   are	   included.	   Kritzman	   (supra)	   like	   many	   other	   writers	   on	   the	  
subject	   relies	   heavily	   on	  Markowits’	   still	   seminal	   1952	   work	   on	  modern	   portfolio	   theory,	  
which	  outlines	   that	  an	  efficient	  portfolio	   is	  one	   that	  delivers	  maximum	  return	  at	   the	  most	  
appropriate	  risk.	  It	  therefore	  follows	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  work,	  that	  the	  researcher	  was	  
concerned	  with	  determining	  how	  the	  theory	  around	  asset	  allocation	  affects	   investor	  views	  
of	  RE	  assets.	  It	  remains	  therefore	  that	  the	  key	  aspects	  influencing	  asset	  allocation	  decisions	  
for	  local	  institutional	  investors	  looking	  at	  RE	  assets	  would	  be	  the	  following:	  
i. Risk:	  do	  RE	  assets	  provide	  risk	  differentiation	  benefits	  (non-­‐correlation)
ii. Return:	   do	   they	   enhance	   estimated	   expected	   return	   of	   the	   investors	   current
portfolio	  over	  the	  long	  term
Blanc-­‐Brude	   (2014)	  writes	  of	   the	   challenges	   investors	   face	   in	  estimating	   return	  and	   risk	   in	  
infrastructure	  projects.	  He	  writes	  that	  difficulty	  in	  this	  process	  emanates	  from	  what	  Meeder	  
(2000)	  refers	  to	  as	  the	  ‘heterogeneous’	  make-­‐up	  of	  infrastructure	  assets.	  Assets	  can	  vary	  in	  
their	  contractual	  make-­‐up.	  The	  very	  point	  made	  by	  Weber	  and	  Alfen	  (2010)	  above.	  
Msimanga	   and	   Sebitosi	   (2014)	   in	   their	   paper	   however	   show	   that	   the	   advantage	   of	   the	  
REIPPP	  is	  that	  contract	  standardisation	  across	  all	  projects	  gives	  rise	  to	  some	  useful	  common	  




PPA	  for	  instance,	  allow	  for	  a	  set	  of	  common	  financial	  features	  to	  be	  identified	  across	  all	  RE	  
assets	  (a	  point	  reiterated	  by	  Baker,	  2011	  as	  well).	  Contractual	  standardisation	  may	  therefore	  
make	  it	  possible	  to	  successfully	  begin	  the	  process	  of	  benchmarking	  certain	  features	  for	  the	  
purposes	  of	  asset	  allocation.	  	  
	  
Institutional	   investors	  analysing	  RE	  assets,	  need	   to	  develop	  asset	  allocation	   strategies	   that	  
are	  rigorous	  enough	  to	  properly	  understand	  the	  risk/reward	  make	  up	  of	  RE	  assets,	  build-­‐out	  
suitable	   proxies	   for	   RE	   assets	   in	   order	   to	   benchmark	   them	   and	   ultimately	   assess	   these	  
assets’	  overall	  impact	  on	  their	  respective	  portfolio	  (Weber	  and	  Alfen,	  2010).	  
	  
The	  standardisation	  of	  the	  REIPPP	  could	  be	  useful	  in	  helping	  the	  institutional	  market	  develop	  
a	  common	  outlook	  for	  evaluating	  RE	  projects.	  Friebe	  and	  Flotow	  (2011)	  outline	  that	  tenor,	  
counterparty	  risk	  and	  other	  financial	  and	  economic	  features	  (that	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  detail	  
below)	  determine	  the	  risk	  and	  return	  profile	  of	  RE	  assets	  and	  therefore	  their	  suitability	  for	  
investors.	  Therefore	  once	  these	  features	  are	  standardised,	  as	  per	  the	  PPA,	  an	  assessment	  of	  
risk	  and	  return	  and	  how	  they	  relate	  becomes	  possible.	  	  	  
	  
Inderst	   (2009)	   writes	   that	   globally,	   the	   largest	   investors	   into	   infrastructure	   assets	   are	  
pension	  funds,	  with	  eight	  of	  the	  top	  ten	  investors	  globally	  being	  pension	  and/or	  endowment	  
funds.	   In	   Preqin’s	   20136	   survey	   on	   asset	   allocation	   outlooks	   for	   infrastructure	   nearly	   sixty	  
percent	   of	   surveyed	   institutional	   investors	   had	   infrastructure	   as	   a	   stand-­‐alone	   asset	  
allocation	  category.	  A	  separate	   thirty	  percent	  classified	   it	  under	  private	  equity	  and	  sixteen	  
percent	  under	   so	   called	   real	   assets.	   	   In	   the	   same	  Preqin	   (supra)	   study	   it	   is	   concluded	   that	  
infrastructure	  assets	  make	   the	  grade,	  as	   it	  were,	  because	   they	  minimise	  portfolio	   risk	  and	  
enhance	  expected	  return	  of	  respective	  portfolios.	  
	  
As	   indicated	   above,	   Blanc-­‐Brude	   (2014)	   makes	   the	   point	   that	   the	   difficulty	   for	   asset	  
allocators	   looking	   at	   infrastructure	   assets	   is	   the	   lack	   of	   appropriate	   benchmarks.	  
Benchmarks	   typically	   allow	   investors	   to	   compare	  whether	   the	   level	   of	   return	   and	   the	   risk	  
associated	   with	   that	   return	   is	   comparable.	   In	   effect,	   benchmarking	   quantifies	   the	  
opportunity	  in	  an	  investment	  world	  full	  of	  mutually	  exclusive	  decision-­‐making.	  There	  is	  some	  
strong	  literature	  however	  that	  adequately	  outlines	  proposed	  investor	  benchmarks	  for	  asset	  
                                                




allocation	  on	   infrastructure	  assets,	   indicating	  some	  emerging	  consensus.	   Inderst	   (2010)	   for	  
instance,	  writes	   that	   the	   investor	   trend	   is	   to	   utilise	   absolute	   return	   and	   CPI-­‐indexation	   as	  
relevant	  benchmarks	  to	  gauge	  expected	  return.	  As	  described	  above,	  expected	  return	  is	  a	  key	  
cog	   for	   asset	   allocators.	  Many	  authors	  have	   cited	   the	  high	  visibility	  of	   infrastructure	  asset	  
earnings	  and	  cash	  flows,	  given	  the	  contracted	  nature	  of	  their	  earnings	  and	  cash	  flows	  (Bitsch	  
et	   al,	   2010,	   Blanc-­‐Brude,	   2014,	   Peng	   and	  Newell,	   2008	   et	   al)	   and	   therefore	   the	   ability	   to	  
derive	  return	  and	  risk	  benchmarks	  from	  the	  contractual	  nature	  of	  the	  various	  RE	  assets.	  	  
	  
As	  Baker	  (2015)	  outlines,	  there	  are	  some	  highly	  standardized	  and	  highly	  discernable	  features	  
of	  RE	  assets	  under	   the	  REIPPP.	  The	   tariff	   for	   instance	   is	   indexed	   to	   inflation,	   the	  PPAs	  are	  
twenty	   years,	   Eskom	   is	   the	   single	   buyer	   across	   all	   projects,	   and	   Treasury	   provides	   a	  
guarantee	   on	   the	   tariff.	   All	   of	   which	   could	   help	   in	   developing	   key	   measurement	   and	  
performance	  metrics	  for	  RE	  assets	  thus	  providing	  asset	  allocators	  the	  ability	  to	  workout	  if	  RE	  
assets	  would	  satisfy	  their	  relevant	  risk	  and	  expected	  return	  objectives.	  	  	  
	  
There	   is	   however	   ongoing	   debate	   as	   to	   whether	   these	   discernable	   features	   of	   RE	   assets	  
would	   make	   them	   automatically	   suitable	   for	   asset	   allocation	   consideration	   as	   their	   own,	  
stand-­‐alone	  assets.	  Beeferman	  (2007)	  writes	  extensively	  about	  the	  current	  lack	  of	  consensus	  
regarding	   asset	   allocation	   of	   infrastructure	   assets	   -­‐	   even	   amongst	   investors	   who	   deem	  
infrastructure	  assets	  as	  legitimate	  investment	  targets.	  Citing	  an	  Australian	  study	  he	  indicates	  
that	   47%	  of	   Australian	   investors	   have	   a	   separate	   asset	   allocation	   for	   infrastructure	   assets	  
whereas	  43%	  include	  it	  in	  their	  private	  equity	  allocation	  with	  just	  fewer	  than	  10%	  including	  it	  
in	  the	  real	  estate	  allocation	  mandates.	  As	  Nhlapo	  and	  Gumata	  (2010)	  indicate	  in	  their	  study	  
of	   the	   local	   institutional	   market,	   South	   African	   investors’	   preferred	   asset	   allocation	  
categories	   include	   equities,	   bonds,	   real	   estate	   with	   a	   small	   growing	   focus	   on	   alternative	  
asset	  classes.	  South	  African	  investors	  have	  not	  begun	  to	  reflect	  the	  trend	  overseas	  to	  include	  
infrastructure	  as	  part	  of	  their	  asset	  allocation	  mandate,	  although	  there	  is	  some	  debate	  (see	  
Gecelter,	  2013).	  	  The	  reality	  is	  RE	  assets	  would	  have	  to	  compete	  with	  other	  assets	  within	  the	  
investment	   universe	   in	   investor	   asset	   allocation	   analysis.	   The	   table	   below	   is	   instructive;	  
showing	  different	  types	  of	  assets	  investors	  consider.	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Figure	  3	  Table	  of	  Asset	  Allocation	  Characteristics	  (source:	  Beeferman,	  2007)	  
For	   local	   investors,	   inflation	   indexation	  of	   cash	   flows	   (via	   the	  PPA	   linking	   tariff	   increases	  –	  
revenues	  –	  to	  inflation	  over	  its	  twenty	  year	  duration)	  is	  a	  key	  feature	  of	  RE	  assets	  and	  may	  
increase	  the	  asset	  allocation	  profile	  of	  RE	  assets,	  especially	  for	  investors	  who	  would	  prioritise	  
risk	   non-­‐correlation	   in	   their	   asset	   allocation	   framework.	   This	   inflation-­‐indexation	   feature	  
could	  make	  RE	  assets	  particularly	  important	  for	  institutional	  investors	  such	  as	  pension	  funds	  
who	  prioritise	  liability	  driven	  investment	  strategies.	  From	  as	  early	  as	  the	  mid	  1990s	  Campbell	  
and	   Schiller	   (1996)	   discussed	   the	   benefits	   institutional	   investors	   enjoy	   when	   they	   include	  
long-­‐dated,	   inflation-­‐hedged	   cash	   flow	   instruments	   into	   a	   portfolio.	   They	   found	   that	   long	  




strategies	   –	   i.e.	   allow	   investors	   to	   hedge	   inflation	   induced	   asset	   depreciation	   risk	   by	  
matching	   liabilities	   with	   asset	   growth.	   Moreover	   allowing	   them	   to	   match	   cash	   flow	  
obligations	  that	  may	  exist	  within	  a	  fund	  with	  cash	  in-­‐flows	  received	  from	  such	  instruments.	  
The	   question	   arises	   therefore,	   what	   benefits	   would	   accrue	   to	   local	   investors	   looking	   into	  
invest	  in	  RE	  assets.	  As	  can	  be	  seen	  from	  Figure	  3,	  infrastructure	  assets	  are	  long	  dated	  income	  
assets	  with	  relatively	  low	  cash	  flow	  volatility	  with	  the	  added	  benefit	  of	  a	  PPA	  that	  accounts	  
for	  a	  relatively	  high	  inflation	  outlook.	  Key	  features,	  which	  may	  be	  useful	  to	  a	   local	  pension	  
fund,	  look	  for	  some	  diversification.	  
	  
Weisdorf	  (2007)	  takes	  Campbell	  &	  Shiller’s	  (Supra)	  point	  further	  by	  discussing	  the	  suitability	  
of	   infrastructure	   assets	   such	   as	   RE	   Utilities,	   and	   their	   suitability	   for	   pension	   funds,	  
endowments	  and	  annuity	  funds	  –	  he	  surmises	  that	  given	  their	  long	  dated	  cash	  flow	  profile,	  
and	   inflation	   hedge	   (through	   tariff	   indexation),	   RE	   asset	   cash	   flows	   are	   highly	   suitable	   for	  
liability	  driven	   investment	  strategies.	  Therefore	  making	  such	  assets	  suitable	  candidates	   for	  
pension	   funds	   and	   other	   long-­‐term	   investors.	   As	   Nhlapo	   and	   Gumata	   (2010)	   highlight,	  
pension	  funds	  are	  key	  feature	  of	  the	  South	  African	  institutional	  investor	  landscape	  many	  of	  
which	   seek	   to	  manage	   long-­‐term	   liabilities	   through	   strategic	   asset	   allocation	   processes	   by	  
prioritising	  assets	  that	  contain	  some	  element	  of	  inflation	  hedge.	  
	  
In	   considering	   RE	   assets	   (or	   any	   other	   asset	   class)	   what	   will	   remain	   critical	   for	   long-­‐term	  
investors	   is	   the	   relationship	   between	   risk	   and	   reward	   that	   RE	   assets	   represent.	   In	   other	  
words,	  is	  the	  expected	  return	  they	  are	  receiving	  via	  exposure	  to	  RE	  assets	  justified	  given	  the	  
measure	   of	   risk?	   Bitsch	   Buchner	   Kaserer	   (2010)	   examine	   and	   describe	   the	   normative	  
economic	  and	  financial	  features	  of	   infrastructure	  assets.	  They	  do	  this	  within	  the	  context	  of	  
examining	  whether	  such	  assets’	  economic	  and	  financial	  features	  fit	   in	  well	  with	  the	  overall	  
investment	  objectives	  of	   large	  institutional	   investors	  such	  as	  pension	  funds,	  namely	  from	  a	  
risk/return	   perspective	   is	   their	   inclusion	   in	   the	   asset	   allocation	   framework	   justified.	   Their	  
work	   effectively	   counters	   the	   ‘infrastructure	  narrative’	   that	   states	   that	   infrastructure	   cash	  
flows	   and	   earnings	   are,	   as	   a	   whole,	   less	   volatile	   than	   non-­‐infrastructure	   assets.	   In	   other	  
words,	   they	  question	   the	  diversity	   benefits	   of	   infrastructure	   assets	   cited	  by	  other	   authors	  
looking	  at	  this	  subject	  (see	  Peng	  and	  Newell.	  2008).	  Bitsch	  et	  al	  (2010)	  do	  however	  find	  that	  
infrastructure	   assets	   show	   low	  default	   frequencies	   compared	   to	  non-­‐infrastructure	   assets.	  
Default	   risk	   being	   a	   key	  measurement	   of	   the	   risk	   represented	   by	   an	   asset.	   An	   interesting	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take	   away	   from	   their	   study	   also	   indicates	   that	   infrastructure	   assets	   have	   higher	   median	  
returns	  (as	  measured	  using	  IRR)	  than	  non-­‐infrastructure	  assets	  of	  a	  similar	  risk	  profile.	  The	  
authors	   explain	   though,	   that	   their	   findings	   could	   reflect	   the	   higher	   than	   normal	   market	  
premium	  investors	  expected	  immediately	  after	  the	  financial	  crisis	  of	  2007/8.	  
Idzorek	  and	  Armstrong	  (2009)	  study,	  detail,	  the	  role	  of	  infrastructure	  assets	  within	  the	  asset	  
allocation	  frameworks	  of	   institutional	   investors.	  They	  develop	  and	  apply	  CAPM	  based	  tools	  
to	   estimate	   expected	   return	   of	   infrastructure	   asset	   classes.	   	   Using	   mean	   variance	  
optimisations	  they	  conclude	  that	  ‘including	  infrastructure	  in	  the	  opportunity-­‐set	  results	  in	  a	  
slight	   improvement	   in	   the	   efficiency	   of	   the	   resulting	   asset	   allocations.	   Moreover	   in	   their	  
study	  they	  find	  that	  there	  are	  some	  diversification	  benefits	  to	  including	  infrastructure	  assets	  
within	  a	  portfolio.	  On	  this	  point	  they	  diverge	  with	  Bitsch	  et	  al	  (2010).	  As	  discussed	  elsewhere	  
in	   this	   paper,	   Blanc-­‐Brude	   (2013)	   also	   discuss	   some	   of	   the	   limitations	   in	   the	   findings	  
indicating	   that	   there	   is	   little	   correlation	   benefit	   for	   investors	   who	   include	   infrastructure	  
assets.	  	  
Underscoring	  this	  discussion	  and	  review	  on	  asset	  allocation	  is	  the	  expectation	  that	  investors	  
would	   approach	   RE	   assets	   as	   rational	   investors.	   A	   rational	   investor	   would	   be	   primarily	  
concerned	  with	  maximising	   their	   overall	   risk/return	   trade-­‐off	   (Singh	   and	   Ling,	   2003).	   Thus	  
assuming	   that	   SA	   institutional	   investors	   are	   rational	   investors,	   when	   looking	   at	   RE	   assets	  
their	   objectives	   will	   be	   to	   determine	   whether	   an	   investment	   in	   the	   REIPPP	   will	   improve	  
overall	  portfolio	  efficiencies.	  As	  Eberhard	  et	  al	  (2014)	  document,	  there	  is	  already	  substantial	  
participation	   by	   a	   small	   handful	   of	   institutional	   investors	   such	   as	  Old	  Mutual	   into	  REIPPP,	  
further	   understanding	   the	   asset	   allocation	   trade-­‐offs	   can	   help	   set	   the	   basis	   even	   more	  
investor	  participation	  in	  the	  REIPPP	  program.	  
The	   debate	   around	   nomenclature	   and	   benchmarking	   notwithstanding,	   the	   trend	   amongst	  
institutional	   investors	   internationally	   has	   been	   to	   include	   infrastructure	   into	   the	   asset	  
allocation	   mix.	   Preqin	   (2010)	   tracked	   over	   800	   worldwide	   investors	   with	   defined	   asset	  
allocation	   frameworks	   for	   infrastructure	   assets,	  with	   pension	   funds	  making	   up	   the	   largest	  
grouping.	  In	  this	  same	  Preqin	  (supra)	  study	  it	  was	  found	  that	  56%	  of	  the	  investors	  surveyed	  
have	  distinct	  asset	  allocation	  frameworks	  for	  infrastructure	  assets	  –	  with	  utilities	  making	  up	  
the	  single	  largest	  category.	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In	  November	  2013	  Ernst	  and	  Young	  published	  the	  findings	  of	  a	  6-­‐month	  survey	  testing	  the	  
attitudes,	  perceptions	  and	  participation	  of	  global	  institutional	  investors	  (pension,	  insurance	  
funds	  mainly)	  regarding	  Renewable	  Energy	  Infrastructure.	  Some	  of	  the	  75	  participants	  were	  
South	  African	  focused	  participants	  and	  REIPPP	  featured	  prominently	  in	  the	  survey.	  The	  key	  
findings	  were	  as	  follows:	  
• 61%	  of	  institutional	  investors	  have	  no	  investment	  in	  RE	  –	  although	  a	  third	  expected
this	  change	  within	  3	  years
• The	  response	  on	  “how”	  to	  invest	  into	  RE	  impacted	  asset	  allocation
• Clear	  government	  policy	  –	  for	  both	  RE	  and	  the	  investment	  space	  –	  were	  key	  drivers
in	  determining	  asset	  allocation.
What	   is	   clear	   from	   the	   EY	   survey	   (2013)	   is	   that	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   asset	   allocation	   a	  
confluence	   of	   factors	   impact	   the	   outlook.	   It	   is	   not	  merely	   limited	   to	  mere	   economic	   and	  
financial	   considerations	   –	   investors	  have	   to	   consider	   regulatory	   imposed	  prudential	   limits,	  
non-­‐financial	  considerations	  (ESG	  mandated	  allocations)7.	  	  The	  EY	  study	  echoes	  some	  of	  the	  
academic	   literature	   discussed	   herein	   in	   highlighting	   the	   need	   to	   develop	   adequate	  
benchmarks	   regarding	   RE	   assets	   to	   enable	   greater	   involvement	   of	   RE	   assets	   in	   asset	  
allocation	  frameworks.	  
As	  mentioned	  above,	  given	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  PPA	  pricing	  mechanism	  (Willis,	  2014)	  –	  tariffs	  
are	   indexed	   to	   inflation	   over	   a	   20-­‐year	   period	   –	   one	   would	   expect	   some	   overlaps	   and	  
correlation	   (in	   both	   return	   and	   risk)	   in	   inflation-­‐linked	  bond	   cash	   flows	   and	  RE	   asset	   cash	  
flows.	   Assuming	   South	   African	   institutional	   investors	   apply	   standard	   portfolio	   theory	   in	  
determining	   their	   asset	  allocation	   strategy,	   South	  African	  portfolio	  managers	  will	   seek	  out	  
correlation/non-­‐correlation	  return	  patterns	  of	  RE	  assets	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  universe	  of	  other	  assets	  
they	  manage	   (see	  Petrella,	  2005	   for	  an	   interesting	  discussion	  on	  whether	  small	   cap	  stocks	  
are	   a	   distinct	   asset	   class).	   But	   as	   Bitsch	   et	   al	   (2010)	   indicate,	   the	   narrative	   regarding	  
‘diversification	   benefits’	   of	   infrastructure	   assets	  would	   have	   to	   be	   carefully	   scrutinized	   by	  
asset	  allocators.	  




Investors	  also	  operate	  within	  a	  series	  of	  both	  internal	  and	  external	  constraints.	  Regulations	  
and	  internal	  policy	  issues	  will	  also	  affect	  asset	  allocation	  patterns	  for	  institutional	  investors,	  
especially	  given	  the	  sheer	  dominance	  of	  pension	  fund	  money	  as	  a	  component	  of	  non-­‐bank	  
institutional	   assets	   (Andonov,	  Bauer,	   and	  Cremers,	  2014).	  Nhlapo	  and	  Gumata	   (2011)	  also	  
find	  that	  even	  though	   local	   institutional	   investor	  participation	   in	  the	  broader	  economy	  has	  
exponentially	   grown,	   asset	   allocation	   patterns	   have	   not	   changed	   much,	   with	   Cash,	   fixed	  
interest	   instruments,	   property	   and	   equities	   making	   up	   asset	   allocation	  mixes.	   During	   the	  
period	   observed,	   equities	   maintained	   a	   dominant	   position	   of	   circa	   40%	   within	   asset	  
allocation	  mixes	  with	  fixed	  income	  securities,	  also	  at	  circa	  40%	  during	  the	  1990s	  dropping	  off	  
to	  just	  20%	  of	  assets.	  	  
	  
As	  highlighted	  above,	  pension	  funds,	  insurers	  make	  up	  a	  significant	  number	  of	  the	  total	  circa	  
R4	   trillion	   in	  assets	   that	  non-­‐bank	   institutional	   investors	  hold	   (Nhlapo	  and	  Gumata,	  2011),	  
and	  this	  figure	  comes	  off	  a	  low	  base.	  	  
	  
Given	  the	  dominance	  of	  pension	  funds	  and	  insurers	  in	  the	  South	  African	  institutional	  space,	  
regulation	  20	  of	  the	  Pension	  Funds	  Act	  has	  significant	  impact	  on	  determining	  asset	  allocation	  
outlooks	   (Leape	   and	   Thomas,	   2011)	   and	   will	   therefore	   inevitably	   have	   an	   impact	   on	   the	  
decision	   making	   around	   inclusion	   of	   RE	   assets.	   Regulation	   28	   of	   the	   Pension	   Funds	   Act8	  
significantly	   impacts	   asset	   allocation	   patterns	   as	   Treasury	   has	   the	   power	   to	   define	   and	  
determine	  asset	  allocation	  spreads	   for	  pension	   funds.	   In	  2011	  there	  was	  a	  modification	   to	  
the	   allowable	   asset	   classes	   within	   pension	   fund	   asset	   allocation	  mandates.	   	  Whereas	   the	  
restriction	   on	   unlisted	   equity	   was	   5%	   across	   the	   board,	   i.e.	   inclusive	   of	   other	   termed	  
‘alternative	  assets’.	  The	  new	  guidelines	  make	  allowances	  for	  up	  to	  a	  30%	  allowance	  across	  
capital	   structure	  and	  different	   types	  of	  unlisted	   instruments	  –	  private	  equity,	  hedge	   funds	  
(unlisted	  debt	  and	  unlisted	  equity).	  Given	  the	  fact	  that	  RE	  assets	  are	  typically	  unlisted,	  these	  
developments	  could	  augur	  well	  for	  local	  investors	  looking	  to	  invest	  into	  RE	  assets.	  	  
	  
Once	   again	   the	   limitations	   of	   this	   study	   make	   it	   difficult	   to	   construct	   the	   relevant	  
benchmarking	  tools	  for	  RE	  assets.	  Future	  studies	  for	  instances,	  may	  be	  able	  to	  compare	  say	  
absolute	   return	   data	   series	   of	   RE	   assets	   within	   the	   REIPPP	   program,	   juxtaposing	   those	  
findings	  against	  other	  asset	  classes.	  Further,	  other	  studies	  could	  also	  look	  at	  the	  impact	  on	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the	  overall	  portfolios’	  standard	  deviation	  –	  as	  a	  measure	  of	  risk.	  
2.4 Project	  Finance	  as	  the	  preferred	  investment	  vehicle	  
In	  determining	  the	  viability	  of	  RE	  assets	  as	  an	  investment	  target,	  investors	  will	  be	  influenced	  
by	   the	   legal	   structure	   and	   form	  of	   their	   investment.	   In	   fact	   as	   Brealey	  Cooper	   and	  Habib,	  
1996	   argue,	   the	   legal	   form	   of	   an	   infrastructure	   vehicle	   can	   determine	   how	   investors	  
approach	   pricing	   and	   risk.	   To	   date,	   project	   finance	   has	   been	   the	   preferred	   form	   of	  
investment	   of	   investment	   vehicle	   for	   REIPPP	   (Eberhard	   et	   al,	   2014).	   This	   follows	   the	  
international	   trend	   of	   utilising	   project	   finance	   as	   the	   preferred	   funding	   and	   investment	  
vehicle	   for	  utility	   investments	  worldwide	  (Yescombe	  2014).	   	  Gratwick	  and	  Eberhard	  (2008)	  
indicate	   that	   the	   move	   towards	   project	   finance	   followed	   a	   wave	   of	   restructuring	   and	  
privatisation	   of	   utility	   assets	   of	   developing	   countries	   in	   the	   1980s	   and	   1980s.	   Given	   the	  
political	  and	  economic	  environment	  of	  1980s	  South	  Africa,	  Eskom	  –	   the	  main	  government	  
owned	  utility	  in	  South	  Africa	  –	  missed	  this	  wave.	  	  
Although	  each	  RE	  project	  is	  different,	  the	  financing	  and	  investment	  structure	  largely	  follows	  
similar	   investment	  and	  capital	   structures,	  namely	   investors	  and	  promoters	  have	   sought	   to	  
use	   ring-­‐fenced	  SPVs,	   in	  which	   they	  apply	   a	   relatively	  high	  degree	  of	   leverage	  within	   thus	  
minimising	  the	  equity	  layout	  required	  (Baker	  and	  Wlokas,	  2015).	  	  
Idzorek	  and	  Armstrong	   (2009)	  make	   the	  point	   that	   institutional	   investor	   interest	   in	   the	  RE	  
space	   will	   be	   highly	   dependent	   on	   the	   kind	   of	   investment	   vehicle	   utilised	   as	   this	   speaks	  
directly	  to	  the	  assessment	  of	  overall	   risk.	  They	  further	  argue	  that	  a	  transparent	  and	  highly	  
recognizable	   legal	   structure	   for	   instance,	  will	   attract	   less	   investment	   risk	   versus	   structures	  
that	  are	  opaque	  and	  un-­‐rooted	  in	  the	  familiar.	  Standardization	  of	  legal	  structure	  is	  therefore	  
also	   an	   important	   component	   in	   helping	   determine	   the	   nomenclature	   of	   RE	   assets	   as	   a	  
distinct	  asset	  class	  	  	  
It	   is	   therefore	  useful,	   for	  asset	  allocation	  considerations,	   that	  most	  RE	  assets	   in	  SA	  are,	   to	  
date,	  structured	  on	  a	  project	  finance	  basis.	  There	  are	  however,	  some	  other	  useful	  examples	  
and	  modalities	  to	  consider.	  Nelson	  and	  Pierpont	  (2013),	  referring	  to	  international	  examples,	  




i. Special	  Purpose	  Vehicles	  (typical	  to	  a	  project	  finance	  structure	  employed	  in	  South	  
Africa	  RE	  assets)	  
ii. Pooled	  Investment	  –	  Unit	  trusts,	  typically	  termed	  Collective	  Investment	  Schemes	  
in	  South	  Africa,	  which	  have	  an	  exclusive	  focus	  on	  RE	  assets.	  These	  type	  of	  vehicles	  
are	  non-­‐existent	  (bar	  private	  equity	  funds)	  (Preqin	  2013)	  
iii. Direct,	   where	   institutional	   investors	   take	   a	   direct	   stake	   in	   RE	   assets.	   There	   is	  
already	  some	  evidence	  of	  this	  form	  of	  investments	  in	  the	  RE	  space	  –	  PIC,	  IDC,	  Old	  
Mutual	  (Eberhard	  et	  al,	  2014)	  
	  	  
Brealey	  et	  al	  (1996)	  however	  make	  the	  argument	  that	  project	  finance	  is	  arguably	  the	  most	  
optimal	  investment	  structure	  for	  infrastructure	  finance	  because,	  inter	  alia,	  it	  allows	  for	  wide	  
use	  of	  debt	  on	  a	  limited	  recourse	  basis	  for	  equity	  sponsors.	  They	  further	  make	  the	  argument	  
that	  project	  finance	  is	  also	  a	  useful	  way	  to	  usher	  in	  private	  capital	  into	  government-­‐backed	  
initiatives	  -­‐	   (like	  the	  REIPPP).	   Its	  usefulness	  arises	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  project	   finance	  allows	  
for	   compartmentalisation	   of	   different	   risks,	   allowing	   for	   the	   right	   type	   of	   capital	   to	   be	  
matched	  with	   the	  most	   appropriate	   risks.	   RE	   assets	   like	  most	   infrastructure	   assets	  have	   a	  
long	   life	   cycle	   with	   the	   arguably	   the	   riskiest	   form	   of	   capital	   being	   deployed	   in	   the	  
development	  phase	  of	  an	  asset’s	   life,	  conversely	  the	  least	  riskiest	  being	  deployed	  once	  the	  
project	   has	   been	   fully	   commissioned	   and	   is	   post	   revenue	   (Davis,	   1996).	   In	   this	   scenario	  
institutional	   equity	   capital	   for	   instance,	   may	   be	   suitable	   for	   some	   of	   the	   early	   stage	  
investment	  whereas	   debt	   capital	  may	   play	   a	   role	   as	   the	   project	   de-­‐risks.	   	   Project	   finance	  
therefore	  allows	  large-­‐scale	  infrastructure	  programs	  like	  the	  REIPPP	  to	  attract	  a	  wide	  array	  
of	  investors	  –	  often	  each	  with	  a	  differing	  risk	  outlook.	  	  	  	  
	  Weber	  et	  al	  (2010)	  describe	  four	  key	  features	  of	  project	  finance:	  
a. Special	  purpose	  Vehicle	  –	  a	  ring-­‐fenced,	  new	  entity	  as	  the	  asset	  owner	  
b. Cash	  Flow	  lending	  -­‐	  Investors	  participate	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  stream	  of	  highly	  visible	  
cash	  flows	  
c. Categorisation	  and	  Spreading	  of	   risk	  –	   specific	  project	  partners	   take	  up	   specific	  
project	  risks,	  risk	  is	  spread	  
d. Non-­‐recourse	  –	  the	  project	  SPV’s	  liabilities	  are	  limited	  to	  the	  capital	  contributions	  
of	  the	  various	  project	  partners	  
	  




typically	  invest	  in	  three	  ways:	  via	  equity,	  via	  debt	  and	  via	  mezzanine	  finance	  (equity	  and	  debt	  




Debt	  plays	  a	  critical	  role	  in	  project	  finance	  as	  it	  allows	  project	  sponsors	  to	  optimally	  allocate	  
their	  equity	  capital	  by	  seeking	  long-­‐term	  semi-­‐permanent	  capital	  partners.	  More	  importantly	  
the	   utilisation	   of	   debt	   also	   allows	   project	   sponsors	   to	   reduce	   their	   own	   capital	   outlay	  
through	  the	  use	  of	   leverage	  (Weber	  et	  al,	  2010).	  As	   is	  highlighted	  elsewhere	   in	  this	  paper,	  
project	  finance	  allows	  debt	  providers	  to	  invest	  into	  a	  ring-­‐fenced	  structure	  where	  the	  legal	  
mechanisms	  are	  highly	  visible	  and	  rooted	   in	   the	   familiar	   (Brealey	  et	  al,	  1996).	   	  Thus	  when	  
speaking	   of	   institutional	   investors	   regarding	   RE	   assets,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   recognise	   that	  
depending	  on	  their	  risk	  outlook,	  mandate	  and	  regulatory	  profile,	  institutional	  investors	  into	  
the	  REIPPP	  may	  participate	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  ways	  and	  at	  different	  components	  of	  the	  capital	  
structure.	  	  
	  
The	  major	  banks	  in	  South	  Africa	  are	  the	  main	  initial	  providers	  of	  debt	  capital	  into	  the	  REIPPP.	  
Over	  and	  above	  the	  big	  banks,	  the	  IDC	  has	  also	  played	  a	  critical	  role	  in	  providing	  debt	  finance	  
to	   RE	   projects,	   having	   financed	   R7,8bn	   to	   date	   (interview	   with	   IDC	   employee,	   Baker	   and	  
Wlokas,	  2015).	  Other	  contributors	  to	  debt	  financing	  include	  large	  fixed	  income	  houses	  that	  
are	   typically	   backed	   by	   pension	   funds	   and	   annuity	   houses	   (Baker	   and	   Wlokas,	   2015	   &	  
Eberhard	   et	   al,	   2014).	   Debt	   has	   played	   a	   critical	   role	   in	   underpinning	   the	   success	   of	   the	  
REIPPPP	   (Eberhard	   et	   al,	   2014).	   Gatti	   (2013)	   makes	   the	   point	   (touched	   on	   above)	   that	  
project	  finance	  allows	  for	  the	  optimal	  use	  of	  high	  levels	  of	  debt	  into	  project	  companies	  thus	  
effectively	   increasing	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   investor	   universe.	   Moreover,	   given	   the	   explicit	  
government	   underpin,	   cost	   of	   debt	   funding	   is	   made	   affordable	   thus	   helping	   increase	   the	  
commercial	  viability	  of	  projects.	   	   In	  a	  recent	  study	  by	  Ruester	  (2015)	  highlights	  that	   it	   is	   in	  
fact	  typical	  for	  debt	  to	  be	  syndicated	  amongst	  a	  group	  of	  investors	  by	  the	  primary	  lenders,	  
namely	   banks.	   Given	   the	   size	   and	   importance	   of	   the	   institutional	   market,	   within	   a	   South	  
African	  context	  syndication	  would	  therefore	  seem	  to	  play	  an	  integral	  role	  in	  determining	  the	  
sustainability	   of	   investor	   participation	  within	   the	   RE	   asset	   universe.	   Twinamatsiko,	   (2009)	  
outlines	  the	  benefits	  and	  rationale	  of	   loan	  syndication	  in	  project	  financing,	  highlighting	  the	  
critical	   role	  debt	   syndication	  plays	   in	   the	  mobilisation	  of	   funds	   from	  non-­‐banking	   financial	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investors.	   Twinamatsiko	   (supra)	   also	  makes	   the	   crucial	   point	   that	   loan	   syndication	  plays	   a	  
critical	  role	  in	  determining	  risk	  and	  pricing	  of	  debt	  instruments	  issued	  by	  project	  SPVs.	  Point	  
being	  that	  syndication	  allows	  for	  a	   level	  of	  pricing	  discovery	  within	  underlying	   instruments	  
by	  effectively	  introducing	  market	  making	  for	  debt	  instruments.	  	  Thus	  syndication	  could	  play	  
a	  lynchpin	  role	  in	  ushering	  in	  investor	  participation	  within	  the	  RE	  space.	  
Writing	   in	   an	   industry	   focused	   study	   Gecelter	   (2013)	  makes	   the	   point	   that	   South	   African	  
banks	   have	   tended	   to	   participate	   in	   the	   REIPPP	   via	   syndicated	   loan	   arrangements	   –	   with	  
syndication	  occurring	  either	  at	  financial	  close	  or	  shortly	  thereafter9.	  Gecelter	  (supra)	  further	  
states	   that	   banks	   typically	   off	   load	   their	   positions	   to	   non-­‐institutional	   investors	   such	   as	  
pension	   and	   annuity	   houses	   but	   questions	   whether	   there	   is	   sufficient	   capacity	   for	   direct	  
bond	  issuances	  by	  RE	  asset	  SPVs.	  This	  could	  be	  an	  interesting	  area	  for	  further	  research.	  
2.4.2 Equity	  
Equity	   plays	   a	   crucial	   role	   in	   essentially	   de-­‐risking	   an	   infrastructure	   project,	   particularly	  
within	  a	  project	  finance	  context	  (Yescombe,	  2014).	  Equity	  investors	  are	  usually	  first	  in	  line	  to	  
put	  money	   into	   a	   project	   and	   therefore	   assuming	  much	   of	   the	   early	   risk	   (Ruester,	   2015).	  	  
Equity	  investors	  assume	  what	  is	  colloquially	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘first	  loss	  positions’	  in	  RE	  projects	  
(Yescombe,	   2014).	   The	   structured	   nature	   of	   project	   finance	   however	   allows	   for	   equity	  
investors	   to	   not	   go	   in	   ‘naked’	   (another	   colloquialism)	   into	   a	   project,	   i.e.	   project	   finance	  
typically	  allows	  for	  high	  visibility	  of	  earnings	  distributions	  for	  equity	  investors.	  Davis	  (1996)	  
argues	   the	   project	   finance	   in	   fact	   enables	   the	   participation	   of	   capital	   market;	   non-­‐bank	  
institutional	   investors	  by	  optimally	  re-­‐ordering	  risk	  and	  return	  (a	  by-­‐product	  of	  which,	   is	  to	  
create	  different	  classes	  of	  investors	  into	  infrastructure	  projects).	  
2.4.3 Project	  Sponsors	  
Beyond	  capital	  providers,	  Baker	  (2015)	  writes	  that	  project	  finance	  attracts	  the	  participation	  
of	   other	   stakeholders,	   namely	   technical	   partners	   –	   EPC,	   O&M	   mainly	   and	   of	   course	  
government	  by	  transferring	  relevant	  risks	  to	  those	  sponsors	  who	  are	  most	  suitably	  able	  to	  
carry	  them	  (Ahlfeldt,	  2013).	  Peter	  and	  Frank	  (2000)	  write	  that	  a	  properly	  constructed	  project	  
9	  see	  	  also	  Gecelter’s	  ,(2013)	  discussion	  on	  the	  feasibilty	  of	  RE	  asset	  bonds	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structure	   allows	   for	   appropriate	   disintermediation	   of	   risks	   within	   a	   project	   company	   and	  
therefore	  allowing	   for	   the	   relationship	  between	   risk	  and	   return	   to	  be	  appropriately	  priced	  
and	  evaluated.	  For	  example	  construction	  risk	   is	  transferred	  from	  the	  project	  SPV	  to	  a	  third	  
party	   construction	   party	   (Ahlfeldt,	   2013).	   All	   of	   which	   is	   critical	   for	   institutional	   investor	  
trying	  to	  determine	  both	  the	  make	  up	  of	  risk	  and	  return	  within	  RE	  assets.	  The	  highly	  contract	  
driven	  nature	  of	  project	   finance	  provides	   for	  a	  highly	   transparent	  and	   legally	  certain	  entry	  
point	  for	  investors.	  One	  where	  investors	  can	  observe	  and	  measure	  the	  risks	  that,	  inter	  alia,	  y	  
technology,	   construction	  and	   regulatory	  bring	   to	  bear	   into	  a	  RE	  asset	   (Nevitt	   and	  Fabozzi,	  
2000).	   All	   of	   these	   considerations	   are	   the	   building	   blocks	   of	   the	   asset	   allocation	   process	  
because	   they	   speak	   directly	   to	   measuring,	   assessing	   and	   ultimately	   pricing	   both	   risk	   and	  
return	  profiles	  of	  RE	  assets	  (Weisdorf,	  2007).	  
Lastly,	  Nelson	  and	  Pierpont	  (2013)	  also	  make	  a	  connection	  between	  the	  investment	  vehicle	  
type	   and	   the	   overall	   finance	   costs.	   It	   is	   therefore	   important	   to	   consider	   how	   institutional	  
investors	   view	   the	   project	   finance	   model,	   given	   that	   it	   is	   so	   far	   the	   preferred	   mode	   of	  
financing	  RE	  projects	  in	  South	  Africa	  (Eberhard	  et	  al,	  2014,	  Supra,	  Baker	  and	  Wlokas,	  2015).	  	  
The	   type	   of	   investment	   vehicle	   utilised,	   also	   speaks	   to	   the	   particular	   type	   of	   financing	  
methodology	  employed	  into	  SA	  REIPPP	  investing.	  	  Per	  above,	  Baker	  (2015)	  &	  Eberhard	  et	  al	  
(2014)	   identify	   project	   finance	   as	   the	   most	   utilised	   investment	   vehicle	   for	   RE	   projects	   in	  
rounds	   1,	   2	   and	   3	   (Round	   three	   had	   6	   corporate	   financed	   projects,	   that	   balance	   sheet	  
financed	  vehicles).	  	  
2.4 	  Regulatory	  and	  Policy	  imperatives	  
Aschauer	  (1989)	  showed	  the	  critical	  role	  infrastructure	  investment	  plays	  in	  a	  nation’s	  overall	  
economic	  prosperity.	  Governments	  around	  the	  world	  recognize	  the	  policy	  benefits	  that	  good	  
infrastructure	   investment	  can	  have	  on	  the	  nation’s	  fiscal	  outlook.	   	  Sutton	  (2007)	  takes	  this	  
point	  further	  by	  highlighting	  the	  positive	  benefits	  that	  investment	  into	  utilities	  can	  foster	  for	  
economic	   development.	   	   In	   South	   Africa,	   in	   1998	   the	   state	  moved	   towards	   an	   integrated	  
generation	   mix,	   including	   different	   type	   of	   energy	   technologies	   recognising	   that	   over	  
reliance	  on	  coal	  generation	  was	  unsustainable	  (Winkler,	  2005).	  




underwritten	   its	   fortunes	   (DOE	   2015).	   The	   REIPPP	   program	   followed	   a	   developing	   trend	  
internationally,	  of	  introducing	  large-­‐scale	  private	  investment	  into	  the	  utility	  sector	  (Winkler,	  
2005).	   	   Many	   writers	   such	   as	   Mansour	   and	   Nadji	   (2006)	   have	   recognised	   the	   benefit	   of	  
adopting	  a	  mixed	  development	  model	  in	  developing	  a	  countries	  utility	  sector.	  Such	  a	  model	  
recognising	  that	  the	  right	  mix	  of	  government	  and	  private	  sector	  capital	   is	  usually	  the	  most	  
optimal	   way	   to	   underwrite	   large-­‐scale	   infrastructure	   funding	   gaps.	   South	   African	  
government	  has	  itself	  adopted	  this	  approach.	  Since	  2003	  DOE	  has	  followed	  a	  pretty	  detailed	  
and	  rigorous	  policy	  trajectory:	  
	  
	  
Figure	  4:	  Renewable	  Energy:	  Policy	  Trajectory	  (Source:	  State	  of	  Renewable	  Energy,	  2015,	  
DOE)	  
	  
In	   1998	   when	   the	   white	   paper	   was	   published	   South	   Africa’s	   energy	   policy	   was	   almost	  
exclusively	   orientated	   around	   carbon	   rich	   coal	   (DOE,	   2015).	   And	   at	   the	   time	   of	   its	  
formulation,	  renewable	  energy	  was	  at	  best	  a	  marginal	  part	  of	  the	  energy	  sector.	  	  
	  
The	  REIPPP	  program	  is	  predicated	  upon	  a	  competitive	  pricing	  regime.	  Where	  private	  players	  
bid,	  per	  the	  RFP,	  based	  on	  a	  number	  of	  factors;	  price	  being	  the	  most	  important,	  IRP	  (2010).	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This	  is	  an	  important	  fact	  given	  the	  development	  of	  relatively	  low	  price	  regime.	  South	  African	  
RE	  assets	  have	  amongst	  the	  world’s	  most	  competitive	  tariffs,	  which	  are	  inflation	  indexed	  for	  
the	  duration	  of	  the	  PPA	  (DOE,	  2015).	  This	   is	  a	  direct	  consequence	  of	  government	  policy	  as	  
outlined	   in	   the	   2011	   White	   Paper.	   Government’s	   intention	   was	   to	   usher	   in	   private	  
investment	   into	   the	  power	   sector	   that	  would	  be	   affordable.	  Moreover	  private	   investment	  
would	   occur	   within	   a	   policy	   framework	   that	   located	   government	   as	   a	   critical	   role	   player	  
(Gaunt,	  2008).	  	  
REIPPP	  program	  with	  it’s	  partial	  commitment	  to	  privatisation	  whilst	  keeping	  government	  as	  
a	   key	   stakeholder	   in	   all	   likelihood	   represented	   a	   policy	   balance	   by	  Government	   given	   the	  
political	  costs	  associated	  with	  privatisation	  (Phaahlamohlaka,	  2008).	  The	  policy	  trade	  off	  for	  
privatisation	   is	   in	  all	   likelihood	  cheaper	  electricity	  although	  Baker	  and	  Wlokas	   (2015)	  have	  
raised	  some	  concern	  regarding	  the	  rapidly	  declining	  tariffs	   in	  successive	  bid	  rounds,	  asking	  
whether	  from	  a	  financial	  perspective,	  the	  program	  has	  reached	  its	  peak.	  	  	  
The	   REIPPP	   program	   is	   implemented	   through	   a	   series	   of	   standardised	   agreements	   where	  
government	   is	   a	  main	   counterparty	  with	   the	   two	  main	   agreements	  where	   government	   is	  
counterparty	  being	  (Baker	  and	  Wlokas,	  2015)”	  
a. PPA
b. Implementation	  Agreement
The	   PPA	   is	   the	   agreement	  where	   tariff,	   duration,	   technical	   specification	   requirements	   are	  
determined.	  National	  treasury	  in	  part	  underwrites	  the	  PPA	  provisions	  (Eberhard	  et	  al,	  2014).	  	  
The	   implementation	  agreement	  governs	   the	   relationship	  between	  DOE	  and	   the	   respective	  
project	   companies	   (Implementation	   Agreement	   –	   Project	   X,	   2012).	   It	   includes	   terms	   and	  
provisions	  around	  saleability,	  how	  long	  a	  project	  company	  can	  take	  to	  construct,	  when	  the	  
equity	  owners	  of	  a	  project	  can	  dispose	  of	  their	  equity.	  Therefore	  even	  though	  government	  is	  
not	  a	  direct	  project	  owner,	  it	  is	  able	  to	  impact	  and	  influence	  the	  commercial	  considerations	  
of	  a	  project	  over	  its	  entire	  lifetime.	  	  
DOE	  for	  instance,	  restricts	  the	  outright	  sale	  of	  RE	  project	  equity	  and	  the	  selling	  down	  of	  debt	  
(DOE,	  2012).	  The	  rationale	  was	  to	  introduce	  investment	  certainty	  into	  a	  new	  industry	  where	  





A	  key	  pillar	  of	  any	  infrastructure	  program	  is	  ensuring	  that	  there’s	  an	  ongoing	  legal	  and	  policy	  
framework	   upon	   which	   investors	   can	   base	   their	   investment	   decisions	   (Nellis,	   1999).	   The	  
highly	   contracted,	   standardised,	   nature	   of	   the	   REIPPP	   program	   conforms	   to	   this	   view.	   A	  
recent	   survey	   by	   the	   audit	   company	   Ernst	   and	   Young,	   the	   REIPPP	   program	   is	   a	   highly	  
transparent	  program	  (Ernst	  and	  young,	  2013).	  	  
	  
2.5 Literature	  review	  conclusion	  
	  
The	  term	  “asset	  class”	  is	  contested	  and	  whether	  infrastructure	  assets	  meet	  some	  agreed-­‐to	  
definition	   of	   asset	   class	   even	   more	   so.	   From	   the	   literature	   cited	   above,	   there	   is	   some	  
emerging	  consensus	  around	  what	  the	  economic	  and	  financial	  features	  of	  RE	  assets	  looks	  like.	  
Internationally,	   more	   and	   more	   investors	   are	   including	   infrastructure	   within	   their	   asset	  
allocation	   frameworks.	   Moreover,	   some	   studies	   indicate	   that	   there	   are	   real	   benefits	   to	  
portfolios	  that	  include	  infrastructure	  assets	  within	  their	  mix.	  Inderst	  (2009)	  for	  instance	  finds	  
that	  expected	  return	  increases	  and	  risk	  lowers	  with	  the	  inclusion	  of	  infrastructure	  assets.	  	  
The	   literature	   also	   seems	   to	   find	   consensus	   that	   RE	   assets	   are	   a	   legitimate	   sub-­‐set	   of	  
infrastructure	   assets.	   Eberhard	   et	   al	   (2014)’s	   study	   indicates	   the	   rapidly	   growing	   REIPPP	  
program	  and	  the	  cascade	  effect	  it	  is	  having	  on	  investor	  allocations.	  Other	  local	  authors	  such	  
as	  Wlokas	  and	  Baker	  (2015)	  also	  show	  that	  there	  is	  developing	  consensus	  locally	  as	  to	  how	  
to	   fund	   and	   invest	   in	   RE	   assets.	   This	   standardisation	   relates	   to	   capital	   structure,	   legal	  
structure,	  risk-­‐return	  expectations.	  
	  
The	   literature	   reviewed	   does	   however	   highlight	   exactly	   how	  much	  work	   still	   needs	   to	   be	  
done	   in	   assessing	   the	   South	   African	   institutional	   market’s	   response	   to	   REIPPP	   program.	  
There	   is	   very	   little	   data	   by	   way	   of	   benchmarks	   and	   thorough	   analysis.	   At	   this	   stage,	  
understanding	  the	  REIPPP	  program	  often	  means	  extrapolating	   imperfect,	   foreign	  examples	  
into	  a	  local	  context.	  	  
	  
Lastly	  the	  literature	  indicates	  that	   in	  the	  absence	  of	  established	  benchmarks,	   investors	  will	  
glean	   and	   determine	   asset	   allocation	   suitability	   for	   infrastructure	   assets	   by	   performing	   a	  
thorough	   examination	   of	   such	   assets	   economic	   and	   financial	   features	   often	   in	   a	   non-­‐
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standardised	   manner.	   Thereafter	   juxtaposing	   such	   features	   against	   the	   features	   of	   more	  
established	  asset	  classes.	  
Very	  little	  of	  the	  available	  literature	  deals	  with	  the	  South	  African	  context.	  South	  Africa	  does	  
have	  one	  of	  the	  most	  sophisticated	  institutional	  investor	  bases	  in	  the	  world,	  therefore	  it	  may	  
only	  be	  a	  matter	  of	  time	  until	  relevant	  asset	  allocation	  models	  are	  developed	  to	  cater	  for	  RE	  
assets.	  
3 RESEARCH	  METHODOLOGY	  
3.1 Research	  Approach	  and	  Strategy	  
Given	  the	  nascent	  nature	  of	  the	  RE	  space	  in	  South	  Africa	  there	  is	  a	  dearth	  of	  available	  data.	  
It	  would	  not	  have	  been	  feasible	  to	  adopt	  a	  quantitative	  research	  approach	  given	  the	  lack	  of	  
financial	  data	  for	  RE	  at	  the	  present	  moment.	  The	  research	  therefore	  followed	  an	   inductive	  
qualitative	  approach.	  	  
An	   inductive,	   qualitative	   research	   approach	   allows	   the	   researcher	   to	   formulate	   a	   theory-­‐
building	  approach	  to	  the	  research	  (Cresswell,	  2013).	  A	  series	  of	  in-­‐depth,	  focused	  interviews	  
allowed	   the	   researcher	   to	   identify	   emerging	   themes,	   which	   were	   then	   triangulated	   with	  
other	  available	  data	  and	  an	  extensive	  literature	  review.	  
This	   research	  approach	  also	  provides	   the	  benefit	  of	  allowing	   the	   researcher	   to	   reflect	  and	  
glean	   non-­‐binaries,	   non-­‐quantifiable	   insights	   in	   the	   interviewee	   responses,	   thus	   capturing	  
nuance	   in	   a	   way	   a	   deductive	   approach	   would	   make	   difficult	   if	   not	   impossible	   given	   the	  
nature	  of	  this	  research	  topic.	  An	  inductive	  qualitative	  approach	  also	  allowed	  the	  researcher	  
to	   iteratively	   build	   theoretical	   frameworks,	   testing	   them	   through	   observations	   and	   a	  
thorough	  literature	  review.	  	  Further,	  an	  inductive	  theory	  approach	  allows	  for	  the	  researcher	  
to	   formulate	   what	   they	   observe	   through	   data	   collection,	   interviews	   into	   theoretical	  
concepts,	  which	  could	  inform	  the	  basis	  of	  future	  research	  in	  this	  field	  (Marcoulides,	  1998).	  	  
The	  approach	  to	  data	  collection	  was	  primarily	  through	  a	  series	  of	  interviews	  with	  RE	  project	  
sponsors	   (owners,	   financiers,	   developers)	   plus	   a	   series	   of	   interviews	   with	   various	  
institutional	  investor	  representatives	  (pension	  funds,	  life	  houses,	  DFIs,	  fixed	  income	  money	  




very	   best	   available	   expert	   viewpoints	   in	   South	   Africa.	   	   In	   order	   not	   to	   contaminate	   the	  
research	   findings,	   the	   researcher	   endeavoured	   to	   ask	   interviewees	   non-­‐leading	   questions,	  
avoiding	   binary	   enquiries	   and	   letting	   the	   interviewees	   describe	   in	   their	   owns	  words	   their	  
own	  experiences	  and	  perceptions	  of	  the	  REIPPP	  program’s	  viability	  for	  investors.	  	  
The	  research	  relied	  on	  Grounded	  Theory	  (Glaser	  and	  Strauss,	  1967,	  Shields	  and	  Tajalli.	  2006)	  
to	   help	   triangulate	   the	   set	   of	   findings	   and	   observations	   collated	   from	   the	   interviews	   and	  
other	  data	  observations	  (such	  as	  a	  study	  of	  DOE	  policy	  documentation	  and	  legislation).	  The	  
use	   of	   Grounded	   Theory	   therefore	   helped	   ‘sanity-­‐check’	   the	   data	   collected	   from	   the	  
interviewees	  by	  cross-­‐referencing	  data	  findings	  and	  conclusions	  from	  interviews	  with	  other	  
information	   sources	   gleaned	   from	   literature	   reviews,	   policy	  &	   legislations	   documentation,	  
media	  and	  news	  analysis	  and	  intra-­‐interview	  data	  from	  various	  respondents	  themselves.	  As	  
mentioned,	   the	  primary	  mode	  of	  data	  collection	  was	  through	  a	  series	  of	   interviews	  with	  a	  
specified	  pool	  of	  participants.	  Interviews	  were	  in	  both	  structured	  and	  unstructured	  formats.	  
Unstructured	  interviews	  were	  utilised	  primarily	  to	  gain	  new	  or	  nuanced	  insights	  into	  the	  RE	  
space	   whereas	   structured	   interviews	   were	   utilised	   to	   garner	   specific	   information	   from	  
participants.	  As	  mentioned	  above,	  all	  data	  garnered	  from	  interviews	  was	  triangulated	  with	  
other	  data	  sources	  –	  thus	  strengthening	  the	  validity	  and	  interpretation	  of	  the	  collected	  data	  
and	  minimising	  the	  potential	  for	  confirmation	  bias	  by	  the	  researcher.	  
	  
3.2 Data	  Collection,	  Frequency	  and	  Choice	  of	  Data	  
The	  REIPPP	  is	  a	  mere	  four	  years	  old	  (DOE,	  2010)	  and	  therefore	  the	  outlook	  and	  prospects	  of	  
the	  program	  is	  as	  of	  yet	  undetermined.	  Research	  design	  is	  the	  ‘map’	  the	  researcher	  utilises	  
in	   order	   to	   properly	   answer	   the	   research	   question	   (Saunders,	   Lewis	   and	   Thornhill,	   2009).	  
Given	  the	  newness	  of	  REIPPP,	  an	  exploratory	  research	  design	  was	  the	  most	  optimal	  research	  
approach.	  There	  are	  relatively	  very	  few	  areas	  of	  research	  on	  this	  topic	  within	  a	  South	  African	  
context,	  that	  is	  compounded	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  is	  also	  a	  dearth	  of	  financial	  and	  economic	  
data	  from	  which	  to	  draw	  hard	  conclusions.	  Reliance	  therefore	  predicated	  on	  the	  experience	  
and	  outlook	  of	  actual	  market	  participants	  in	  REIPPP	  or	  those	  seeking	  to	  obtain	  exposure	  to	  
the	  space.	  	  	  
Exploratory	   research	  allows	   the	   researcher	   to	  ventilate	  new	   thinking	  on	  a	  particular	   topic,	  
helping	   develop	   new	   insights	   on	   existing	   literature	   and	   findings,	   ultimately	   helping	   build	  
upon	  existing	  theory	  (Shields	  and	  Tajalli,	  2006).	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  More	  importantly	  though,	  the	  researcher	  hopes	  that	  this	  research	  will	  help	  form	  the	  basis	  
of	  future	  research	  –	  as	  the	  REIPPP	  matures	  and	  more	  datasets	  become	  available	  over	  longer	  
periods.	  	  
Research	  interviewees	  were	  selected	  for	  their	  respective	  insights	  into	  the	  REIPPP	  space.	  As	  
mentioned	   briefly	   above,	   all	   the	   respondents	   are	   active	   stakeholders	   in	   the	   REIPPP	   and	  
therefore	  are	  able	  to	  share	  first	  hand,	  expert	  insights	  about	  the	  space	  from	  their	  particular	  
perspectives.	  Given	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  research	  design	  is	  exploratory,	  the	  interviewee	  list	  can	  
never	  be	  exhaustive.	  	  
The	   researcher	   interviewed	   26	   individuals	   all	   either	   directly	   or	   indirectly	   involved	   with	  
REIPPP	   either	   as	   financiers,	   investors,	   project	   developers,	   project	   sponsors,	   regulators,	  
advisors.	   Of	   the	   26	   interviewees,	   over	   90%	   are	   direct	   investors	   in	   the	   REIPPP	   program,	  
representing	  some	  of	  the	  major	  investment	  and	  financing	  houses	  in	  South	  Africa.	  	  
Interviews	   were	   mainly	   semi-­‐structured	   via	   a	   set	   of	   well-­‐designed	   interview	   questions	  
(Appendix	   1)	   and	   then	   followed	   by	   a	   series	   unstructured	   interviews	   and	   conversations.	  
Furthermore	  the	  researcher	  consulted	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  published	  information	  in	  the	  form	  of	  
academic	   and	   non-­‐academic	   literature	   to	   collect	   further	   data	   and	   triangulate	   data	  
emanating	   from	   the	   interviews.	   The	   triangulation	   went	   both	   ways,	   testing	   both	   the	  
interview	  findings	  via	  the	  literature	  review	  and	  vice	  versa.	  
Corbin	   and	   Strauss	   (2014)	   stipulate	   that	   research	   can	   be	   validly	   collected	   and	   collated	  
through	  a	  variety	  of	  means	   including	   interviews,	  questionnaires	  and	  observations	  and	  that	  
this	   cross-­‐sectional	   approach	   to	   data	   collation	   helps	   reinforce	   the	   data’s	   validity	   via	  
triangulation.	   Therefore	   Interview	  generated	  data	  was	   cross-­‐referenced	  with	   the	   available	  
literature	   via	  media	   reports,	   policy	   and	   regulatory	   reports	   from	  DOE	   and	   various	   industry	  
presentations	  made	  by	  various	  industry	  participants	  who	  are	  experts	  in	  one	  or	  more	  aspects	  
of	  the	  REIPPP.	  
Secondary	   sources	   of	   data	   beyond	   literature	   review	   and	   interviews	   were	   also	   relied	   on	  
mainly	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  review	  of	  existing	  policy	  documents	  published	  by	  the	  DOE.	  
Given	   the	  dearth	  of	   literature	  on	   this	   topic	   directly	   relevant	   to	   the	   South	  African	   context,	  
reliance	  had	  to	  be	  placed	  on	  literature	  describing	  and	  quantifying	  market	  scenarios	  in	  places	  




contextualise	  the	  data	  collected	  from	  the	  interviewees	  and	  other	  local	  material	  and	  in	  some	  
instances,	   vice	   versa.	   The	   benefit	   of	   using	   unstructured	   interviews	   is	   that	   it	   allowed	   the	  
researcher	  to	  elicit	  responses	  from	  the	  interviewees	  that	  provided	  some	  very	  useful	  insights	  
into	  a	  new	  sector.	  Of	  particular	  usefulness	  were	  the	  insights	  from	  portfolio	  managers.	  	  
3.3 Sampling	  
The	   nature	   of	   the	   newness	   of	   REIPPP	   dictates	   that	   exploratory	   research	   design	   outlined	  
above	   is	   perhaps	   the	  most	   appropriate	   research	  approach.	   The	   study	   relied	  on	   interviews	  
(26),	  cross-­‐referenced	  with	  a	  detailed	  literature	  review	  plus	  an	  extensive	  analysis	  of	  existing	  
policy	   documents	   in	   order	   to	   analyse	   the	   data.	   Interviewees	   represent	   some	   of	   the	  most	  
experienced	  REIPPP	  program	  participants	  in	  South	  Africa.	  All	  are	  key	  decision	  makers	  in	  their	  
respective	  organisations	  and	  generally	  represent	  decades	  of	  experience	  in	  financial	  services,	  
project	   finance	   and	   other	   relevant	   spheres.	   Collectively	   the	   individuals	   interviewed	  
represent	  nearly	  R2	  trillion	  of	  economic	  interests	  through	  the	  respective	  organisations	  (with	  
the	  PIC	  representative	  making	  up	  for	  half	  of	  this	  amount)	  
In	   order	   to	   ensure	   that	   the	   research	   findings	   are	   reflective	   of	   a	   sufficiently	   wide	   enough	  
range	  of	  REIPPP	   stakeholders,	   the	   researcher	   intends	   to	   interview	  stakeholders	  across	   the	  
following	  categories:	  
i. Institutional	   investors	   and	   financiers	   (Pension	   Funds,	   DFIs,	   Fixed-­‐Income	  
managers)	  (“Investors”)	  	  
ii. Regulators	  Government	  and	  Eskom	  representatives	  (DOE,	  Treasury,	  Eskom)	  	  
iii. Transaction	  Advisors	  (“Advisors”)	  	  	  
Following	   Gorman	   and	   Clayton’s	   (2005)	   definition	   of	   non-­‐probability	   sampling.	   The	  
researcher	  understands	   the	  dangers	  of	   this	  approach	   in	   that	   it	   can	   introduce	  confirmation	  
bias	  given	  that	  the	  sampling	  process	  is	  inherently	  subjective	  and	  may	  reflect	  the	  researchers	  
own	  outlook	  and	  biases.	  With	  this	   in	  mind	  the	  researcher	  constructed	  the	  sample	  cases	  to	  
be	   as	   relevant	   as	   possible	   to	   the	   research	   question	   by	   focusing	   on	   parties	   that	   have	   an	  
intimate	  knowledge	  of	  the	  investment	  landscape	  of	  REIPPP	  to	  date.	  
To	   this	   end,	   the	   researcher	   also	   adopted	   an	   iterative	   interview	   approach	   which	   in	   turn	  
ultimately	   determined	   the	   sample	   profile	   and	   breadth	   -­‐	   that	   is:	   structured	   interview	  




interviews	  à	  then	  follow	  up	  and	  further	  semi-­‐unstructured	  interviews.	  Another	  point	  worth	  
noting	   is	   that	   given	   the	   newness	   of	   the	   REIPPP	   most	   participants	   were	   familiar	   to	   one	  
another	   either	   directly	   or	   indirectly	   which	   made	   it	   easier	   to	   get	   in	   touch	   with	   other	  
prospective	  interviewees).	  There	  was	  also,	  therefore,	  an	  easier	  ability	  to	  cross-­‐reference	  and	  
triangulate	  emerging	  data	  and	  themes	  within	  the	  sample	  grouping	   itself.	  Moreover	  further	  
cross-­‐referencing	  this	  emerging	  data	  by	  referring	  to	  existing	  literature	  -­‐	  both	  academic	  texts	  
and	   policy	   and	   legislation	   documentation	   (Berg	   and	   Lune,	   2004).	   Where	   the	   researcher	  
found	   that	   interviewees	   differed	   on	   a	   particular	   point	   or	   finding,	   the	   researcher	   would	  
ventilate	   that	  contradiction	  with	  other	   interviewees	   further	  cross-­‐referencing	   the	   research	  
findings	  with	  the	  literature	  review	  findings	  
Given	   the	  overall	   standardization	   in	   the	  REIPPP	  process	   (i.e.	   the	   standardised	  bid	  process,	  
standardised	   project	   legal	   agreements	   such	   as	   the	   PPA	   and	   Implementation	   Agreements	  
(DOE,	  2015)),	  there	  are	  some	  usefully	  common	  features	  across	  the	  various	  RE	  projects.	  This	  
factor	   helped	   in	   testing	   the	   validity	   of	   the	   merging	   data	   and	   themes	   given	   the	   fact	   that	  
respondents,	   irrespective	   of	   which	   RE	   project	   they’re	   involved	   in,	   all	   typically	   contended	  
with	  the	  same	  framework.	  
	  
3.4 Data	  Analysis	  Methods	  
Data	  was	  collected	  in	  a	  number	  of	  different	  mays.	  The	  main	  mode	  of	  data	  collection	  was	  via	  
a	  series	  of	   interviews	  and	  discussions	  with	  people	  who	  have	  extensive	  experience	  with	  the	  
REIPPP.	   Initial	   discussions	   and	   interviews	  were	   framed	  via	   a	   series	  of	   structured	   interview	  
questions	   that	   were	   communicated	   to	   the	   participants.	   Follow-­‐up	   discussions	   and	  
communication	   then	   followed	   up	   the	   structured	   interview	   responses.	   The	   researcher	  
identified	   themes	   in	   the	   responses	   and	   discussions,	   coding	   each	   theme	   with	   a	   view	   to	  
returning	  to	  it	  either	  via	  further	  discussion	  with	  participants	  and	  triangulating	  the	  thematic	  
findings	  with	  other	  material	  gathered	  under	  an	  extensive	  literature	  review.	  
Data	   collected	   was	   then	   cross-­‐sectionalised	   through	   an	   extensive	   literature	   review	   of	  
applicable,	   existing	   academic	   theory	   on	   the	   research	   scope	   at	   hand.	   Eisenhardt	   (1989)	  
outlines	  the	  importance	  of	  cross-­‐checking	  and	  interrogating	  collected	  data	  through	  a	  variety	  
of	  means	  and	  methodologies	  (grounded	  theory).	   In	  this	   instance,	  and	  as	   intimated	  directly	  
above,	   the	   researcher	   augmented	   the	   data	   analysis	   process	   by	   reviewing	   other	   relevant	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materials	  –	  this	  allowed	  the	  collected	  data	  to	  be	  analysed	  through	  a	  variety	  of	  different	  and	  
sometimes	  differing	  perspectives.	  	  
Applying	   the	   grounded	   theory	   approach	   further	   allowed	   the	   researcher	   to	   split	   the	   data	  
analysis	  process	  in	  to	  two	  broad	  frameworks:	  
i. Data	  collation,	  sampling
ii. Categorisation	  or	  Coding	  (thematic	  approach)
Data	   was	   collated	   then	   synthesized,	   and	   streamlined	   into	   applicable	   categories	   based	   on	  
emerging	  themes.	  Categorising	  the	  collected	  data	  in	  such	  a	  structured	  manner	  enabled	  the	  
researcher	   to	   appropriately	   contextualise	   data	   whilst	   gleaning	   from	   it	   emerging	   patterns	  
within	  each	  particular	   grouping.	   This	   process	  of	   collation	  and	   categorisation	  was	   iterative,	  
repeated	   at	   each	   stage	   of	   the	   data	   sampling	   process.	   In	   practice	   categorisation	   was	  
performed	   once	   all	   interviews	   were	   completed,	   where	   themes	   were	   identified.	   The	  
researcher	   then	  went	   back	   to	   some	   of	   the	   respondents	   to	   clarify	   and	   perform	   follow	   up	  
questions	  via	  semi-­‐structured	  interviews.	  	  All	  the	  while	  sorting	  out	  the	  emerging	  themes	  into	  
applicable	   categories.	   This	   approach	  also	  allowed	   the	   researcher	   to	   scope	  out	  any	  gaps	   in	  
the	   data	   collection	   process,	   making	   allowance	   for	   further	   data	   to	   be	   collected	   and	   once	  
categorised,	   where	   applicable.	   This	   theoretical	   sampling	   approach	   underscores	   the	   data	  
analysis	  process	  by	  providing	  a	  rigorous	  framework	  to	  cross-­‐reference	  data.	  
3.5 Research	  Reliability	  and	  Validity	  
The	  danger	   in	   this	   research	  process	   outlined	   above	   is	   that	   the	   researcher	   can	   insert	   their	  
own	   biases	   into	   the	   data	   collection	   process,	   skewing	   sample	   of	   interviewees,	   unwittingly	  
emphasising	   certain	   data	   sets	   over	   other.	   To	   mitigate	   this	   danger,	   the	   researcher	   cross-­‐
sectionalised	  their	  data	  collection	  –	  triangulating	  data	  collection	  methodology	  as	  described	  
above	  by	   applying	   grounded	   theory	   concepts;	   seeking	  out	   anomalies	   in	   the	  different	  data	  
collection	   processes.	   Thus	   it	   was	   critical	   that	   external,	   secondary	   data	   collection	  
methodologies	   (namely	   literature	   reviews)	   corroborate	   the	   overall	   primary	   data	   findings,	  
thus	  validating	  data	  collected	  from	  interviews	  (Patton,	  1990).	  Moreover	  it	  is	  important	  that	  
the	  data	  findings	  were	  easily	  extrapolated	  and	  generalised.	  In	  other	  words,	  ensuring	  that	  the	  




of	  data	  collection	  methods	  strengthened	  the	  research	  collection	  framework	  and	  limited	  this	  
latter-­‐described	  risk.	  
3.6 Limitations	  
The	   researcher	   acknowledges	   that	   time,	   resources	   and	   an	   overall	   lack	   of	   South	   Africa-­‐
specific	  material	  and	  data	  hampers	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  research.	  A	  single-­‐researcher	  approach	  
also	  limits	  all	  available	  perspectives	  
4 RESEARCH	  FINDINGS,	  ANALYSIS	  AND	  DISCUSSION	  
	  
4.1 	  Introduction	  	  
The	   list	  of	   interviewees	  the	  researcher	  communicated	  with	  can	  be	  considered	  to	  be	  at	  the	  
forefront	   of	   the	   REIPPP.	   Many	   highlighted	   various	   motivations	   for	   participating	   in	   the	  
REIPPP,	  but	   the	  underlying	   theme	   that	  emerged	  was	  one	  of	   financial	   consideration.	  Many	  
interviewees	   explicitly	   described	   their	   participation	   in	   REIPPP	   as	   driven	   by	   a	   financial	  
motivation.	  	  This	  is	  an	  important	  starting	  point	  within	  the	  context	  of	  this	  paper	  given	  the	  fact	  
that	  this	  research	  concerns	  itself	  with	  investigating	  the	  motivations	  and	  (financial)	  incentives	  
of	  institutional	  investors	  looking	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  REIPPP.	  A	  key	  underlying	  assumption	  is	  
that	   investors	  are	  acting	   rationally,	   in	   that	   they	  seek	   to	  maximise	   return	  whilst	  minimizing	  
associated	  risks.	  
A	   senior	   portfolio	   manager	   at	   one	   of	   the	   largest	   pension	   fund	   houses	   in	   SA	   (personal	  
communication,	   11	   September	   2016)	   described	   their	   participation	   the	   in	   REIPPP	   as	   an	  
‘opportunity	   to	   access	   cash	   flows	   with	   relatively	   low	   downside	   risk	   [given	   the	   role	   of	  
Treasury	   in	   underwriting	   the	   PPA]	   ’.	  What	   this	   respondent	  was	   alluding	   to	   is	   that	   in	   their	  
view;	  RE	  assets	  present	  a	  viable	  investment	  opportunity	  given	  what	  he	  termed	  a	  favourable	  
relationship	  between	  risk	  and	  return.	  	  However,	  echoing	  a	  common	  sentiment	  amongst	  the	  
interviewees,	  this	  respondent	  further	  stated	  that	  the	  difficulty	  his	  organisation	  faces	  when	  it	  
comes	  to	  RE	  assets,	   is	   in	  developing	  what	  Brealey,	  Cooper	  and	  Habib(1996)	  refer	  to	  as	  the	  
taxonomy	  of	   finance.	   There	  was	  a	   feeling	  expressed	   that	   it	  was	   still	   difficult	   to	  determine	  
where	  within	   their	   respective	   investment	  universe	  RE	  assets	  would	   fit	   in.	   Further	  whether	  
existing	   mandates	   and	   definitions	   would	   suffice	   in	   understanding	   this	   emerging	   new	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investment	   target	  or	  whether	  new	  nomenclature	  would	  need	   to	  be	  developed	   in	  order	   to	  
appropriately	  categorise	  RE	  assets	  within	  the	  asset	  allocation	  framework	  
Nearly	   all	   participants	   viewed	   the	   REIPPP	   as	   a	   favourable	   policy	   development	   and	   more	  
importantly	  viewed	  DOE’s	  commitment	  to	   it	  as	  sustainable	  and	   long	  term.	  However,	  some	  
interviewees	  expressed	  the	  view	  that	  Independent	  Power	  Office	  (“the	  IPP	  Office”)	  should	  be	  
located	   within	   a	   firmer	   legislative	   framework.	   In	   other	   words	   its	   functions	   should	   be	  
institutionalised	   in	   order	   for	   the	   program	   to	   be	   fully	   sustainable	   thus	   echoing	   a	   view	  
expressed	  by	  Msimanga	  and	  Sebitosi	  	  (2014).	  	  	  
A-­‐110,	  a	  very	  senior	  official	  within	  the	  IPP	  Office,	  disputed	  the	  assertion	  that	  the	  IPP	  Office	  
may	  suffer	  from	  a	  lack	  of	  a	  highly	   identifiable	  institutional	  framework.	  Her	  view	  is	  that	  the	  
IPP	   Office	   enjoys	   support	   from	   both	   the	   National	   Treasury	   (A-­‐1	   herself	   being	   a	   Treasury	  
official)	  and	  The	  Presidency)	  thus	  ensuring	  a	  successive	  policy	  framework	  for	  the	  REIPPP.	  
For	  many	   interviewees,	   the	  mechanics	   of	  how	   they	   participated	   in	   the	   REIPPP	   influenced	  
their	  asset	  allocation	  outlook.	  	  For	  instance,	  some	  investors	  were	  attracted	  to	  the	  economic	  
and	   financial	   profile	   of	   RE	   assets	   but	   were	   restricted	   from	   investing	   into	   an	   asset	   with	  
unlisted	  instruments.	  This	  ‘how’	  question	  which	  is	  essentially	  a	  mandate	  question	  often	  links	  
itself	   to	   a	   normal	   asset	   allocation	   process.	   As	  more	   than	   one	   respondent	   pointed	   out,	   an	  
asset	  can	  theoretically	  be	  considered	   favourably	   for	  asset	  allocation	  purposes	  but	   investor	  
mandate	   issues	   can	  make	   it	   impossible	   to	   invest.	   This	   latter	   point	  was	   a	   recurring	   theme	  
emanating	  from	  interview	  discussions.	  	  
Other	  considerations	  that	  relate	  to	  both	  mandate	  and	  pure	  economic	  considerations	  related	  
to	  perception	  of	  risk	  given	  the	  composition	  of	  RE	  asset	  capital	  structures.	  A-­‐2	  for	  instance,	  a	  
portfolio	   manager	   in	   a	   large	   fixed	   income	   investment	   house	   (personal	   communication)	  
makes	   the	   point	   that	   capital	   structure	   considerations	   weigh	   heavily	   on	   their	   outlook	  
regarding	   RE	   assets.	   A-­‐2	   oversees	   institutional	   money	   that	   invests	   in	   high	   yielding	   fixed	  
income	   instruments	   such	  as	  REITS.	  He	  pointed	  out	   that	   emanating	   from	   legacy	   issues	  and	  
current	   internal	   credit	   policy	   considerations,	   his	   funds	   were	   restricted	   from	   investing	   in	  




REITS	   where	   the	   underlying	   blended	   loan	   to	   value	   of	   the	   target	   property	   company	   was	  
higher	  than	  40%.	  RE	  assets	  as	  described	  elsewhere	  in	  this	  paper,	  are	  usually	  funded	  via	  ring-­‐
fenced	   SPVs	   where	   the	   applicable	   leverage	   is	   way	   in	   excess	   of	   the	   40%	   restriction	   A-­‐2	  
contends	  with.	  This	   latter	  point	   introduces	  a	  quandary	  for	  him	  when	  considering	  RE	  assets	  
for	  asset	  allocation	  purposes	  irrespective	  of	  whether	  he	  is	  satisfied	  with	  the	  overall	  risk	  and	  
return	   economics,	   the	   credit	   policy	   restrictions	   (essentially	   mandate	   restrictions)	   make	   is	  
difficult	  to	  argue	  for	  RE	  asset	  inclusion	  within	  his	  mandates.	  What	  is	  interesting	  to	  observe,	  
was	   that	   even	   where	   investors	   could	   make	   a	   financial	   case	   for	   investing	   in	   RE,	   many	  
respondents	  expressed	  the	  view	  that	  their	  own	  internal	  mandates	  severely	  proscribed	  their	  
participation	  as	  investors	  in	  RE	  assets.	  Revealing	  that	  there	  is	  exists	  a	  lag	  between	  objective	  
(financial)	  analysis	  of	  RE	  assets	  and	  how	  they	  are	  perceived.	  	  
4.2 Renewable	  Energy:	  Investor	  perceptions	  and	  expectations	  
Given	  Eskom’s	  longstanding	  monopoly	  in	  South	  Africa’s	  energy	  sector,	  the	  private	  sector	  has	  
historically	   played	   a	   tangential	   role	   in	   financing	   and	   investing	   within	   the	   utilities	   space	  
(Eberhard	  2007).	  Private	  sector	  capital	  has	  typically	  been	  crowded	  out	  by	  the	  state’s	  singular	  
investment	  focus	  into	  Eskom	  over	  nearly	  70	  years.	  	  Therefore,	  to	  many	  portfolio	  managers,	  
pension	   fund	   trustees,	   analysts	   and	   other	   involved	   in	   the	   asset	   allocation	   process	   the	  
question	   of	   whether	   RE	   assets	   should	   form	   part	   of	   their	   formal	   mandates	   is	   a	   new	   and	  
untested	   consideration.	   Traditionally	   South	   African	   investors’	   preferred	   asset	   classes	   are:	  
Equities,	  Bonds,	  and	  Property	  (Nhlapo	  and	  Gumata,	  2011).	  	  	  
In	   the	   early	   rounds	   (Rounds	   1,	   2)	   of	   the	   REIPPP,	   there	   were	   a	   handful	   of	   institutional	  
investors,	  namely	  Old	  Mutual	  (via	  IDEAS	  Fund,	  AIIM,	  Funds,	  and	  A	  large	  fixed	  income	  house),	  
DFIs	   (IDC,	   DBSA)	   and	   a	   handful	   of	   private	   equity	   funds	   that	   in	   part	   represented	   mainly	  
foreign	  DFIs	  such	  as	  the	  IFC,	  Norfund,	  Geerf.	  	  
According	   to	   A-­‐3,	  who	  works	   at	   a	   large,	   listed	   financial	   services	   house11,	   	   (per	   telephonic	  
interview	  and	  discussion)	   his	   organisation	  much	   like’s	   its	   peers,	   hadn’t	   anticipated	  REIPPP	  
and	  further,	  they	  had	  very	  little	  in-­‐house	  project	  or	  infrastructure	  finance	  expertise	  to	  asses	  
its	  viability	  for	  their	  clients,	  who	  are	  mainly	  a	  mix	  pensioners	  and	  other	  retail	  investors	  (A-­‐3,	  
supra).	  	  	  
                                                
11	  A-­‐3	  is	  very	  senior	  and	  sits	  on	  the	  Exco	  of	  this	  company.	  One	  of	  the	  largest	  on	  the	  JSE	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Kingdom	  Mugadza,	   formerly	   of	   Omigsa’s	   IDEAS	   fund,	   indicated	   (personal	   communication)	  
that	   many	   institutional	   investment	   houses	   had	   not	   adequately	   developed	   the	   necessary	  
nomenclature	  in	  order	  to	  appropriately	  categorise	  RE	  assets	  within	  their	  existing	  mandates.	  
The	  conversation	  around	  RE	  assets	  still	  centred	  on	  where	  in	  the	  investment	  universe	  money	  
managers	  should	  allocate	  (if	  they	  allocate	  at	  all)	  RE	  assets.	  The	  lack	  of	  history	  and	  outright	  
newness	  of	  the	  sector	  often	  trapped	  any	  serious	  discussion	  around	  RE	  assets	  at	  often	  very	  
preliminary	   and	   basic	   analysis	   focused	   on	   determining	   exactly	  what	   this	   new	   sector	   looks	  
like,	  determining	  nomenclature.	  	  He	  made	  the	  further	  point	  that	  many	  institutional	  investors	  
were	  still	  ignorant	  of	  the	  detail	  surrounding	  RE	  assets	  and	  would	  therefore	  take	  ‘longer	  than	  
the	  short-­‐term’	  to	  develop	  informed	  views	  and	  perceptions	  of	  the	  sector.	  	  	  
Mugadza	  also	  expressed	  a	  viewpoint	  echoed	  by	  other	  respondent	  that	  RE	  assets	   	  -­‐	  at	  both	  
debt	  and	  equity	   levels	  of	   investment	  –	  represented	  a	  type	  of	   fixed	   income	  opportunity	   for	  
investors.	  	  
Underlining	  this	  latter	  expressed	  viewpoint	  was	  the	  fact	  once	  RE	  assets	  reached	  their	  post-­‐
construction	  phase	  they	  were	  expected	  to	  represent	  long	  term	  and	  steady	  streams	  of	  cash	  
flows	  to	  both	  debt	  and	  equity	  investors.	  An	  interviewee	  who	  is	  a	  senior	  dealmaker	  at	  the	  PIC	  
(telephonic	  interview)	  revealed	  that	  the	  PIC	  had	  in	  fact	  ‘missed	  the	  boat’	  on	  the	  first	  round	  
of	  the	  REIPPP.	  There	  was	  no	  internal	  policy	  or	  mandate	  or	  even	  expertise	  within	  that	  would	  
have	  allowed	  the	  PIC	  to	  participate	  as	  an	  investor	  in	  the	  REIPPP.	  The	  PIC	  is	  the	  government’s	  
pension	   fund	   manager	   representing	   over	   one	   trillion	   Rands	   in	   funds	   of	   their	   various	  
members.	   They	   are	   by	   all	  measures	   the	   largest	   fund	  manager	   in	   the	   country.	  Making	   the	  
respondents	  revelation	  even	  more	  remarkable.	  In	  that	  by	  the	  commencement	  of	  the	  REIPPP	  
program	  the	  mainstream	  institutional	  market	  hadn’t	  even	  considered	  putting	  on	  their	  radar	  
let	   alone	   formulating	   a	   sophisticated	   asset	   allocation	   outlook	   to	   RE	   assets.	   	   The	   PIC	  
respondent	   did	   however	   indicate	   that	   by	   the	   time	   the	   second	   round	   of	   bids	   had	   come	  
around	   they	   had	   both	   capacitated	   and	   formulated	   internal	   mandates,	   which	   placed	   the	  
REIPPP	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  their	  investment	  policy.	  	  A	  key	  consideration	  for	  the	  PIC	  (and	  other	  
organisations	   as	   expressed	   by	   other	   interviewees)	   was	   determining	   whether	   they	   would	  
invest	   across	   the	   capital	   structure	   or	   merely	   limit	   themselves	   to	   investments	   of	   a	   debt	  
nature.	  	  
In	  constructing	  a	  view	  around	  the	  REIPPP	  and	  therefore	  RE	  assets	  many	  of	  the	  respondents	  
expressed	  a	  near-­‐instinctive	  viewpoint	  that	  from	  a	  risk	  adjusted	  perspective	  (and	  therefore	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asset	  allocation	  perspective)	   it	  would	  most	   likely	  be	   ‘easier’	   to	   invest	   in	  debt	   instruments.	  
There	  were	  however,	  some	  interesting	  opinions	  regarding	  whether	  there	  is	  in	  actual	  fact	  any	  
material	  difference	  between	  debt	  and	  equity	  from	  a	  risk	  adjusted	  perspective.	  This	  point	  of	  
view	   underscored	   by	   the	   fact	   that	  most	   RE	   assets	  were	   structured	   as	   ring-­‐fenced	   project	  
finance	  SPVs	  
Mugadza	  (Old	  Mutual)	  finds	  that	  distinctions	  between	  equity	  and	  debt	  instruments	  within	  a	  
project	  finance	  context	  were	  often	  superfluous.	  According	  to	  him,	  the	  additional	  contractual	  
protection	   that	   debt	   investors	   enjoy	   over	   equity	   investors,	   is	   not	   sufficient	   to	   yield	   vastly	  
different	  returns	  for	  debt	  and	  equity.	  As	  Eberhard	  et	  al	  (2014)	  show	  in	  their	  important	  paper	  
on	  the	  REIPPP;	  over	  the	  last	  three	  rounds	  the	  return	  on	  both	  debt	  and	  equity	  has	  contracted	  
but	  equity	  has	  re-­‐priced	  downwards	  at	  vastly	  higher	  rate	  than	  debt	  pricing.	  	  
In	  a	  paper	  from	  the	  EDHEC-­‐Risk	  Institute,	  Blanc-­‐Brude,	  Hasan	  and	  Ismail	  (2014),	  argue	  that	  
the	  probability	  of	  default	  for	  a	  ring-­‐fenced	  infrastructure	  project,	  is	  similar	  across	  the	  capital	  
structure,	   given	   that	   recoverability	   in	   the	   event	   of	   loss	   is	   limited	  within	   a	   project	   finance	  
context.	   	   Mugadza	   is	   in	   effect	   reiterating	   Blanc-­‐Brude	   et	   al’s	   (2014)	   viewpoint.	   	   How	  
investors	  perceive	  and	  ultimately	  analyse	  debt	  and	  equity	  instruments	  will	  have	  a	  direct	  and	  
immediate	  bearing	  on	   their	   asset	   allocation	  decisions.	   The	   relationship	  between	  debt	   and	  
equity	  and	  the	  risk	  return	  profiles	  of	  the	  two	  is	  an	  important	  marker	  in	  shaping	  investment	  
perception	  of	  RE	  assets	  and	  ultimately,	  an	  asset	  allocation	  strategy	  involving	  RE	  assets	  within	  
the	   investment	  make-­‐up.	  The	  data	   collected	   from	   interviewees	   indicated	   that	  even	  where	  
participants	  had	  formulated	  internal	  mandates	  and	  their	  overall	  perception	  the	  REIPPP	  was	  
favourable	   (as	   an	   investment	   target)	   many	   still	   expressed	   a	   level	   of	   bias	   towards	  
participating	  as	  debt	  investors.	  Indicating	  that	  institutional	  investors	  need	  to	  still	  wrap	  their	  
minds	  around	  equity	  investments.	  This	  is	  discussed	  further	  below.	  	  
A-­‐5	   from	  a	   large	   fixed	   income	  house,	   in	  a	   telephonic	   interview	   (personal	   communication),	  
reiterated	   the	   above	   view	   (as	   expressed	   by	   Mugadza),	   that	   there	   is	   often	   difficulty	   in	  
appropriately	  differentiating	  between	  debt	  and	  equity	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  firstly	  categorising	  
the	   investment	   from	   a	   mandate	   perspective	   and	   secondly,	   from	   a	   pricing	   perspectives	  
(pricing	  –	  i.e.	  ultimately	  measuring	  and	  quantifying	  both	  risk	  and	  return	  and	  their	  respective	  
relationship).	   She	   cites	   the	  emergence	  of	   Yieldco	  both	   in	   South	  Africa	   and	   internationally.	  
Yieldcos	  are	  effectively	  packaged	  cash	  flows	  of	  mainly	  equity-­‐backed	  cash	  flows	  –	  but	  have	  
bond	   like	   qualities	   and	   in	   the	   U.S.	   are	   typically	   listed.	   A-­‐5	   cites	   the	   participation	   of	   fixed	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income	   investors	   into	   Yieldcos	   (buying	   exposure	   to	  what	   are	   essentially	   equity	   cash	   flows	  
whereas	  such	  investors	  would	  typically	  buy	  fixed	  income	  bond	  instruments)	  as	  evidence	  of	  
the	   conflation	   between	   equity	   and	   debt	   pricing.	   	   A-­‐5	   indicated	   that	   she	   expects	   to	   see	   a	  
contraction	  in	  pricing	  differential	  between	  equity	  and	  debt	  instruments	  of	  RE	  assets.	  
In	   the	  REIPPP	  both	  debt	  and	  equity	   investors	  have	  a	   contractual	   right	   to	  a	   stream	  of	   long	  
dated	  cash	  flows	  generated	  via	  sale	  of	  electricity	  to	  Eskom	  over	  a	  20	  year	  PPA	  period.	  	  Debt	  
investors	  have	  contractually	  more	  rights	  and	  are	  in	  a	  very	  real	  sense,	  better	  protected	  in	  the	  
case	  of	   liquidation	  and/or	  default.	   	  A-­‐5	  however	  stated	  that	  two	  occurrences	  took	  place	   in	  
subsequent	  rounds	  of	  the	  REIPPP,	  that	  could	  impact	  their	  view	  on	  the	  sector:	  -­‐	  Firstly,	  overall	  
tariffs	   have	   come	   down	   by	   as	  much	   as	   45%	   in	   some	   instances	   (a	   view	   reiterated	   by	  DOE	  
(2015))	  –	  meaning	  overall	  project	  returns	  have	  reduced.	  Secondly,	   the	  yield	  differentiation	  
between	   debt	   and	   equity	   within	   projects	   has	   diminished,	   with	   Round	   3	   project	   returns	  
indicating	   a	   differential	   as	   low	  as	   3%.	   (that	   is,	   in	   nominal	   terms	  equity	   yields	   on	   some	  RE	  
projects	  are	  only	  three	  percent	  higher	  than	  debt	  yields	  on	  the	  same	  project).	  
In	   A-­‐5’s	   view,	   these	   two	   related	   events	   reflect	   the	   changing	   perception	   of	   risk	   associated	  
with	  REIPPP	  and	  project	  finance	  in	  general,	  but	  moreover,	  this	  movement	  also	  indicates	  that	  
there	  is	  return	  and	  risk	  correlation	  between	  debt	  and	  equity	  cash	  flows.	  She	  emphasised	  this	  
latter	   point	   by	   highlighting	   that	   in	   so	   called	   ‘catastrophic	   loss	   events’	   (personal	  
communication,	  supra)	  the	  timing	  of	  loss	  to	  equity	  would	  be	  similar	  to	  the	  timing	  of	  the	  loss	  
to	  debt	  holders	  (that	  is,	  if	  equity	  providers	  lose	  money	  in	  a	  project,	  there’s	  a	  near	  certainty	  
that	   debt	   providers	   would	   also	   experience	   some	   loss	   albeit	   at	   a	   slightly	   differing	   time	  
differential).	  She	  underpins	  this	  latter	  point	  by	  indicating	  that	  recoverability	  (given	  a	  specific	  
event	   of	   default)	   for	   debt	   providers	  would	   not	   be	   significantly	   higher	   than	   that	   of	   equity	  
holders.12In	   her	   view,	   with	   government	   as	   a	   major	   stakeholder	   the	   normal	   avenues	   of	  
liquidation	  and	   recoverability	   could	  be	   complicated.	  Moreover	   she	   stated	   that	   solar	   farms	  
and	  wind	  farms	  for	   instance,	  with	  20	  year	  contracted	  PPAs	  to	  Eskom	  are	  not	  easily	  broken	  
up	   into	  various	  components	  and	  thereby	  sold	  to	  recover	   losses.	   Investors	  –	  both	  debt	  and	  
equity	  –	  are	  saddled	  with	  the	  losses	   in	  A-­‐5’s	  view.	  A-­‐5	  echoes	  a	  common	  sentiment	  across	  
respondents	   that	   views	   RE	   assets	   as	   a	   form	   of	   income	   investing,	   cash	   flow	   backed	  
investments	  as	  opposed	  to	  say	  pure	  asset	  back-­‐lending,	  which	  would	  heavily	  favour	  lenders.	  	  
12	  examining	  the	  probability	  of	  default	  for	  both	  equity	  and	  debt	  investors	  in	  RE	  projects	  could	  be	  another




Put	   simply	   the	   emerging	   consensus	   is	   that	   both	   equity	   and	   debt	   investors	   into	   RE	   assets	  
would	  need	  to	  take	  a	  primary	  view	  on	  the	   long	  term	  integrity	  of	  RE	  cash	  flows	   in	  order	  to	  
appropriately	   price	   both	   return	   and	   risk.	   Ultimately	   what	   will	   drive	   perceptions	   and	  
therefore	   investment	  allocation	  decision-­‐making	  regarding	  RE	  assets,	  will	  be	  how	  investors	  
perceive	  both	  risk	  and	  return	  associated	  with	  the	  assets	  –	  and	  how	  those	  particular	  assets	  
actually	  perform	  in	  the	  long	  term.	  	  
Many	  respondents	  repeatedly	  expressed	  the	  view	  that	  they	  would	  participate	  in	  the	  REIPPP	  
If	   investing	   in	   RE	   assets	   maximised	   their	   overall	   portfolio	   returns	   without	   introducing	  
disproportionate	  risk.	  So	  whilst	  a	  thorough	  cash	  flow	  analysis	  represented	  a	  critical	  starting	  
point	  in	  determining	  overall	  pricing	  a	  key	  component	  of	  the	  analysis	  centred	  on	  determining	  
REIPPP	   longevity	  as	   this	   spoke	  directly	   to	  assessing	   the	   long	   term	   integrity	  of	  project	   cash	  
flows.	  For	  many	  respondents	  what	  seemed	   like	  a	  key	  aspect	  of	   this	  consideration	  was	   the	  
belief	  that	  government	  was,	  in	  the	  words	  of	  one	  of	  the	  respondents,	  ‘married	  to	  the	  REIPPP’.	  	  
Tafadzwa	  Mhlanga,	  a	  private	  equity	  practioner	   in	   the	  REIPPP	  since	   its	   inception,	  explained	  
how	   perception	   of	   the	   REIPPP	   improved	   with	   each	   subsequent	   bid	   round.	   According	   to	  
Mhlanga,	   government’s	   reputation	   had	   taken	   a	   severe	   knock	   initially	   because	   of	   the	  
repeated	  program	  delays	  (Baker,	  2015)	  in	  implementing	  renewable	  energy	  policy.	  The	  delays	  
between	   2007	   and	   2011	   resulted	   in	  many	   projects	   being	   severely	   delayed	   and	   falling	   off,	  
because	  as	  Mhlanga	  says,	  investing	  into	  an	  RE	  asset	  requires	  that	  you	  ‘upfront	  and	  commit	  
all	  your	  capital’	  and	  yet	  one	  has	   to	   take	  a	   long-­‐term	  view	  on	  how	  government	  and	  Eskom	  
will	   perform	  as	   a	   project	   partner.	   A	   senior	   credit	   analyst	   from	  DBSA	   reiterated	  Mhlanga’s	  
view,	  although	  he	  still	   feels	   that	  government	  has	  been	   responsible	   for	   some	  missteps	  and	  
thus	  inadvertently	  introducing	  some	  ongoing	  risks	  to	  the	  program.	  	  	  
Some	   of	   the	   risks	   the	   DBSA	   respondent	   highlighted	   as	   threatening	   the	   REIPPP’s	   viability	  
included	  what	  he	  considers	  Eskom	  un-­‐readiness	  for	  the	  REIPPP	  roll	  out.	  His	  primary	  concern	  
related	  to	  grid-­‐connection	  issues.	  	  Roelf	  (2015)	  writes	  that	  Eskom	  would	  need	  another	  R149	  
billion	  by	  2022	  in	  order	  to	  strengthen	  the	  grid	  and	  transmission	  network	  in	  order	  to	  connect	  
the	  expected	  capacity	  coming	  on	  stream	  from,	  inter	  alia,	  the	  REIPPP.	  Colin	  Matlala,	  CEO	  of	  
Lebone	  Engineering	   (personal	   communication)	   echoes	   a	   view	   that	  by	   resolving	   generation	  
capacity	  constraints	  Eskom	  could	  solve	  one	  problem	  and	  yet	  create	  another.	  His	  view	  is	  that	  
REIPPP’s	  success	  or	  failure	  will	  be	  dependant	  on	  able	  and	  ready	  Eskom	  is	  to	  take	  on	  new	  grid	  
capacity.	   Matlala,	   an	   Electrical	   Engineer	   with	   extensive	   project	   finance	   experience	   across	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Africa,	  says	  that	  there	  is	  at	  least	  35	  years	  of	  under-­‐investment	  in	  the	  electrical	  grid	  and	  that	  
grid	  connection	   issues	  pose	  a	  greater	  problem	  for	  electricity	   supply	   than	  generation	   itself.	  
His	   suggestion	   is	   that	   the	   IPP’s	  mandate	   be	   expanded	   to	   include	   private	   investment	   into	  
portions	  of	  the	  grid	  –	  where	  Eskom	  would	  lease	  from	  the	  private	  sector.	  
Although	  many	   respondents	  expressed	  strong	  of	   confidence	   in	  government’s	   commitment	  
to	   REIPPP,	  Mike	   Brooks	   (CEO	   of	   Inspired	   Evolution	   –	   a	   leading	   investor	   into	   the	   REIPPP	   -­‐	  
telephonic	  correspondence),	  highlighted	  that	  in	  his	  view	  government	  doesn’t	  always	  execute	  
the	   plans	   and	   policies	   it	   signed	   off	   on.	   Although	   he	   sees	   minimum	   risk	   in	   government	  
reneging	   on	   its	   commitment	   to	   the	   REIPPP,	   he	   does	   however	   question	   what	   impact	   the	  
government’s	  commitment	  to	  nuclear	  will	  have	  on	  the	  current	  commitment	  to	  the	  REIPPP.	  
Per	   government’s	   IRP	   (2013),	   it	   has	   been	   determined	   that	   nuclear	   power	   is	   essentially	  
superfluous	   given	   the	   country’s	   economic	   prospects.	   Moreover	   the	   IRP	   suggested	   that	  
Nuclear	   is	  an	  expensive	   form	  of	   investment	  and	   that	  gaps	   in	   supply	   should	  be	  augmented	  
through	   regional	   hydro	   projects	   and	   other	   RE	   projects.	   Brook’s	   view	   is	   that	   government	  
seems	  to	  be	  ignoring	  its	  own	  advice	  and	  this	  puts	  a	  small	  question	  mark	  around	  the	  DOE’s	  
long-­‐term	  commitment	  to	  the	  REIPPP.	  He	  was	  however	  careful	  to	  point	  out	  that	  government	  
wouldn’t	  necessarily	  renege	  on	  existing	  arrangements	  but	  rather,	  could	  slow	  down	  the	  roll	  
out	  of	  successive	  rounds.	  
Obakeng	  Moloabi	  from	  Pele	  Energy	  Group	  (personal	  correspondence)	  participates	  mainly	  as	  
an	  equity	   investor	   in	   the	  REIPPP	  and	  a	  provider	  of	  BEE	  and	   local	  equity	  as	  per	   the	  REIPPP	  
requirements	   (DOE,	   2012).	   His	   view	   of	   RE	   assets	   is	   that	   they	   represent	   the	  most	   optimal	  
arrangement	  between	  private	  sector	  and	  government	  in	  tackling	  the	  problem	  of	  supplying	  a	  
very	  public	  good,	  namely	  electricity.	  Moloabi’s	  view	  is	  that	  the	  REIPPP	  will	  be	  an	  investment	  
model	   that	   government	   expands	   into	   other	   policy	   considerations	   such	   as	   water,	   health,	  
public	  works.	  He	  therefore	  sees	  an	  investment	  in	  the	  RE	  space	  as	  an	  explicit	  investment	  into	  
South	  Africa	  Incorporated	  –	  that	  is,	  it’s	  an	  indirect	  play	  on	  the	  sovereign.	  	  
He	  views	  institutional	  investor	  participation	  as	  a	  crucial	  underpin	  in	  determining	  the	  overall	  
sustainability	  of	   the	  REIPPP.	   Investors	   are	  of	   course	  driven	  by	   various	   considerations	  both	  
endogenous	  and	  exogenous.	  One	  of	   the	  key	  drivers	  of	   investor	  participation	   in	   the	  REIPPP	  
would	   be	  whether	   RE	   assets	   represent	   a	   viable	   financial	   fit	   and	   the	   starting	   point	   of	   that	  
conversation	   is	   whether	   they	   qualify	   for	   mandate	   and	   asset	   allocation	   recommendations	  




4.3 	  	  Asset	  allocation	  and	  investor	  mandates	  
As	  expounded	  upon	  above,	  an	  asset	  class	  has	  been,	  inter	  alia,	  defined	  as	  a	  “logical	  grouping	  
of	   sub-­‐assets”	   (Idzorek	  and	  Armstrong,	  2009).	  For	  most	   respondents	   the	  starting	  point	   for	  
assigning	   a	   common	   set	   of	   characteristics	   (in	   order	   to	   ‘group’	   RE	   assets	   per	   Idzorek	   and	  
Armstrong’s	  2009,	  definition)	  was	  to	  firstly	  discern	  and	  analyse	  their	  economic	  and	  financial	  
characteristics.	  To	  be	  viable	  contenders	   in	  any	  asset	  allocation	  process,	  RE	  assets	   (like	  any	  
other	   asset	   under	   consideration)	   should	   effectively	   satisfy	   two	   broad	   requirements:	   raise	  
expected	  return	  of	  an	  overall	  portfolio	  and/or	  lower	  overall	  portfolio	  risk	  (Kritzman,	  2007).	  	  	  
Implicit	   in	   this	   determination,	   is	   an	   assessment	   of	   return	   and	   risk	   and	   furthermore,	   an	  
assessment	  of	   correlation	  RE	  assets	  would	  have	  with	  other	   assets	   already	   included	  within	  
the	   portfolio	   (Markowitz,	   1952).	   Once	   again,	   underpinning	   this	   type	   of	   analysis	   would	   be	  
availability	  of	  more	  data	  analyse.	  
As	  mentioned	  elsewhere	  in	  this	  paper,	  to	  date	  there	  have	  been	  three	  Rounds	  of	  REIPPP	  at	  
time	   of	  writing,	  with	   a	   total	   of	   88	   projects	   approved	   to	   date.	  Many	   of	   these	   projects	   are	  
either	  newly	  constructed,	  with	  very	  limited	  operating	  lifespans	  and	  therefore	  very	  little	  long	  
term	   data	   for	   investors	   to	   work	   with.	   This	   has	   made	   it	   difficult	   formulate	   a	   research	  
viewpoint	   on	   purely	   objective	   factors	   such	   return	   and	   standard	   deviation	   analysis	   of	   RE	  
assets.	  	  
Any	  real	  assessment	  of	  both	  expected	  return	   from	  RE	  assets	  and	  the	  associated	  risks	   they	  
carry	  has	  to	  begin	  with	  an	  assessment	  of	  their	  economic	  and	  financial	  characteristics.	  	  Given	  
the	   lack	  of	  historical	  data	  many	  respondents	  and	   interviewees	  defaulted	  to	   firstly	  gleaning	  
and	   measuring	   the	   economic	   and	   financial	   features	   of	   RE	   assets	   as	   best	   as	   they	   could	  
observe	   and	   then	  making	   a	  determination	   as	   to	  whether	   they	   should	  be	   included	   in	   their	  
current	   and	   existing	   asset	   allocation	   mandates.	   	   Many	   respondents	   across	   the	   spectrum	  
considered	  their	  return	  analysis	  as	  being	  primarily	  driven	  by	  the	  tariff	  analysis	  as	  contained	  
in	  the	  PPA.	  	  
The	   PPA	   contracted	   tariff	   essentially	   drives	   and	   underpins	   the	   narrative	   around	   expected	  
return.	  As	  A-­‐5	  indicated	  above,	  tariff	  has	  fallen	  dramatically	  in	  each	  subsequent	  round	  of	  the	  
REIPPP.	   This	   is	   because	   of	   the	   competitive	   nature	   of	   the	   REIPPP	   bidding	   process,	   which	  
weighs	  tariff	  disproportionately	  higher	   in	  the	  scoring	  winning	  bids.	  So	  the	  key	  question	  for	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many	  respondents	  has	  been	  to	  determine	  exactly	  what	  constitutes	  a	  fair	  expected	  return	  for	  
RE	  assets.	  As	  Eberhard	  et	  al	  (2014)	  and	  Baker	  and	  Wlokas	  (2015)	  indicate	  in	  their	  respective	  
studies	  there’s	  been	  a	  near	  50%	  drop	  in	  tariff	  numbers	  between	  Rounds	  1	  –	  3	  in	  the	  REIPPP.	  	  
The	   impact	   on	   return	   is	   still	   as	   of	   yet	   hard	   to	   quantify.	   A-­‐5	   does	   however	   indicate	   in	  
interview	  discussions,	  that	  their	  initial	  in-­‐house	  return	  expectation	  for	  round	  1	  was	  in	  excess	  
of	   20%	   real	   IRR,	   with	   debt	   return	   middling	   in	   the	   mid-­‐teens	   nominal.	   For	   round	   three	  
however	   the	  picture	  had	  shifted	  considerably	  with	  equity	   returns	  sitting	   in	   the	   low	  to	  mid	  
teens	  nominal	  and	  debt	   returns	   having	   nearly	   halved	   to	   circa	   300	   –	   350	   bps	   above	   three	  
month	   Jibar	   (at	   time	   of	  writing,	   5.1%).	   	  Many	   respondents	   however	   did	   indicate	   that	   the	  
initial	   round	   one	   returns	   represented	   what	   one	   respondent	   termed	   ‘a	   once	   in	   a	   lifetime	  
event’	   from	   a	   risk	   adjusted	   return	   perspective.	   Steven	   Faure	   from	   private	   equity	   house	  
Inspired	   Evolution	   expressed	   the	   view	   that	   they	   would	   most	   likely	   never	   again	   see	   what	  
were	   essentially	   text	   book	   private	   equity	   returns	   for	   what	   he	   perceived	   to	   be	   low	   risk	  
infrastructure	   risk.	   There	   was	   therefore	   a	   prevailing	   view	   that	   the	   new	   round	   3	   pricing	  
reflected	  what	  was	  essentially	  a	  normalisation	  in	  the	  risk-­‐adjusted	  profile	  of	  RE	  assets.	  This	  
sentiment	   is	  echoed	  by	  other	  respondents	  such	  as	  Mugadza	  who,	  as	   indicated	  above,	  who	  
see	  RE	  assets	  as	  essentially	  a	  form	  of	  fixed-­‐income	  assets	  -­‐	  representing	  steady	  cash	  yields	  
with	  relatively	  low	  volatility	  and	  therefore	  fore	  relatively	  low	  upside.	  	  	  
The	  motif	  in	  the	  respondents’	  views	  was	  the	  difficulty	  in	  extrapolating	  precise	  views	  on	  both	  
return	  and	   risk	  of	  RE	  assets	  with	   very	   little	  historical	  data	  available.	   Even	  where	   investors	  
were	  comfortable	  with	  working	  with	  the	  little	  data	  available	  to	  construct	  an	  asset	  allocation	  
point	  of	  view	  many	  found	  that	  internal	  mandate	  constraints	  impacted	  on	  their	  overall	  asset	  
allocation	  outlooks.	  	  
A-­‐3’s	  response	  in	  some	  sense	  reflected	  the	  views	  of	  many	  other	  interviewees	  	  -­‐	  namely,	  that	  
even	  where	  he	  and	  his	  team	  could	  clearly	  make	  out	  the	  economic	  and	  financial	  features	  of	  
RE	  assets,	  they	  still	  struggled	  with	  assigning	  the	  relevant	  nomenclature	  to	  RE	  assets.	  This	  in	  
turn	   made	   it	   difficult	   to	   benchmark	   and	   therefore	   articulate	   observed	   features	   within	   a	  
comparative	  context.	  	  
Echoing	  an	  approach	   communicated	  by	  other	   respondents,	  A-­‐3	   indicated	   that	   the	   starting	  
point	  for	  him	  and	  his	  team	  was	  to	  determine	  whether	  or	  not	  their	  current	  investor	  mandates	  




investment	   baskets.	   In	   order	   to	   answer	   this	   starting	   point	   enquiry,	   A-­‐3	   (personal	  
communication,	  supra)	  said	  he	  and	  his	  team	  needed	  to	  determine	  what	  the	  exact	  financial	  
and	  economic	  features	  of	  such	  assets	  are	  (even	  if	  this	  is	  merely	  a	  normative	  determination),	  
further	  determining	  whether	  they	  fit	  into	  existing	  mandates.	  So	  for	  A-­‐3,	  issues	  around	  asset	  
allocation	   and	   mandate	   are	   regarded	   interchangeably	   –	   even	   though	   he	   recognises	   and	  
accepts	  the	  difference	  between	  ‘mandate’	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  ‘economic	  viability’	  on	  the	  
other.	   His	   initial	   view	   was	   that	   RE	   assets	   satisfy	   asset	   allocation	   criteria	   of	   fixed	   income	  
portfolios	  particularly	  as	  potential	  inflation-­‐linked	  fixed	  income	  instruments	  but	  at	  the	  same	  
time	   he	   expressed	   encountering	   some	   difficulty	   from	   his	   legal	   and	   credit	   committees,	  
namely	  as	  to	  whether	  RE	  assets	  would	  be	  permissible	  investments	  within	  their	  current	  fixed	  
income	  funds.	  
RE	   project	   companies	   receive	   contracted	   cash	   flows	   from	   Eskom	   via	   a	   Power-­‐Purchase	  
Agreement	   (“PPA”),	   which	   in	   turn,	   receives	   a	   full	   guarantee	   from	   National	   Treasury	  
(Treasury)	  (DOE,	  2012i).	   	  Effectively,	  the	  sovereign	  underwrites	  the	  PPA.	   	  For	  A-­‐3	  this	   is	  an	  
important	   factor	   from	   a	   mandate	   and	   asset	   allocation	   perspective,	   because	   many	   of	   the	  
fixed	   income	   funds	   they	  manage	   require	  a	  minimum	  credit	  profile	  and	  having	  a	   sovereign	  
underpin	  on	  the	  PPA	  could	  justify	  relying	  on	  South	  Africa’s	  sovereign	  status	  as	  an	  investment	  
grade	   destination.	   A-­‐3	   is	   careful	   to	   make	   a	   distinction	   between	   ‘mandate	   fit’	   (which	   he	  
considered	   a	   regulatory	   and	   internal	   policy	   consideration)	   and	   ‘asset	   allocation	   decision’	  
(which	  he	  expressed	  as	  a	  function	  of	  the	  impact	  on	  expected	  return	  and	  standard	  deviation	  
with	  an	  overall	  portfolio	  –	  personal	  communication).	  	  	  
Effectively	   by	   highlighting	   this	   distinction	   A-­‐3	   is	   underlining	   the	   fact	   that	   RE	   assets	   could	  
satisfy	  asset	  allocation	   requirements	  and	  still	  not	  be	  eligible	   to	  be	   included	  within	  a	  given	  
portfolio	  because	  of	  mandate	  and	  regulatory	  restrictions	  that	  a	  given	  fund	  may	  carry.	  	  
Reiterating	  A-­‐3’s	  view,	  A-­‐6	  from	  a	  large	  CPT	  based	  institutional	  investor	  fund	  manager	  (who	  
is	   an	   active	   participant	   as	   an	   RE	   asset	   manager),	   (personal	   correspondence)	   regards	   RE	  
assets	  as	  part	  of	  the	  fixed	  income	  asset	  class	  universe.	  A-­‐6’s	  view	  is	  that	  the	  overall	  absolute	  
return	  of	  RE	  assets	  should	  ultimately	  correlate	  to	  the	  long-­‐term	  government	  yield	  curve.	  	  
This	  is	  an	  important	  assertion	  from	  A-­‐6	  because	  it	  reiterates	  two	  aforementioned	  principals	  
embedded	   in	  any	  asset	  allocation	  decision:	   is	   there	  an	   impact	  by	  the	  RE	  asset	  on	  portfolio	  




correlation	   benefits).	   	   For	   many	   of	   the	   respondents	   those	   were	   the	   two	   key	   questions	  
determining	  the	  economic	  and	  financial	  bona	  fides	  of	  RE	  assets.	  A-­‐6	   further	  states	  that	  he	  
views	   the	   issue	   of	   correlation	   in	   two	  ways.	   Firstly,	   in	   order	   to	   justify	   being	   included	   into	  
particular	  mandates	   (and	  what	   he	   refers	   to	   as	   RE	   assets	   establishing	   its	   ‘asset	   class	   bona	  
fides’)	  RE	  assets	  must	  as	  matter	  of	  course	  ‘look	  and	  feel’	  like	  an	  asset	  class	  that	  institutional	  
investors,	   pension	   fund	   trustees	   know	   and	   are	   already	   comfortable	   with	   (personal	  
communication).	   In	   this	  way,	   from	  A-­‐6’s	  perspective,	   the	  conversation	  around	  mandate	   fit	  
becomes	   easier	   if	   investors	   feel	   that	   RE	   assets	   display	   relatively	   similar	   features	   to	   other	  
asset	  classes,	  for	  e.g.	  REITS.	  It	  makes	  the	  ‘ideological	  leap’	  easier	  for	  institutional	  investors	  if	  
they	   feel	   that	  RE	  assets	   represent	  a	   largely	   interchangeable	  opportunity	   set.	   In	  A-­‐6’s	   view	  
investors	   are	   guided	   by	   economic	   and	   financial	   features	   that	   seem	   familiar	   and	   easily	  
identifiable.	  	  
The	   second	   aspect	   regarding	   correlation	   that	   A-­‐6	   highlights	   relates	   to	   the	   diversification	  
benefits	  RE	  assets	  could	  bring	  to	  a	  given	  portfolio.	  	  
A-­‐6’s	   view	   is	   that	   the	   long-­‐term,	   contracted	   nature	   of	   RE	   cash	   flows	   (under-­‐pinned	   by	  
Treasury)	  will	  yield	   long	  term	  returns	  with	  relatively	   low	  standard	  deviations	  over	  the	   long	  
run.	  So	  in	  his	  view,	  RE	  asset	  returns	  would	  perform	  the	  function	  of	  reducing	  overall	  portfolio	  
risk,	  as	  the	  expectation	  is	  that	  RE	  asset	  cash	  flows	  are	  highly	  visible	  (given	  their	  contracted	  
nature)	   over	   the	   long	   term,	   and	   critically	   benefit	   from	  a	   Treasury	  underpin.	  On	   this	   latter	  
point,	  A-­‐6	  is	  expressing	  a	  variation	  of	  the	  point	  made	  by	  A-­‐3	  (supra)	  the	  view	  that	  RE	  assets	  
are	  a	  close	  proxy	  for	  government	  backed	  securities.	   	  He	  summarises	  his	  view	  by	  describing	  
investing	  into	  RE	  assets	  as	  ‘buying	  government	  bonds	  with	  a	  yield	  pick-­‐up’.	  This	  ‘pick	  up’	  A-­‐6	  
believes,	   compensate	   investors	   for	   the	   inherent	   technology,	   regulatory	   and	   market	   risk	  
associated	  with	  RE	  assets.	  The	  researcher	  pointed	  out	  to	  A-­‐6	  (and	  others)	  that	  the	  findings	  of	  
the	  Bitsch	  et	  al	  (2010)	  study	  found	  that	  infrastructure	  assets	  do	  not	  necessarily	  provide	  more	  
stable	   cash	   flows	   than	   non-­‐infrastructure	   cash	   flows	   and	   that	   in	   some	   instances	  
infrastructure	   utility	   cash	   flows	   are	   highly	   variable.	   A-­‐6	   pointed	   out	   however	   that	   in	   the	  
instance	   of	   REIPPP	   the	   market	   risk	   (which	   may	   give	   rise	   to	   variability	   of	   cash	   flows)	   is	  
mitigated	   by	   the	   contractual	   make	   up	   of	   the	   REIPPP.	   Firstly,	   he	   mentioned	   Treasury’s	  
backing	  of	  the	  PPA,	  secondly	  he	  mentioned	  that	  Eskom	  is	  obligated	  to	  buy	  whatever	  energy	  




Gqi	  Raoleka	   from	  Pele	  Energy	   (formerly	  of	   JP	  Morgan),	   (personal	  communication)	   in	   some	  
ways	   takes	   A-­‐6’s	   above	   points	   further	   whilst	   effectively	   reiterating	   them.	   	   Given	   the	  
inflation-­‐adjusted	  cash	  flows	  of	  RE	  assets,	  Raoleka	  views	  long	  term	  inflation	  yields	  as	  crucial	  
proxies	  in	  establishing	  a	  house	  view	  on	  RE	  asset	  as	  a	  suitable	  asset	  class.	  Pele	  Energy	  raises	  
capital	  in	  order	  to	  invest	  in	  mainly	  pre-­‐construction	  RE	  assets.	  The	  type	  of	  capital	  they	  raise	  
is	  usually	  inflation-­‐linked	  funding	  given	  the	  inflation-­‐linked	  nature	  of	  RE	  asset	  cash	  flows,	  per	  
PPA	   (DOE,	   2012).	   The	   tariff	   agreed	   to	   in	   the	   PPA	   is	   adjusted	   annually	   in	   line	   with	   the	  
prevailing	  inflation	  rate.	  Thus	  from	  Raoleka’s	  point	  of	  view,	  the	  long-­‐term	  inflation	  curve	  is	  
the	   best	   proxy	   in	   determining	   overall	   RE	   asset	   pricing	   and	   therefore	   asset	   allocation	  
suitability.	  	  
Raoleka	   believes	   that	   the	   inherent	   inflation-­‐hedge	   that	   RE	   assets	   provide	   is	   the	   singular	  
defining	  feature	  of	  RE	  assets	  that	  make	  them	  eligible	  for	  inclusion	  within	  investor	  portfolios.	  
Like	  A-­‐6	   and	  A-­‐3	   (supra),	   Raoleka’s	   view	   is	   that	  RE	   assets	   are	   subsets	  of	   the	   fixed	   income	  
asset	   class	   universe	   (much	   in	   the	   same	   way	   as	   listed	   property	   stocks	   –	   although	   a	   very	  
distinct	  asset	  class	  in	  their	  own	  right	  –	  are	  usually	   included	  within	  specialised	  fixed	  income	  
portfolios).	  
Consistent	   with	   other	   interviewees,	   Raoleka	   highlighted	   that	   to	   properly	   understand	   the	  
asset	  allocation	  suitability	  of	  RE	  assets,	  one	  needed	  to	  have	  a	  comprehensive	  understanding	  
of	  what	  downside	  risk	  entails.	  Specifically	  understanding	  whether	  there	  are	  certain	  types	  of	  
unique	  risks	  associated	  with	  RE	  assets	  which	  could	  disqualify	  them	  from	  an	  asset	  allocation	  
process	  and	  what	  are	  the	  chances	  of	  such	  risks	  materialising	  (personal	  correspondence).	  	  In	  
Raoleka’s	  view,	  the	  investment	  approach	  adopted	  by	  his	  team	  primarily	  focuses	  on	  analysing	  
and	  quantifying	  downside	  risk	  as	  a	  starting	  point.	  This	   is	  because	   in	  his	  view	  revenues	  and	  
cash	   flows	   are	   highly	   visible	   and	   determinable	   given	   the	   relatively	   low	   market	   risk.	   Put	  
succinctly,	   Raoleka’s	   approach	   to	  RE	   investing	   is	   to	   first	   and	   foremost	  make	   sure	   that	   the	  
downside	   is	  continuously	  managed	  and	  the	  upside	  (namely	  revenues	  and	  cash	  flows)	   ‘take	  
care	   of	   themselves’	   as	   he	   put	   it	   directly	   (personal	   communication.	   	   This	   approach	   entails	  
thoroughly	  understanding	  the	  technology,	  resource	  (wind,	  solar)	  risk,	  construction	  risk	  of	  a	  
project.	  
Given	  that	  many	  interviewees	  saw	  an	  investment	  in	  RE	  assets	  as	  an	  investment	  in	  long	  term	  
cash	   flows,	   the	   risk	   assessments	   and	   concerns	   expressed	   by	   many	   of	   the	   interviewees	  




In	  other	  words,	  what	  factors	  –	  apart	  from	  Eskom	  not	  honouring	  its	  obligations	  under	  the	  PPA	  
–	  could	  result	  in	  investors	  not	  receiving	  distributions.	  	  
Interviewees	  across	  the	  spectrum	  highlighted	  technology	  risk	  as	  a	  key	  risk,	   including	  those	  
those	  who	  viewed	  RE	  assets	  as	  suitable	  proxy	  for	  government	  backed	  inflation-­‐linked	  bonds.	  
Many	  expressed	  some	  frustration	  at	  being	  unable	  to	  properly	  quantify	  the	  technology	  and	  
resource	  risk	  associated	  with	  the	  RE	  assets.	  	  
In	   both	   solar	   and	   wind	   assets,	   pre-­‐commissioned	   assets	   are	   evaluated	   using	   a	   stochastic	  
assessment	  of	  either	  the	  wind	  resource	  or	  the	  solar	  resource.	  Namely	  this	  approach	  works	  
out	  how	  likely	  wind	  or	  solar	  resource,	  as	  it	  were,	  would	  be	  available	  at	  a	  particular	  yield	  and	  
therefore	  how	  much	  energy	  and	  therefore	  revenue	  can	  be	  generated	  from	  an	  RE	  asset.	  Gqi	  
Raoleka	   (personal	   communication)	   said	   his	   organisation	   looks	   at	   pre-­‐commissioned	  
investments	   based	   on	   a	   number	   of	   factors,	   he	   emphasised	   that	   they	   prioritised	   assessed	  
availability	   factor	   for	  wind	  and	  solar	  as	  key	  metric.	  Moreover	  pertaining	  to	  wind	  RE	  assets	  
their	  key	  metric	   is	   the	  net	  capacity	   factor	  and	  pertaining	   to	  solar	  RE	  assets	   the	  key	  metric	  
was	  performance	  ratio	  (“PR”)	  (Deloitte,	  2015).	  
Raoleka	  describes	  Available	  Capacity	  Factor	  as	  the	  amount	  of	  time	  a	  RE	  asset	   (wind,	  solar)	  
spends	  generating	  actual	  electricity	  onto	  the	  grid.	  This	  metric	  is	  useful	  because	  it	  underpins	  
any	  analysis	  around	  the	  variance	  of	   revenue	  and	  cash	   flows.	  Put	  differently,	  a	  consistently	  
high	  Available	  Capacity	  Factor	  points	  to	  a	  consistently	  healthy	  cash	  yield.	  Raoleka	  describes	  
net	  capacity	  factor	  as	  measure	  of	  the	  actual	  energy	  generated	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  what	  a	  plant	  would	  
generate	  at	  full	  capacity.	  	  PR	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  Raoleka	  describes	  as	  the	  overall	  efficiency	  of	  
a	  solar	  plant	  –	  i.e.	  how	  much	  energy	  it	  gets	  onto	  the	  grid	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  its	  total	  capacity.	  	  
Raoleka	  foresees	  strong	  correlation	  between	  the	  metrics	  above	  and	  overall	  financial	  return.	  
His	   view	   is	   that	   both	   solar	   and	  wind	   technologies	   have	   proved	   their	   efficacy	   over	   several	  
decades	  in	  other	  jurisdictions	  -­‐	  jurisdictions	  with	  arguably	  less	  solar	  and	  wind	  resources	  than	  
South	   Africa.	   Therefore	   it	   would	   be	   reasonable	   for	   South	   African	   RE	   asset	   technology	   to	  




A	  further	  motivating	  factor	  that	  Raoleka	  highlighted,	  was	  that	  RE	  assets	  allow	  them	  to	  invest	  
into	   UN	   PRI13	   compliant	   asset	   class,	   that	   is,	   investments	   that	   are	   underpinned	   with	   an	  
Environmental,	  Social,	  Governance	  (ESG)	  ethos.	   	  For	  Pele	  Energy	  this	   is	  an	   important	  asset	  
allocation	   consideration.	   Mhlanga	   and	   Brooks	   from	   Tirisano	   RE	   and	   Inspired	   Evolution	  
respectively	  (both	  active	   investors	   in	  the	  REIPPP)	  also	  underlined	  the	  importance	  of	  ESG	  in	  
their	  investment	  allocation	  and	  mandate	  process.	  Brooks	  indicated	  that	  they	  measure	  return	  
in	  a	  variety	  of	  non-­‐financial	  ways	  -­‐	  with	  the	  key	  theme	  for	  them	  being	  sustainability.	  	  
Key	  themes	  that	  emerged	  from	  investors	  allocating	  or	  seeking	  to	  allocate	  RE	  assets	  into	  their	  
respective	  portfolios	  where	  that	  RE	  assets	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  long	  term	  income	  assets,	  that	  they	  
would	   face	   very	   little	   market	   risk	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   listed	   equities	   (i.e.	   offer	   some	   diversification	  
benefits),	  the	  real	  and	  ultimate	  counterparty	  was	  sovereign.	  What	  was	  also	  interesting	  was	  
that	  many	  interviewees	  saw	  the	  regulated	  monopolistic	  feature	  of	  the	  REIPPP	  as	  a	  positive	  
as	  it	  also	  mitigated	  aforementioned	  market	  risk.	  Nonetheless	  many	  interviewees	  expressed	  
some	  concern	  that	  the	  highly	  price-­‐biased	  bid	  rounds	  will	  have	  the	  effect	  of	  ‘dragging	  return	  
downwards,	   too	  quickly’.	  Many	  other	   respondents	  also	  expressed	  the	  view	  that	   there	  was	  
often	  a	   lag	   in	  current	  mandate	  policy	  and	  a	  pure	  economic	  asset	  allocation	  determination.	  
Further	  that	  institutional	  investors	  across	  the	  spectrum	  needed	  to	  readjust	  investment	  and	  
credit	   policies	   to	   take	   into	   effect	   the	   introduction	   of	   RE	   assets	   into	   the	   investment	  
landscape.	  	  	  
4.4 The	  mechanics	  of	  investing	  into	  RE	  assets	  
Weber	   and	   Alfen	   (2010)	   use	   the	   word	   ‘heterogeneous’	   to	   describe	   infrastructure	   assets,	  
further	  stating	  that	  a	   large	  part	  of	  this	   ‘heterogeneity’	   is	  underscored	  by	  the	  wide	  array	  of	  
mechanism	   investors	   can	   use	   to	   participate	   in	   infrastructure	   assets.	   It	   is	   not	   only	   the	  
economic	  and	  financial	  descriptors	  that	  serve	  as	  determinants	  of	  investor	  outlook	  regarding	  
RE	  assets,	  but	  the	   legal	  structure	  of	  an	  RE	  asset	  can	  ultimately	  determine	  how	  an	   investor	  
participates	   (see	   also	  Nelson	  and	  Pierpont,	   2013).	  As	  discussed	  previously	   in	   this	   paper,	   a	  
decision	  to	  invest	  will	  be	  driven	  by	  economic/financial	  considerations	  as	  well	  mandate	  and	  
regulatory	   considerations.	   Issues	   around	   mandate	   are	   often	   interlinked	   with	   the	   legal	  
structure	   of	   the	   investment.	   	   Interviewees	   expressed	   a	   view	   that	   they	   consider	   the	   legal	  
                                                
13	  United	  Nation	  Principles	  of	  Responsible	  Investments.	  A	  set	  of	  six	  ESG	  principles	  which	  many	  fund	  managers	  
have	  agreed	  to	  be	  bound	  by.	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structure	  of	   an	   investment	   in	   their	   asset	   allocation	  analysis	   because	   it	   directly	  pertains	   to	  
how	  they	  view	  risk	  in	  the	  project,	  more	  particularly	  how	  risk	  is	  shared	  within	  an	  RE	  project.	  	  
Balebetse	   Leuta,	   project	   finance	   head	   (Africa):	   Standard	   Bank	   (personal	   communication)	  
breaks	  down	  the	  nomenclature	  in	  the	  following	  two	  ways:	  
i. Mode	  of	  investing	  –	  describing	  the	  instrument	  that	  gives	  rise	  to	  the	  investors	  RE
asset	  exposure	  (eg:	  Fixed	  Income	  Bonds	  or	  Listed	  Equity)
ii. Market	   Vehicles	   –	   describing	   the	   legal	   structure	   and	   investment	   pool	   (listed
equity,	  private	  equity,	  listed	  bond,	  dedicated	  unit	  trust
Leuta	   says	   in	   his	   view,	   the	   decision	   to	   invest	   is	  made	   up	   of	   the	   asset	   allocation	   decision	  
(discussed	  above)	  and	  the	  decisions	  pertaining	  to	  the	  two	  categories	  he	  outlines	  above.	  That	  
is,	  once	  the	  asset	  allocation	  decision	  has	  been	  made,	  an	  investor	  needs	  to	  determine	  firstly	  if	  
they’ll	  fund	  and/or	  subscribe	  for	  equity	  or	  debt	  (or	  combination)	  in	  a	  project	  asset	  (mode	  of	  
investment).	  Secondly	  they	  need	  to	  determine	  the	  investment	  vehicle	  or	  legal	  structure	  for	  
that	   investment.	   	   Leuta	   describes	   this	   as	   the	   ‘how’	   of	   the	   overall	   investment	   decisions,	  
viewing	  it	  as	  equally	  important	  in	  some	  respects	  as	  the	  asset	  allocation	  decision.	  
As	  has	  been	  evidenced	  in	  the	  REIPPP,	  Project	  Finance	  is	  the	  preferred	  mode	  of	   investment	  
into	   large	   infrastructure	   projects	   (Yescombe	   2014).	   Project	   finance	   allows	   for	   the	  
demarcation	  of	  risks	  into	  a	  specified,	  ring-­‐fenced	  special	  purpose	  vehicle	  (“Project	  SPV”).	  A	  
defining	  feature	  of	  project	  finance	  is	  that	  it	  allows	  the	  various	  participants	  to	  share	  risks	  “on	  
the	  basis	  of	  their	  ability	  to	  influence	  and	  control	  the	  risks”	  (Weber	  and	  Alfen,	  2010).	  
Leuta	   (supra)	   describes	   project	   finance	   as	   ‘the	   most	   optimal’	   mode	   of	   investing	   for	   the	  
REIPPP	  and	  particularly	   for	   institutional	   investors.	   Leauta’s	  view	   is	   that	   the	  highly	  contract	  
driven	  nature	  of	  project	  finance,	  ‘ventilates	  and	  reveals	  project	  risks	  upfront’.	  Investors	  are	  
then	   able	   to	   quantify	   and	   measure	   risk	   of	   a	   project	   well	   before	   money	   is	   committed.	  
Furthermore	  his	  view	  is	  that	  within	  a	  project	  finance	  SPV,	  specific	  types	  of	  risks	  are	  usually	  
allocated	  to	  those	  parties	  best	  able	  to	  price,	  evaluate	  and	  ultimately	  manage	  and	  mitigate.	  
As	   it	   stands	   therefore,	   the	   dominant	   investment	   structure	   for	   RE	   assets	   (to	   date)	   is	   the	  
project	   finance	   structure.	   Investors	   therefore	   have	   to	   contend	  with	  what	   the	   implications	  
are	   in	   considering	   such	   structures.	   	   Leuta’s	   view	   describing	   project	   finance	   as	   ‘the	   most	  
optimal	  mode’	   of	   investing	   into	   RE	   assets	  was	   a	   view	   reiterated	   by	   other	   interviewees.	   It	  
61 
emerged	   as	   a	   strong	   theme.	   Some	   interviewees	   did	   however	   lament	   the	   high	   costs	  
associated	  with	  this	  mode	  of	  investment,	  with	  at	  least	  one	  of	  the	  interviewees	  describing	  it	  
as	   an	   overly-­‐cautious,	   expensive	   approach	   (given	   the	   contracted	   cash	   flows	   and	   the	  
technology	  efficacies	  of	  both	  wind	  and	  solar).	  
Obakeng	  Moloabi	   (personal	   communication)	   from	   Pele	   Energy	   Group	   says	   that	   as	   far	   the	  
REIPPP	   is	   concerned	   their	   internal	   requirement	   states	   that	   the	   project	   SPV	   must	   be	   a	  
company	   incorporated	  under	   the	  applicable	   laws	  of	   the	  country.	  His	  view	   is	   that	  company	  
law	  in	  South	  Africa	  is	  extremely	  well	  established	  and	  the	  provisions	  well	  understood,	  making	  
it	  easier	  for	  investors	  to	  consider	  an	  investment	  via	  registered	  company	  SPV.	  
Pele	  Energy	  Group,	  under	  Moloabi’s	  stewardship,	   lead	  the	   listing	  of	  the	  first	  bond	  for	  a	  RE	  
asset	   in	   South	   Africa	   (“Touwsrivier	   Bond”)14	   in	   2011.	   Per	   his	   account,	   the	   exercise	   was	  
interesting	   in	   that	   investors	   spent	  more	   time	   in	   their	   due	   diligence	   focusing	   on	   the	   legal	  
make-­‐up	  of	  the	  project	  SPV	  than	  they	  did	  assessing	  aspects	  such	  as	  technology,	  market	  and	  
even	  construction	  risk.	  A	  ring	  fenced	  SPV	  allows	  for	  the	  appropriate	  sharing	  of	  risks	  amongst	  
project	   stakeholders	   (Brealey	   et	   al,	   1996).	   In	   the	   Touwsrivier	   Bond	   transaction,	   investors	  
subscribed	   for	   a	   fixed	   coupon	   bond,	   which	   represented	   circa	   50%	   of	   the	   total	   required	  
project	   expenditure	   outlay.	   The	   construction	   contract	   was	   guaranteed	   by	   Group	   Five	   (in	  
excess	  of	  100%	  of	  the	  construction	  contract	  amount	  was	  guaranteed	  by	  Group	  5’s	  balance	  
sheet	   for	   instance)	   thus	   enabling	   bondholders	   to	   not	   assume	  wholesale	   construction	   risk.	  
Essentially	   a	   risk	   financial	   investors	   they	  were	   probably	   ill	   placed	   to	   assess	   and	   therefore	  
price.	  
Moloabi	  does	  however	  state	   that	   the	  mode	  of	   investment	  was	  critical	   in	  placing	   the	  bond	  
with	  institutional	   investors.	  He	  mentions	  that	   investors	  wanted	  to	  invest	   in	  something	  that	  
looked	   familiar,	   that	   had	   a	   legal	   reference	  point.	   And	   the	   ring-­‐fenced	  project	   SPV	  offered	  
investors	  exactly	  the	  comfort	  they	  required.	  What	  also	  helped	  the	  Touwsrivier	  bond	  from	  an	  
investor	  point	  of	  view	  was	  that	  Moody’s	  rated	  the	  bond	  (Moodys,	  Touwsrivier	  Credit	  Report,	  
2013).	  	  
A	  Senior	  Credit	  Analyst	  at	  a	   leading	   local	  DBSA	  explained	  that	   from	  a	  credit	  perspective,	  a	  
ring-­‐fenced,	  project	  finance	  SPV	  is	  useful	  because	  it	  allows	  for	  high	  leverage	  and	  it’s	  a	  clean	  
pass	  through	  vehicles	   for	  all	  project	  cash	  flows.	  Typically	  all	  allowable	  cash	  distributions	   in	  
14 See	  Moody’s	  note	  on	  Bond	  Structure.	  See	  references	  for	  citation	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the	  SPV	  are	  paid	  out	  to	  investors,	  similar	  to	  a	  REIT.	  There	  are	  no	  other	  activities	  within	  the	  
SPV	  and	  therefore	  from	  an	  investor’s	  perspective	  operational	  risk	  is	  highly	  visible	  and	  highly	  
quantifiable.	   The	  DBSA	  analyst	  also	  expressed	  a	  view	   that	   lenders	  and	   investors	   express	  a	  
strong	   preference	   for	   legal	   transparency	   and	   that	   the	   project	   finance	   model	   adopted	   by	  
many	  REIPPP	  participants,	  provided	  high	  degrees	  of	  transparency.	  
A	   key	   theme	   that	   kept	   arising	   amongst	   interviewees	   was	   that	   project	   finance	   allowed	  
investors	  not	  to	  assume	  risk	  that	  they	  are	  otherwise	  not	  suited	  to	  take	  on.	  Technology	  and	  
construction	   risk	   were	   identified	   as	   the	   key	   risks	   that	   a	   project	   finance	   model	   dis-­‐
intermediates.	   Moloabi	   for	   instance,	   explained	   that	   within	   a	   project	   SPV	   structure,	   the	  
technology	   risk	   is	   assumed	  by	   the	  O&M	  whereas	   the	   EPC	   underwrites	   a	   large	   part	   of	   the	  
construction	  risk	  (see	  point	  made	  about	  Touwsrivier	  immediately	  above).	  That	  is,	  the	  O&M	  
guarantees,	   for	  a	   fee,	  a	  minimum	  technology	  performance	   level.	  On	  the	  construction	  side,	  
Moloabi	   explains	   that	   the	   EPC	  will	   underwrite	   via	   cash	   bonds	   and	   guarantees,	   the	   entire	  
construction	  outlook	   (from	  building	   timeously,	   building	  with	   requisite	   quality	   and	  building	  
within	  agreed	  budget).	  
At	  the	  time	  of	  writing	  this	  paper,	  there	  was	  no	  direct	   listed	  debt	  or	  equity	   instrument	  that	  
gave	   exposure	   to	   RE	   assets	   (other	   than	   the	   Touwsrivier	   example	   briefly	   discussed).	   The	  
overwhelming	  mode	  of	  investment	  has	  been	  via	  unlisted	  equity	  and	  debt	  instruments.	  This	  
factor	  may	  be	  attributed	  to	  the	  nascent	  nature	  of	  the	  REIPPP.	  Many	  interviewees	  expressed	  
the	   view	   that	   South	  Africa	  will	   see	   a	   rapid	   emergence	   in	   so	   called	   ‘Yieldcos’,	   as	   has	   been	  
evidenced	  elsewhere.	  Leuta	  (supra)	  describes	  Yieldcos	  as	  pooled,	  listed	  investment	  vehicles,	  
which	  have	  a	  sole	  focus	  on	  infrastructure	  RE	  assets.	  
A-­‐6	   (personal	   communication)	   believes	   that	   as	   more	   investors	   become	   familiar	   with	   RE	  
assets,	  the	  investment	  sector	  will	  begin	  to	  organise	  itself	  into	  pooled	  investments,	  much	  like	  
the	  Yieldcos	   that	  have	  emerged	   in	   the	  United	  States.	  He	  believes	   that	  Yieldcos	  are	  merely	  
are	   specialised	   form	   what	   the	   South	   African	   regulatory	   framework	   calls	   Collective	  
Investment	  Schemes15	  -­‐	  which	  covers	  everything	  from	  Exchange	  Traded	  Funds	  to	  Unit	  Trusts	  
and	  more.	  A-­‐6’s	  view	  is	  that	  we	  already	  have	  the	  necessary	  infrastructure	  and	  expertise	  to	  
make	  the	  emergence	  of	  local	  Yieldcos	  an	  inevitability.	  	  
15 Collective	  Investment	  Schemes	  Control	  Act,	  Act	  No.	  45	  of	  2002	  
63 
Some	  of	  the	  interviewees	  expressed	  less	  enthusiasm	  for	  the	  rise	  of	  Yieldcos.	  A	  respondent,	  
who	   works	   at	   one	   of	   the	   largest	   investment	   houses	   managing	   pension	   funds,	   (personal	  
communication)	  expressed	  some	  concerns	  regarding	  pooled	  investments	  into	  RE	  assets.	  His	  
view	  is	  that	  Yieldcos	  (and	  similar)	  will	  introduce	  cheap	  money	  into	  the	  system	  and	  serve	  to	  
increase	   overall	   valuations	   of	   RE	   assets.	   He	   wasn’t	   against	   this	   in	   of	   itself,	   but	   rather	  
cautioned	  that	  this	  RE	  asset	  valuation	  reratings	  should	  occur	  at	  a	  measured	  pace	  in	  order	  to	  
avoid	  pockets	  of	  valuation	  bubbles.	  This	  respondent’s	  view	  was	  that	  RE	  asset	  prices	  should	  
generate	  at	  least	  five	  years	  of	  post	  construction	  cash	  flows	  before	  investors	  started	  looking	  
at	  setting	  up	  Yieldcos	  or	  any	  other	  similar	  pooled	  investment	  vehicle,	  i.e.	  the	  unlisted	  project	  
SPV	  structures	  should	  endure	  for	  the	  short	  to	  medium	  term.	  
Many	   respondents	   viewed	   the	  project	   finance	  model	   as	   the	  most	   optimal	   funding	   vehicle	  
however,	  a	  finding	  that	  is	  supported	  in	  large	  measure	  by	  the	  available	  academic	  literature.	  
Respondents	  viewed	  project	  finance	  as	  introducing	  transparency	  and	  risk	  dis-­‐intermediation.	  
The	   main	   funding	   trend	   many	   respondents	   agreed	   upon	   was	   the	   emergence	   of	   pooled	  
investments	   like	   Yieldcos,	   with	   many	   interviewees	   predicting	   more	   listings	   of	   pooled	  
infrastructure	  vehicles	  in	  South	  Africa.	  	  
4.5 	  	  Capital	  Structure	  and	  impact	  on	  investment	  considerations	  
As	  seen	  from	  the	  above	  interview	  remarks	  and	  responses,	  a	  key	  determinant	  of	  whether	  RE	  
assets	  are	  considered	  viable	  will	  arise	  from	  what	  their	  key	  economic	  and	  financial	  features	  
are.	  What	  Leuta	  (supra)	  above	  describes	  as	  ‘the	  how’	  (of	  the	  overall	  investment	  decision)	  is	  
usually	  determined	  by	  mandate,	   regulatory,	   tax	  considerations.	   Investors	  will	  also	  concern	  
themselves	   with	   investing	   where	   they	   think	   they’ll	   get	   the	   best	   risk-­‐adjusted	   returns.	  
Perception	   of	   risk	   is	   often	   influenced	   by	   where	   in	   the	   capital	   structure	   an	   investor	  
participates.	   Investors	   into	   the	   REIPPP	   have	   to	   date	   invested	   across	   the	   capital	   structure;	  
equity,	  mezzanine,	   and	  debt.	   Each	   aspect	   of	   the	   capital	   structure	  would	   invariably	   attract	  
different	  types	  of	  investors,	  given	  both	  mandate	  and	  risk/return	  expectations.	  	  
RE	  assets	  typically	  have	  a	  very	  high	  debt	  to	  equity	  ratio,	  often	  as	  high	  as	  80:20	  in	  favour	  of	  
debt.	  Some	  writers	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  right	  capital	  structure	  is	  one,	  which	  produces	  the	  
lowest	  WACC	  and	  thereby	  maximising	  overall	  value	  (De	  Wet	  2006).	  	  For	  many	  respondents,	  
where	   in	   the	  capital	   structure	   they	  are	  able	   to	   invest	  matters	  a	  great	  deal	   -­‐	  given	   issue	  of	  
mandate	   and	   perception	   and	   assessment	   of	   risk.	   Some	   interviewees	   viewed	   equity	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investments	  as	  being	  materially	  riskier	  than	  investing	  in	  debt	  for	  instance.	  Highlighting	  the	  
typically	  contracted	  legal	  protections	  that	  debt	  holders	  enjoy	  over	  equity.	  Some	  respondents	  
however	  expressed	  a	   level	  of	  agnosticism	   in	   the	  decision	  to	   invest	   in	  debt	  or	  equity.	  Their	  
view	   was	   that	   given	   the	   nature	   and	   structure	   of	   RE	   project	   SPVs,	   the	   fundamental	  
counterparty	   risk	   would	   always	   be	   government	   via	   the	   Treasury	   backed-­‐PPAs.	   Typically	  
interviewees	  who	  saw	  technology	  risk	  as	  a	  pronounced	  risk	  would	  emphasise	  the	  distinction	  
between	  equity	  and	  debt	  risk/return	  profiles.	  	  One	  respondent,	  countering	  A-­‐6’s	  view	  above,	  
stated	   that	   given	   the	   inherent	   technology	   risk,	   RE	   asset	   are	   not	   a	   useful	   proxy	   for	  
government	  bonds	  as	  technology	  risk	  and	  resource	  risk	  may	  introduce	  significant	  variability	  
in	  long	  term	  cash	  flows.	  	  But	  even	  this	  respondent	  conceded	  that	  an	  investor	  would	  be	  more	  
than	  compensated	  for	  risks	  like	  technology	  and	  market	  risk	  and	  that	  over	  the	  long	  term	  we	  
should	  see	  return	  correlation	  between	  government	  bonds	  and	  RE	  assets.	  	  
4.5.1 Economic	  and	  Financial	  Characteristics	  of	  RE	  assets	  
RE	  assets	  have	  some	  discernable	  economic	  and	  financial	  features	  that	  could	  serve	  as	  useful	  
markers	   for	   investors	   considering	   how	   to	   structure	   their	   participation.	   In	   follow	   up	  
unstructured	   interviews,	   some	   respondents	   were	   asked	   what	   they	   thought	   the	   three	  
defining	   economic	   and	   financial	   features	   of	   RE	   Assets	   are.	   Kingdom	  Mugadza’s	   (personal	  
communication)	   response	   can	   be	   considered	   as	   an	   accurate	   representation	   of	   the	   overall	  
interviewee	  response,	  summarised	  as	  follows:	  
i. Long	  dated,	  contracted	  cash	  flows	  (of	  the	  back	  of	  the	  PPA)
ii. Inherent	  inflation	  hedge	  (given	  the	  tariff	  inflation	  indexation
iii. Low	  Market	  risk	  on	  revenue	  and	  cash	  flows
Mugadza	   further	   indicated	   that	   RE	   assets	   operate	   under	   a	   regulated	  monopoly,	   one	   that	  
created	  an	  effective	  barrier	  to	  entry.	  This	  latter	  feature	  has	  the	  attended	  result	  of	  ensuring	  
the	  long	  term	  integrity	  of	  RE	  project	  earnings	  and	  cash	  flows.	  These	  economic	  and	  financial	  
features	  do	  however	  differ	  depending	  at	  which	   level	   into	   the	  capital	   structure	  an	   investor	  
participates.	  
4.5.2 Debt	  
Debt	   providers,	   as	   legal	   custom	  would	   dictate,	   enjoy	   preferential	   rights	   in	   relation	   to	   say	  




return	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  equity.	  As	  A-­‐5	  (supra)	  and	  Kingdom	  Mugadza	  (supra)	  above	  indicate,	  within	  
the	  RE	  space	  (and	  infrastructure	  investments	  generally)	  the	  real	  protection	  to	  debt	  providers	  
manifests	   itself	   through	   preferential	   timing	   regarding	   cash	   flow	   distributions	   –	   both	   in	  
normal	  operating	   conditions	  and	  when	  default	  arises.	  That	   is,	  debt	  holders	  always	   receive	  
their	  cash	  flow	  distributions	  first	  and	  equity	  holders	  receive	  distributions	  only	  once	  certain	  
requirements	  in	  favour	  of	  debt	  holders	  are	  met.	  	  
	  
Figure	  5	  Main	  debt	  providers	  Rounds	  1	  -­‐	  3	  (source:	  Eberhard,	  2014)	  
Nonetheless,	   there	   is	   a	   view	  amongst	   some	   investors	   that	  debt	   financing	   into	  RE	  assets	   is	  
essentially	  a	  form	  of	  cash	  flow	  lending,	  with	  very	  little	  asset	  cover.	  	  
Johan	  Human	   from	  Alluvia	   Finance16	   (an	  actuary	  by	   training.	  Personal	   interview,)	   is	  of	   the	  
view	  that	  the	  primary	  advantage	  of	  debt	  holders	  in	  RE	  assets,	  is	  the	  cash	  cover	  requirement	  
provided	   for	  debt	  holders	  by	   the	  project	   company.	  The	  most	  prominent	   representation	  of	  
this	   cash	   cover	   requirement	   according	   to	  Human	   is	   the	  debt	   service	   cover	   ratio	   (“DSCR”).	  
DSCR	  reflects	  the	  cash	  reserves	  funded	  by	  the	  project	  company’s	  owners	  that	  are	  meant	  to	  
make	  the	  lenders	  ‘whole’	  in	  an	  event	  of	  critical	  default.	  The	  Higher	  the	  DSCR	  the	  better	  the	  
credit	  of	  the	  loan	  (Blanc-­‐Brude	  et	  al,	  2014).	  
Human	  contends	  that	  given	  the	  highly	  contracted	  nature	  of	  RE	  project	  cash	  flows,	  the	  DSCR	  
is	  usually	  contracted	  upfront	  and	  remains	  relatively	  flat	  over	  the	  project	  life.	  The	  PPA	  allows	  
for	  a	  short	   loan	  tail	   (plus	  a	   lower	  DSCR)	  arguably	  because	  the	  market	  risk	  of	  an	  RE	  asset	   is	  
mitigated	  through	  PPAs,	  Treasury	  underpins,	  etc.	  Human’s	  point	  is	  that	  debt	  providers	  into	  
RE	  projects	  seem	  to	  be	  content	  to	  enter	  into	  debt	  agreements	  that	  reflect	  relative	  certainty	  
                                                




of	  (contracted)	  cash	  flows	  whilst	  trading	  that	  feature	  for	  relatively	   lower	  DSCRs.	  Moreover	  
the	  credit	  analyst	  from	  DBSA	  indicated	  that	  RE	  assets	  typically	  have	  shorter	  debt	  tails	  (that	  
is,	  the	  duration	  of	  the	  debt	  loan	  arrangement	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  overall	  project	   life).	  The	  quicker	  
the	  debt	   is	  paid	  down	  the	   longer	   the	   tail.	   	  A	   longer	   tail	  arguably	  gives	   the	  debt	   investor	  a	  
longer	  runway	  to	  account	  for	  any	  restructures	  that	  may	  arise	  from	  default	  events	  –	  a	   long	  
tail	   is	   therefore	   seen	   as	   a	   strong	   credit	   feature.	   This	   is	   an	   interesting	   point	   by	   Human	  
because	  it	  may	  reveal	  key	  insight	  into	  how	  debt	  providers	  in	  the	  RE	  space	  perceive	  risk.	  The	  
fact	  that	  they	  are	  willing	  to	  accept	  a	  relatively	  low	  DSCR	  over	  a	  long	  dated	  period	  indicates	  
that	  they	  perceived	  risk	  of	  default	  and	  variability	  of	  cash	  flows	  possibly	  low.	  	  
	  
Human’s	   views	  are	  echoed	   in	   a	   study	   into	   the	  performance	  of	   Private	   Infrastructure	  Debt	  
undertaken	   by	   Blanc,	   Hasan	   and	   Ismail	   (2014)	   which	   found	   that	   knowing	   the	   statistical	  
distribution	   of	   the	   DSCR	   “is	   sufficient	   to	   predict	   default	   and	   compute	   distance	   to	   default	  
measures,	  allowing	  the	  development	  and	  implementation	  of	  a	  powerful	  structural	  credit	  risk	  
model	  à	  la	  Merton	  (1974)”.	  
	  
Thus	  per	  Human’s	  view,	  RE	  project	  debt	  would	  typically	  have	  a	  short	  tail	  and	  relatively	  low	  
and	  stable	  (i.e.	  non-­‐rising)	  fixed	  DSCR	  over	  the	  life	  a	  project.	  	  It’s	  worth	  reiterating	  the	  fact	  
that	  the	  contracted	  nature	  of	  RE	  asset	  cash	  flows	  mitigate	  the	  risks	  that	  may	  emanate	  from	  
the	  two	  aforementioned	  features	  of	  RE	  debt.	  Human’s	  decision	  making	  regarding	  whether	  to	  
invest	   in	  a	  RE	  project	   is	   therefore	  driven	  by	   the	  two	  considerations	   immediately	  discussed	  
here;	   what	   does	   the	   tail	   look	   like	   and	   how	   is	   the	   DSCR	   distributed	   over	   the	   life	   of	   the	  
proposed	   debt.	   In	   considering	   all	   of	   the	   above	   herein,	   Human	   and	   other	   respondents’	  
approach	   to	   debt	  will	   help	   in	   developing	   standardised	   approaches	   in	   determining	   the	   risk	  
and	  return	  profiles	  of	  RE	  assets,	  in	  this	  instance	  Human	  refers	  to	  a	  discussion	  around	  valuing	  
debt	   instruments.	   Other	   respondents	   however	   expressed	   a	   different	   view	   as	   to	   how	   the	  
perceive	  and	  ultimately	  quantify	  RE	  asset	  debt.	  	  
	  
A-­‐7,	   a	   senior	   transaction	   advisor	   at	   a	   leading	   investment	   bank	   in	   Sandton	   (personal	  
interview)	  makes	  the	  point	   (touched	  on	  by	  A-­‐5,	  supra)	   that	  whilst	   they	  view	  probability	  of	  
default	   within	   their	   RE	   debt	   book	   as	   low	   (default	   defined	   as	   a	   RE	   project	   company	  
generating	   cash	   flows	   available	   to	   debt	   “CFAD”	   that	   fail	   to	   satisfy	   the	   contracted	   DSCR	   –	  




CFAD	  and	  CFAE	  (“Cash	  Flows	  Available	  to	  Equity”).	  This	  correlation	  matters	   if	  we	  take	   into	  
account	   the	   fact	   that	   even	   on	   an	   intra-­‐basis,	   investors	   make	   asset	   allocation	   decisions	  
regarding	   whether	   they	   want	   exposure	   to	   debt	   or	   equity	   within	   RE	   project	   companies	  
(mandate	  allowing).	  And	  if	  there’s	  no	  strategic	  advantage	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  a	  diversification	  benefits,	  
then	  we	  have	  to	  ask	  what	  the	  intellectual	  basis	  of	  differentiating	  between	  debt	  and	  equity	  in	  
RE	  projects	  is.	  Human’s	  view	  is	  that	  debt	  is	  in	  effect	  mispriced.	  
	  
Unlike	   equity	   investments,	   debt	   in	   RE	   projects	   has	   a	   capped	   upside.	   As	   described	   by	   A-­‐5	  
(supra)	  and	  Human	  (supported	  by	  Eberhard’s	  2014	  findings)	  the	  differential	  in	  yield	  between	  
equity	   and	   debt	   has	   drastically	   reduced	   between	   rounds	   1	   and	   3	   of	   REIPPP,	   in	   some	  
instances	   to	   as	   low	   as	   3%.	   Human’s	   view	   is	   that	   equity	   returns	   still	   have	   the	   capacity	   to	  
outperform	  where,	  for	  example	  the	  wind	  or	  solar	  resource	  is	  better	  than	  the	  initial	  forecasts.	  
The	  benefit	  to	  debt	  holders	  in	  such	  an	  outperformance	  scenario,	  is	  that	  the	  DSCR	  is	  likely	  to	  
increase	  with	  the	  life	  of	  the	  project	  and	  the	  loan	  tail	  will	  become	  longer	  –	  both	  favourable	  
from	  a	  credit	  worth	  perspective.	  Nonetheless,	  Human’s	  view	  is	  that	  as	  debt	  de-­‐risks	  in	  a	  RE	  
project	   (in	  an	  outperformance	  scenario),	  equity	  receives	  a	  disproportionate	  amount	  of	  the	  
overall	   benefit.	   This	   is	   because	   in	   such	   an	  outperformance	   scenario,	   equity	  would	   receive	  
more	   distributions,	   that	   is,	   the	   overall	   cash	   yield	   for	   equity	   investors	   would	   increase.	  
Whereas	   for	   debt	   providers,	   the	   debt	   yield	   is	   indexed	   and	   limited	   to	   some	   external	  
component	  such	  as	  Prime	  or	  even	  inflation	  in	  the	  case	  of	  inflation-­‐linked	  bonds.	  	  	  
	  
There	  was	  however	  an	  oft-­‐repeated	  point	  of	  view	  that	  debt	  and	  equity	  instruments	  may,	  in	  
some	  instances,	  be	  looked	  at	  interchangeably	  by	  investors.	  A-­‐4	  an	  employee	  and	  director	  of	  
a	  BEE	  RE	   Investor	  (an	   investor	   in	  the	  REIPPP	  through	   its	   investments	   in	  rounds	  1-­‐3	   in	  both	  
solar	  and	  wind	  assets.	  Personal	   interview)	   indicated	  that	  he	  views	  the	  distinction	  between	  
debt	  and	  equity	  as	  ‘near-­‐superfluous’.	  From	  their	  perspective	  as	  investors,	  A-­‐4	  and	  his	  team	  
prioritise	  absolute	  or	   total	   return,	  measuring	   this	   feature	   in	  a	  variety	  of	  ways.	  Firstly,	   they	  
view	  RE	  debt	  as	  a	  fully	  realisable	  asset	  with	  a	  terminal	  value.	  Their	  business	  model	  includes	  
acquiring	   secondary	   debt	   positions	   from	   banks	   when	   projects	   reach	   financial	   close.	  
Therefore	   in	  order	  to	  measure	  the	  robustness	  of	  his	  acquisition	  purchase	  price,	   the	  return	  
metric	  A-­‐4	  emphasises	  is	  total	  return	  –	  which	  is	  a	  composition	  of	  both	  yield	  received	  from	  a	  
debt	   instrument	  and	   the	  mark	   to	  market	  adjustment	  made	  on	   the	   face	  value	  of	   the	  debt.	  	  




the	  debt).	  The	  mark	  to	  market	  adjustment	   is	  calculated	  by	  performing	  a	  net	  present	  value	  
calculation	  on	  the	  expected	  cash	   flow	  distributions	  due	  to	   the	  debt	  holder	  over	   the	   life	  of	  
the	  instrument.	  	  A-­‐4	  applies	  this	  investment	  approach	  across	  the	  capital	  structure,	  that	  is,	  his	  
investment	  approach	   is	  not	  driven	  by	   the	  nomenclature	  of	  whether	   they	   invest	   in	  debt	  or	  
equity.	   In	   other	   words	   A-­‐4	   and	   his	   team	   evaluate	   both	   debt	   and	   equity	   investments	   by	  
applying	   exactly	   the	   same	   approach	   described	   above.	   His	   view	   is	   that	   analysing	   their	  
participation	   in	   this	  manner	  normalises	  what	  he	   terms	   the	   ‘fictitious	  differences’	  between	  
debt	  and	  equity	  pricing	  in	  RE	  assets.	  	  
	  
In	  some	  respects	  A-­‐4	  echoes	  A-­‐5’s	  (supra)	  view	  that	  investors	  should	  price	  RE	  assets	  along	  a	  
blended	  curve	  composed	  of	  both	  debt	  and	  equity	  metrics.	  A-­‐4’s	  view	   is	   that	   the	  weighted	  
cost	  of	  capital	  of	  a	  project	  is	  the	  most	  optimal	  indicator	  of	  expected	  return.	  His	  view	  is	  that	  a	  
lower	   WACC	   means	   more	   cash	   flows	   available	   to	   distribute	   to	   equity,	   therefore	   greater	  
project	   equity	   value	   (see	   De	   Wet,	   2006,	   a	   similar	   argument	   is	   made	   regarding	   what	   an	  
optimal	  WACC	   looks	   like).	   	  What	  was	   interesting	   is	   that	   A-­‐4	   regards	  WACC	   as	   a	   valuation	  
metric,	  as	  opposed	  to	  merely	  using	  the	  cost	  of	  debt	  figure	  to	  calculate	  his	  carrying	  value.	  His	  
reason	  is	  that	  he	  cannot	  look	  at	  the	  value	  of	  his	  debt	  in	  isolation,	  he	  needs	  to	  take	  a	  view	  on	  
the	  entire	  capital	  structure	  in	  assessing	  risk	  and	  pricing	  of	  his	  debt	  holding.	  He	  further	  states	  
that	  as	  assets	  continue	  to	  mature	  further	   into	  their	  project	   life,	  the	  yield	  of	  both	  debt	  and	  
equity	  should	  tend	  towards	  the	  overall	  project	  SPV	  WACC.	  
	  
A-­‐5	  and	  A-­‐4	  stated	  a	  preference	  to	  use	  a	  static	  WACC	  as	  the	  discount	  rate	  in	  determining	  the	  
holding	  value	  of	  the	  debt	  investment	  they	  make	  into	  an	  RE	  asset,	  WACC	  therefore	  serves	  as	  
the	  investment	  hurdle	  rate.	  When	  calculating	  return	  he	  then	  further	  overlays	  the	  yield	  onto	  
his	   debt	   instrument	   to	   determine	   total	   or	   absolute	   return.	   Preference	   for	   using	   absolute	  
return	  as	  the	  return	  measurement	  metric	  emerged	  as	  a	  key	  finding	  in	  this	  paper.	  This	  could	  
have	  significant	   implications	   in	  establishing	   future	  benchmarking	  metrics,	  espeically	  as	   the	  
industry	   begins	   developing	   standardised	   assessment	   metrics.	   Using	   an	   absolute	   return	  
metric	  with	  debt	  instruments	  is	  slightly	  unusual	  in	  that	  debt	  pricing	  is	  usually	  determined	  by	  
assigning	   a	   coupon	   to	   a	   debt	   instruments,	   ones	   which	   in	   the	   primary	   instance,	   concern	  
themselves	  with	  measuring	  downside	  risk.	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The	   approach	   of	   A-­‐4	   and	   other	   respondents	   of	   utilising	   absolute	   return	   to	  measure	   debt	  
returns,	   as	   opposed	   to	   merely	   yield/coupon	   is	   an	   interesting	   departure	   point.	   Some	  
respondents	  argued	  strongly	  that	  it	  arguably	  allows	  investors	  to	  appropriately	  locate	  RE	  debt	  
instruments	  within	  the	  realm	  of	  fixed	  income	  asset	  classes	  (or	  similar)	  as	  opposed	  to	  looking	  
at	   debt	   purely	   as	   a	   funding	   instrument.	   Assigning	   an	   absolute	   return	   metric	   makes	   a	  
comparison	   with	   REITS	   for	   instance	   more	   plausible.	   	   Another	   important	   consideration	  
(highlighted	  by	  respondents)	  that	  arises	  with	  the	  use	  of	  absolute	  return	  as	  a	  metric	  is	  that	  it	  
allows	   institutional	   investors	   to	   appropriately	   develop	   internal	   benchmarks	   against	   which	  
they	  measure	  the	  viability	  of	  their	  investment	  
This	   is	   an	   important	   consideration	   because	  many	   interviewees	   expressed	   the	   fact	   that	   RE	  
assets	   needed	   to	   satisfy	   a	   specific	   hurdle	   rate,	   one	   that	   was	   usually	   determined	   by	  
benchmarking	  and	  quantifying	  a	  notional	  opportunity	  cost	  (i.e.	  if	  say	  an	  RE	  asset	  provided	  a	  
yield	  of	  8%	  annually	  and	  risk	  free	  bonds	  for	  instance	  could	  provide	  an	  investor	  with	  say	  5%	  
annually,	  an	  investor	  may	  use	  5%	  as	  their	  starting	  point	  in	  calculating	  a	  hurdle	  cost.	  Reason	  
being	  that	  5%	  is	  essentially	  what	  they	  would	  forgo	  by	  investing	  into	  an	  RE	  debt	  instrument,	  
i.e.	  the	  opportunity	  cost	  which	  they	  would	  need	  to	  be	  compensated	  through	  the	  provision	  of
the	   hurdle	   cost).	   For	  many	   investors	   however	   analysing	   a	   potential	   debt	   investment	   was
explicitly	  a	  matter	  of	  satisfying	  mandate	  issues.
One	   of	   the	   interviewees	   the	   researcher	   spoke	   with	   (personal	   communication)	   views	   the	  
mandate	  distinction	  as	  very	  important.	  They	  invest	  on	  behalf	  of	  one	  of	  the	  largest	  pension	  
funds	   in	   South	   Africa	   and	   he	   indicated	   that	   they	   have	   very	   strict	  mandate	   requirements,	  
which	  would	  preclude	  them	  from	  investing	  into	  non-­‐debt	  instruments	  such	  equity	  and	  mezz	  
equity.	   	   These	  mandate	   restrictions	   included	  elements	   such	   as	   tax	   considerations	   –	  which	  
made	  it	  difficult	  for	  them	  to	  invest	  in	  non-­‐debt	  instruments	  that	  would	  return	  non-­‐interest	  
income	  thus	  introducing	  the	  tax	  risk	  of	  being	  regarded	  as	  so	  called	  Hybrid	  instruments.17	  	  
4.5.3 Equity	  




RE	   assets,	   like	   other	   infrastructure	   projects,	   typically	   follow	   a	   linear	   and	   chronological	  
lifecycle	  (Bitsch	  et	  al,	  2010).	  A	  project	  is	  developed,	  constructed,	  and	  then	  operated	  over	  the	  
life	  of	  a	  PPA.	  Equity	  investment	  plays	  a	  critical	  role	  in	  financing	  RE	  assets	  in	  the	  earlier,	  riskier	  
phase	   of	   their	   lives.	   Project	   development	   is	   a	   very	   risky	   enterprise.	   Methuli	   Mbanjwa	   of	  
project	   developer	   G7	   Renewables,	   (telephonic	   conversation)	   describes	   how	   it	   took	   them	  
over	  a	  6	  years	  to	  secure	  a	  construction-­‐ready	  asset.	  Equity	  investors	  play	  a	  very	  crucial	  role,	  
effectively	   as	   first-­‐loss	   providers,	   developing	   assets	   and	   de-­‐risking	   them.	   Thus	   when	  
participants	   and	   interviewees	   speak	   of	   equity	   investing	   into	   the	   RE	   space,	   they	   could	   be	  
referring	  to	  very	  different	  investment	  propositions.	  
	  
	  
Figure	  6	  List	  of	  major	  equity	  providers	  Rounds	  1	  -­‐	  3	  (Source:	  Eberhard,	  2014)	  
	  
To	  date	   in	  the	  REIPPP,	  early	  equity	   investment	  and	  development	  has	  been	  the	  preserve	  of	  
international	  developers	  and	  private	  equity	   infrastructure	   funds	  such	  as	   Inspired	  Evolution	  
Investment	   Management	   (“IEIM”)	   (see	   Figure	   6).	   Mike	   Brooks,	   CEO	   of	   IEIM	   (telephonic	  
correspondence),	   says	   that	   the	   only	   way	   they	   could	   justify	   the	   investment	   case	   –	   that	   is	  
financing	  early	   risk	  development	  of	  RE	  assets	  –	  was	  by	  partnering	  up	  with	  Developmental	  
Funding	  Institutions	  (“DFIs”)	  such	  the	  African	  Development	  Bank	  (“AfDB”),	  who	  have	  social	  
responsibility	  imperatives	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  pure	  commercial	  outlook.	  DFIs	  therefore,	  by	  their	  
very	  nature,	  would	  be	   in	  a	  position	  to	  assume	  more	  equity	  risk.	   	  Brooks	  believes	  there’s	  a	  
economic	  opportunity	  for	  local	  DFIs	  such	  as	  the	  Industrial	  Development	  Corporation	  to	  play	  
a	  bigger	  a	   role	  as	  equity	  partners	   to	  developers.	  His	   view	   is	   that	   if	  DFIs	  don’t	  occupy	   that	  
early-­‐risk	  funding	  gap,	  it	  will	  be	  left	  to	  the	  foreign	  utilities	  to	  assume	  that	  role,	  which	  in	  his	  
view	  represents	  a	  deviation	   from	  DOE’s	   long	   term	  outlook	   for	   the	  energy	  sector	  –	  namely	  
foster	  the	  participation	  of	  local	  participants.	  	  
71 
A-­‐2,	   a	   portfolio	   manager	   in	   a	   large	   institutional	   house,	   	   (personal	   communication)	   views	  
equity	   investors	   as	   the	   lynchpin	  of	   the	  REIPPP.	  His	   view	   that	   equity	   is	  more	   resilient	   than	  
debt	   funding	  and	  by	   its	  very	  nature	  can	  absorb	  greater	   risk	   than	  debt.	   In	  some	  sense	  he’s	  
reiterating	  the	  view	  expressed	  by	  Brooks,	  that	  equity	   investment	  plays	  a	  crucial	  role	   in	  de-­‐
risking	  RE	  projects,	  elevating	   them	  from	  mere	  speculative	   investment	  propositions	   to	   fully	  
fledged	  operating	  project	  companies.	  A-­‐2’s	  view	  is	  that	  equity,	  like	  debt,	  should	  be	  priced	  on	  
the	  long	  dated	  government	  bond	  curve,	  namely	  the	  R18618.	  He	  does	  however	  highlight	  the	  
fact	   that	   he	   expects	   CFAE	   to	   show	  more	   variance	   over	   the	   long	   term	   (as	   opposed	   to	   the	  
relative	  stability	  of	  CFAD).	  This	  being	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  any	  resource	  (wind,	  solar	  efficacy)	  
variability	   is	   likely	   to	   impact	  CFAE	   first	   and	   therefore	   impact	  dividend	  distributions.	  Equity	  
doesn’t	  have	  a	  cash	  cover	  like	  the	  DSCR.	  	  A-­‐2	  is	  in	  some	  sense	  is	  countering	  A-­‐5	  and	  Human’s	  
views	  that	  equity	  cash	  flow	  yields	  will	  correlate	  highly	  with	  debt	  yields	  over	  the	  long	  term.	  
His	  view	  is	  that	  equity	  investing	  in	  RE	  usually	  assumes	  a	  highly	  specialised	  function	  and	  that	  
comes	  with	  some	  attendant	  and	  unique	  risks	  that	  debt	  investors	  are	  typically	  shielded	  from.	  	  
A-­‐6	   (personal	   communication)	   manages	   an	   equity	   infrastructure	   fund	   that	   invests	   into	  
REIPPP.	   They	   use	   absolute	   return	   as	   an	   investment	   metric	   for	   their	   equity	   fund	   and	   his	  
hurdle	  rate	  is	  a	  CPI-­‐indexed	  rate.	  	  His	  opinion	  is	  that	  equity	  investors	  should	  view	  RE	  assets	  
much	   in	   the	   same	   way	   they	   view	   listed	   property	   and	   other	   specialised	   fixed	   income	  
instruments.	  His	  states	  that	  they	  took	  a	  conscious	  decision	  not	  to	  use	  IRR	  as	  metric	  of	  overall	  
return	  because	  they	  feel	  that	  an	  IRR	  metric	  unfairly	  penalises	  the	  return	  of	  the	  RE	  asset	   in	  
the	   early	   years,	   given	   the	   large	   cash	   outflows	   during	   development	   and	   construction.	  
Whereas	   an	   absolute	   return	   metric	   effectively	   smoothens	   out	   return	   over	   the	   life	   of	   an	  
investment.	  A-­‐6	  also	  states	  that	  the	  industry	  norm	  for	  fixed	  income	  instruments	  (of	  which	  he	  
considers	  RE	  assets	   to	  be	  a	   subset)	   is	   to	  use	  an	  absolute	   return	  metric.	   Thus	  applying	   the	  
same	  metric	   to	   RE	   assets	   would	  make	   it	   easier	   for	   investors	   to	   compare	   and	   analyse	   RE	  
assets	  off	  an	  acceptable	  benchmark.	  	  
A-­‐6	  does	  however	  make	   the	  point,	  one	  echoed	  by	  other	   respondents,	   that	   investment	  via	  
equity	   into	   the	   RE	   space	   is	   itself	   quite	   ‘heterogeneous’.	   He	   believes	   that	   you	   need	   two	  
different	  types	  of	  equity	  products	  into	  RE	  assets.	  Firstly,	  you	  need	  the	  kind	  of	  ‘patient’	  equity	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capital	  that	  A-­‐2	  refers	  to	  above,	  typically	  DFI	  development	  capital.	  This	  type	  of	  equity	  would	  
be	  made	   available	   on	   a	   termed	   investment	   horizon,	   that	   is,	   it	  would	   be	   released	   back	   to	  
investors	  upon	  the	  RE	  project	  reaching	  certain	  pre-­‐agree	  milestones.	  A-­‐6’s	  view	  is	  that	  the	  
early	  risk	  capital	  would	  then	  develop	  into	  its	  own	  specialised	  subset,	  attracting	  a	  particular	  
type	  of	  equity	  investor,	  one	  looking	  to	  take	  high	  risk	  for	  high	  reward.	  
The	  other	  type	  of	  equity	  investment	  A-­‐6	  envisages,	  would	  participate	  further	  into	  the	  project	  
life.	   Participating	   from	  what	   is	   termed	   financial	   close	   (i.e.	   all	   permits	  have	  been	  obtained,	  
legal	   agreements	   including	   funding	   agreements	   have	   been	   agreed	   to,	   all	   project	   partners	  
appointed	  and	  contracted	  and	  all	  that	  remains	   is	  for	  the	  funding	  to	  be	  deployed	  to	  enable	  
construction).	  This	  second	  type	  of	  equity	   investment	  would	  suit	  more	  risk	  averse	   investors	  
unwilling	  or	  unable	  to	  take	  development	  and	  construction	  risk.	  	  
According	   to	   A-­‐6	   most	   participating	   institutional	   equity	   investors	   do	   however	   participate	  
right	  across	   the	   life	  of	   the	  project.	   In	  his	   view	   this	   is	   sub-­‐optimal	  because	   it	  distorts	  asset	  
pricing	  –	  given	  the	  very	  different	  nature	  of	  early	  and	  late(r)	  equity	  risk.	  	  This	  in	  turn	  makes	  it	  
very	   difficult	   to	   develop	   the	   necessary	   nomenclature	   and	   benchmarking	   regarding	   the	  
various	  modes	  of	  investing.	  
Another	   key	   theme	   that	   emerged	   form	   interviewees	  was	   the	   restriction	   around	   re-­‐sale	  of	  
equity	  positions	  in	  RE	  Assets	  (DOE	  2012).	  This	  restriction	  is	  contained	  in	  what	  is	  referred	  to	  
as	   the	   Implementation	  Agreement,	   an	   agreement	   entered	   into	   between	   the	  DOE	   and	   the	  
various	  RE	  project	   companies.	   This	   agreement	   covers	   the	  obligations	   and	   responsibility	   of	  
both	   the	   DOE	   and	   the	   project	   SPV	   over	   the	   lifetime	   of	   the	   PPA.	   The	   agreement	   is	   also	  
standardised	  across	  all	  REIPPP	  companies.	  	  	  	  
The	  equity	  lock-­‐in	  clause	  prevents	  equity	  investors	  from	  disposing	  their	  equity	  position	  in	  an	  
RE	  Assets	   at	   anytime	  prior	   to	   the	   expiration	  of	   three	   years	   post	   operation	  date	  of	   the	  RE	  
asset.	  Given	  the	  relatively	  long	  development	  cycle	  of	  RE	  assets,	  a	  three-­‐year	  lock	  is	  in	  effect	  
longer	  than	  three	  years.	  The	  lock-­‐in	  is	  only	  measured	  from	  end	  construction/operating	  date,	  
not	  accounting	  for	  the	  often	  many	  years	  developers	  spend	  in	  bringing	  a	  project	  to	  stream.	  
One	   respondent	   indicated	   that	   they	   typically	   develop	   assets	   over	   a	   three	   to	   five	   year	  
horizon.	   An	   equity	   lock-­‐in	   therefore	  makes	   their	   investment	   horizon	   a	  minimum	  of	   six	   to	  
eight	  years.	  Which	  is	  not	  ideal	  for	  them.	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Most	  of	   the	   interviewees	  expressed	  a	   view	   that	   they	  would	  be	   long	   term	   investors	   in	   the	  
REIPPP,	  but	  simultaneously	  expressed	  concern	  at	  their	  inability	  to	  dispose	  the	  equity	  quickly	  
if	   the	   need	   arose.	   Obakeng	   Moloabi	   (personal	   communication)	   indicated	   that	   his	  
organisation	   invests	   as	   a	   BEE	   investor.	   The	   implementation	   agreement	   has	   an	   additional	  
layer	  of	  restriction	  (equity	  lock	  in)	  for	  BEE	  equity.	  Many	  other	  respondents	  echoed	  his	  view	  
that	   a	   three	   year	   lock-­‐in	   could	   be	   detrimental	   to	   their	   equity	   valuations.	   The	   relationship	  
between	   valuation	   and	   asset	   liquidity	   is	   well	   studied	   and	   well	   established	   (Easley	   and	  
O’Hara,	   2010).	   An	   interviewee,	   working	   as	   a	   senior	   transaction	   advisor	   at	   Absa	   (personal	  
communication)	   echoed	   a	   view	   expressed	   by	   some	   other	   participants,	   namely	   that	   the	  
equity-­‐lock	   in	  may	  prove	   to	  be	  a	  problem	  for	   investors	   that	  need	   to	  mark	   to	  market	   their	  
equity	   holding	   on	   a	   continuous	   basis	   (eg:	   liability	   driven	   investors)	   as	   the	   lock	   in	   could	  
introduce	  some	  distortions	  in	  determining	  the	  value	  of	  the	  asset.	  
Interviewees	  across	  the	  stream,	  agreed	  that	  equity	  finance	  is	  a	  distinct	  form	  of	  investment.	  
They	  however	  differ	   in	  how	  they	  perceive	  risk	  and	  return	  benchmarking	  when	   it	  comes	  to	  
debt	   and	   equity.	   What	   is	   clear	   is	   that	   there	   is	   some	   developing	   consensuses,	   albeit	  
developing	  slowly.	  Investors	  seem	  to	  indicate	  a	  preference	  for	  absolute	  return	  as	  the	  return	  
metric	   for	  measuring	   retun	  performance	  of	  RE	  assets.	  Many	   investors	   view	  RE	  assets	  as	  a	  
form	  of	  income	  asset	  and	  generally	  feel	  that	  the	  market	  risk	  that	  would	  be	  associated	  with	  
tariffs	   and	   Eskom	   by	   extension	   are	   mitigated	   via	   the	   various	   contractual	   undertakings	  




5 RESEARCH	  CONCLUSIONS	  
	  
The	   research	   set	  out	   to	  examine	   the	   suitability	  of	  RE	  assets	   for	   South	  African	   institutional	  
investors.	   Interviewees	   were	   mainly	   subject	   matter	   experts	   on	   the	   issue	   of	   REIPPP	   and	  
therefore	   provided	   key	   insights	   through	   a	   series	   of	   structured	   and	   semi-­‐structured	  
interviews.	   There	   is	   very	   little	   academic	  material	   on	   this	   particular	   context	   within	   a	   local	  
context.	  The	   implications	  of	  this	  study	  are	  therefore	  crucial	   in	  helping	  set	  the	  basis	  for	  the	  
development	  of	  future	  theories	  around	  this	  and	  related	  topics.	  
	  
Interview	  discussions	  and	  review	  of	  other	  material	  revealed	  key	  themes,	  which	  allowed	  the	  
researcher	  to	  discern	  some	  key	  findings:	  
	  
Firstly,	  there’s	  a	  cautious	  but	  emerging	  consensus	  that	  the	  economic	  and	  financial	  features	  
of	   RE	   assets	   could	  make	   them	   suitable	   for	   consideration	   in	   asset	   class	   allocations.	  Many	  
respondents	   expressed	   the	   view	   that	   RE	   assets	   could	   both	   reduce	   volatility	   within	   their	  
existing	   portfolios	   and	   increase	   expected	   return:	   two	   key	   features	   well	   established	   in	  
modern	  portfolio	   literature.	   	  A	  key	  caveat	   to	   this	   last	  point	   is	   that	   interviewees	  viewed	  RE	  
assets	  as	  a	  good	  proxy	  for	  other	  fixed	  income	  assets	  such	  as	  property	  and	  government	  bonds	  
which	   could	   indicate	   that	   where	   there	   are	   some	   diversification	   benefits	   through	   the	  
inclusion	   of	   RE	   assets	   into	   a	   portfolio,	   they	   could	   be	   limited	   if	   RE	   assets	  merely	   correlate	  
existing	  asset	  class	  subsets	  such	  as	  listed	  equities.	  	  
	  
It	  was	  found	  in	  the	  literature	  review	  and	  through	  data	  collected	  through	  various	  interviews	  
that	   the	   notion	   of	   what	   constitutes	   an	   asset	   class	   remains	   highly	   contested.	   So	   investors	  
typically	  defaulted	  to	  what	  looks	  familiar.	  
	  
As	  one	   respondent	  put	   it:	   “finding	   suitable	  proxies	   is	   useful	   because	   it	   helps	   to	  demystify	  
what	  is	  otherwise	  a	  new	  asset	  class”.	  Many	  respondents	  defaulted	  to	  categorising	  RE	  assets	  
–	  with	  their	  long	  dated	  cash	  flow	  profiles,	  sovereign	  underpin	  –	  a	  subset	  of	  the	  fixed	  income	  
universe.	   	   Critically	   many	   investors	   included	   in	   the	   interviews	   expected	   a	   healthy	  
relationship	  between	  risk	  and	  return	  of	  RE	  assets.	  A	  key,	  often-­‐repeated	  view	  was	  that	  RE	  
assets	  could	  serve	  as	  an	  attractive	  proxy	  on	  government	  bonds	  with	  a	  yield	  ratchet.	  In	  other	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words	   similar	   risk	   to	   government	  bonds,	   but	   providing	   a	  higher	  overall	   return,	   a	   so-­‐called	  
yield	  pick-­‐up.	  
Secondly	   there	   was	   a	   view	   amongst	   interviewees	   that	   one	   had	   to	   approach	   the	   issue	   of	  
‘suitability’	  and	  ‘viability’	  from	  different	  points	  of	  view.	  As	  some	  interviewees	  indicated,	  RE	  
assets	  could	  be	  deemed	  to	  be	  economically	  and	   financially	  viable	   from	  an	  asset	  allocation	  
perspective	   but	   still	   fail	   to	   be	   allocated	   because	   of	   mandate	   issues.	   	   ‘Mandate’,	   as	   used	  
within	  this	  context,	  described	  the	  regulatory	  and	  internal	  policy	  considerations	  that	  had	  to	  
be	   factored	   into	   any	   investment	   decision	   process.	   	   A	   key	   theme	   around	   establishing	   a	  
common	  set	  of	  nomenclature	  emerged	  in	  the	  data	  collection	  process.	  
Thirdly,	   respondents	   overwhelmingly	   expressed	   confidence	   in	   DOE’s	   (and	   by	   extension	  
Treasury)	   commitment	   to	   the	   REIPPP.	   This	   commitment	   was	   deemed	   as	   very	   critical	   to	  
investors	  looking	  at	  developing	  their	  long-­‐term	  outlook	  regarding	  viability	  of	  the	  REIPPP.	  The	  
explicit	  and	  most	   immediate	  benefit	  of	  government	  backing	  was	   identified	  as	  the	  Treasury	  
provided	  underpin.	  Moreover,	  given	  South	  Africa’s	  energy	  requirements,	  most	  participants	  
viewed	  government’s	  commitment	  to	  REIPPP	  as	  long	  term	  and	  sustained.	  	  
Lastly,	   regarding	   the	   challenges	   of	   investing	   into	   RE	   assets,	   there	   was	   a	   view	   amongst	  
interviewees	   that	   REIPPP	   remained	   untested	   and	   therefore	   all	   discussion	   and	   analysis	  
around	   return	   and	   risk	   was	   highly	   conditional.	   Some	   investors	   rejected	   the	   ‘government	  
proxy’	   analogy	   in	   analysing	   RE	   assets,	   citing	   the	   variability	   on	   earnings	   that	   aspects	   like	  
technology	  and	  resource	  risk	  may	  bring	  to	  bear.	  	  
Once	  again,	   this	   research	  was	   limited	   to	  a	   study	  of	  DOE	  policy,	   applicable	   legislations	  and	  
interviewee	   responses.	   It’s	   real	   use	   is	   not	   in	   offering	  hard,	   settled	   conclusions,	   but	   rather	  
helping	  formulate	  theory-­‐building	  markers	  which	  may	  be	  of	  use	  to	  future	  researchers	  on	  this	  
topic.	   As	   mentioned	   above,	   although	   the	   interviewees	   represent	   the	   leading	   industry	  
thinkers	  on	  renewable	  energy	  investing	  in	  South	  Africa,	  the	  pool	  of	  interviewees	  represents	  
a	  relatively	  small	  sample	  size.	  The	  reasons	  for	  this	  could	  be	  directly	  attributable	  to	  the	  fact	  
that	  there	  are	  very	  few	  people	  in	  South	  Africa	  with	  the	  relevant	  knowledge	  in	  infrastructure	  




investors,	   hopefully	   further	   demystifying	   a	   sector	   that	   could	   be	   a	   lynchpin	   of	   the	   South	  
African	  economy	  for	  some	  time	  to	  come.	  
	  
6 RECOMMENDATIONS	  FOR	  FUTURE	  RESEARCH	  
	  
The	   theoretical	   literature	   and	   framework	   regarding	   renewable	   energy	   investing	   in	   South	  
Africa	  is	  very	  limited.	  As	  mentioned	  above	  this	  paper	  could	  be	  useful	  to	  both	  academic	  and	  
industry	  practitioners.	  The	  researcher	  believes	  that	  the	  research	  direction	  could	  be	  extended	  
to	  the	  study	  of	   local	  asset	  allocation	  practice	  and	  considerations.	  There	   is	  dearth	  on	  South	  
African	   infrastructure	   financing	   and	   investments	   generally,	   and	   renewable	   energy	   in	  
particular.	  Moreover,	   project	   finance	   as	   financing	   technique	   and	   discipline	  within	   a	   South	  
African	   context	   has	   receive	   relatively	   scant	   attention	   in	   academic	  writing.	   This	   could	   be	   a	  
very	  useful	  area	  of	  further	  study.	  
	  
Other	   important	   factors	   to	   consider	   in	   future	   research	   relate	   to	   a	   study	   in	   what	   would	  
constitute	   the	   optimal	   capital	   structure	   for	   project	   financing	   large	   scale	   utility	   projects	   in	  
South	   Africa.	   Many	   respondents	   spoke	   of	   how	   issues	   around	   capital	   structure	   make-­‐up	  
influenced	   their	   outlook	   of	   RE	   asset	   investing.	   This	   could	   be	   an	   interesting	   area	   of	   future	  
research.	  
	  
The	   limitations	   associated	  with	   this	   research	  disallowed	   the	   researcher	   from	  conducting	   a	  
thorough	  quantitative	  study	  on	  both	  the	  return	  and	  risk	  profile	  of	  RE	  assets.	  An	  interesting	  
point	   that	   arose	   during	   the	   course	   of	   this	   research	   was	   the	   potential	   usefulness	   of	  
appropriate	   stochastic	  models	   in	   developing	   both	   pricing	   and	   risk	  models.	   The	   researcher	  
touches	  on	  the	  study	  conducted	  by	  Blanc-­‐Brude,	  Hasan	  and	  Ismail	   (2014),	  which	  sought	  to	  
develop	   robust	   valuation	   and	   risk	   measurement	   frameworks	   for	   investing	   in	   particularly	  
unlisted	  infrastructure.	  	  
With	  the	  development	  of	  the	  right	  analytical	  tools	  many	  of	  the	  limitations	  imposed	  on	  this	  
particular	  research	  may	  be	  resolved.	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APPENDICES	  
Appendix	  1:	  Structured	  Interview	  Questions	  
1. How	  are	   you	   and	   /or	   your	   organisation	   involved	   in	   the	   REIPPP	   program	  and	  what	   is	   your
level	  of	  seniority	  in	  your	  respective	  organisation?
1.1. What	  are	  your	  overall	  perceptions	  of	  the	  REIPPP	  program?
1.2. Does	  your	  organisation	  have	  a	  formal	  mandate,	  policy	  of	  any	  kind	  to	  participate	  in	  the
REIPPP	  program,	  either	  as	  an	  investor,	  advisor	  or	  in	  any	  other	  tangible	  manner?	  
2. Do	   you	   consider	   RE	   assets	   as	   representing	   a	   distinct	   asset	   class,	   with	   their	   own	   set	   of
economic	  and	  financial	  features?
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2.1. What	  would	  you	  describe	  as	  the	  main	  economic	  and	  financial	  features	  of	  RE	  assets?	  
2.2. How	   would	   measure	   return	   and	   risk	   when	   considering	   your	   participation	   in	   REIPPP	  
program.	  What	  metrics	  would	  rely	  on	  and	  how	  are	  they	  derived?	  
2.3. What	  would	   you	   consider	   to	   be	   suitable	   asset	   proxies	   for	   RE	   assets?	   In	   other	   words	  
which	  other	   investable	   assets	  would	   you	   consider	   similar	   to	  RE	  assets,	   do	   you	  expect	  
correlation	  with	  said	  asset(s)	  and	  RE	  assets	  over	  the	  long	  term,	  
2.4. What	  do	  you	  believe	  is	  the	  most	  optimal	  project	  structure	  for	  RE	  assets?	  	  
2.5. Does	  the	  make-­‐up	  and	  nature	  of	  a	  project’s	  capital	  structure	  have	  any	  bearing	  on	  how	  
you	  assess	  a	  project	  company’s	  economic	  and	  financial	  outlook?	  
3. What	   would	   you	   highlight	   as	   the	   major	   challenges	   and	   major	   financial	   benefits	   that	   you
and/or	  your	  organisation	  face	  as	  a	  stakeholder	  in	  the	  REIPPP?
3.1. Do	  you	  feel	  that	  the	  challenges	  outweigh	  the	  potential	  financial	  benefits,	  or	  vice	  versa?
3.2. Do	  you	  feel	  that	  there	   is	  a	  healthy	  relationship	  between	  risk	  and	  reward	  as	  a	  0REIPPP
program	  participant	  
3.3. What	  is	  your	  view	  of	  the	  project	  finance	  model	  for	  RE	  assets?	  What	  do	  you	  think	  of	  any	  
other	  financing	  models	  you	  may	  have	  encountered	  and	  what	  are	  the	  trends?	  
3.4. Does	   the	   legal	   structure	  of	  an	  RE	  project	   influence	  your	  ultimate	  perception	  of	  either	  
the	  benefits	  and/or	  risks	  you	  describe	  above	  
4. How	  do	  you	  and/or	  your	  organisation	  view	  the	  long-­‐term	  prospects	  of	  REIPPP?
4.1. How	  well	  do	  you	   feel	   that	  you	  or	  your	  organisation	  currently	  understands	   the	  REIPPP
program?	  
4.2. Would	   consider	   your	   participation	   in	   REIPPP	   program	   to	   have	   been	   successful	   or	  
otherwise,	  to	  date?	  
Appendix	  2	  
Name	   Institution	  and	  Designation	   Type	  
Bassy	  Makwane	   Exco	  Member:	  IDC	   Investor	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Mpho	  Makwane	   Eskom:	  Former	  Chairperson	   Developer	  
Tafadzwa	  Mhlanga	   Partner:	  Tirisano	  Renewables	   Private	  Equity	  
A-­‐5	   Senior	  Analyst:	  A	  large	  fixed	  income	  house	   Institutional	  Investor	  
A-­‐3	   Senior	  Portfolio	  Manager:	  Sanlam	   Institutional	  Investor	  
Steve	  Faure	   Senior	  Associate:	  Inspired	   Private	  Equity	  
A-­‐6	   Portfolio	   Manager:	   A	   large	   CPT	   based	  institutional	  investor	  
Institutional	  
Investor	  
A-­‐2	   PM/MD:	  Fix	  Income	  Co.	   Investor	  
Obakeng	  Moloabi	   CEO:	  Pele	  Energy	  Group	   Developer	  
Senior	  Dealmaker	   PIC	   Institutional	  Investor	  
Lawyer	   Leading	  Law	  Firm	  -­‐	  JHB	   Attorney	  Proj	  
Portfolio	  Manager	   Allan	  Gray	   Institutional	  Investor	  
Old	  Mutual	   Old	  Mutual	   Institutional	  Investor	  
Hlompo	  Ntoi	   Senior	  Dealmaker	  AIIM	   Private	  Equity	  
Lawyer	   Leading	  Law	  Firm	  -­‐	  JHB	   Attorney:	   Project	  Finance	  
A-­‐7	   Proj	  Finance	  Deal	  Team	  leader	   Banker	  
Mike	  Brooks	   CEO	  Inspired	   Private	  Equity	  
A-­‐1	   Head:	  IPP	  Office	  DOE	   Regulator	  
Balebetse	  Leuta	   Allan	  Ovary	   Attorney:	   Project	  Finance	  
Kingdom	  Mugadza	   Old	  Mutual	   Private	  Equity	  
A-­‐4	   CEO:	  BEE	  RE	  Investor	   Developer	  
Gqi	  Raoleka	   Director:	  Pele	   developer	  
Mark	  Tanton	   CEO:	  Red	  Cap	   developer	  
Methuli	  Mbanjwa	   Project	  Developer:	  G7	   developer	  
Consultant	   DOE	   regulator	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Senioe	   Credit	  
Analyst	   Credit:	  Analyst	  DBSA	  
Institutional	  
Investor	  
Colin	  Matlala	   CEO:	  Lebone	  Engineering	   Consultant/EPC	  
